

Miguel Marín-Bosch

Votes in the UN General Assembly

Kluwer Law International

Votes in the UN General Assembly

by
Miguel Marín-Bosch

KLUWER LAW INTERNATIONAL
THE HAGUE/LONDON/BOSTON

All Rights Reserved
© 1998 Kluwer Law International

For *Erica*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendixes	ix
Preface	xi
Abbreviations and acronyms	xiii
Tables	xv
Figures	xvii
Introduction	1

PART ONE THE STAGE AND THE ACTORS

1. The international community's most representative forum	5
A universal organization	
The rules of the game	
The regional groups	
The UN budget	
The veto (and other privileges) beyond the Security Council	
Regarding majorities and minorities	
Overwhelming, automatic and meaningless majorities	
A 180 degree change	
Consensus...that makes sense	
2. A half-century of debates	31
An ever-heavier agenda	
Consistency and contradictions	
'Twixt the cup and the lip: Cyprus and French nuclear testing	
Korea: two contradictory resolutions	
The repeal of resolutions: the two cases	
The difficult questions	
A perennial item: <i>apartheid</i>	
The Middle East: mission impossible?	
The fundamental issues	
A farewell to colonies: the weight of the files	
Human rights: a problem of definition	
The United Nations and human rights	
Economic inequalities	
The arms race	
The struggle for the disarmament agenda	

- The codes of conduct
- The Organization's functioning
 - The Secretary-General: more secretary than general
 - The Security Council and Charter review
 - The representation of China
 - 1960: the consolidation of a bi-polar world
 - 1990: the end of an era
 - The role of the UN

PART TWO

VOTING PATTERNS

3. The resolutions and the votes <ul style="list-style-type: none"> An ocean of resolutions The negative votes Resolutions adopted by a vote <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Resolutions with negative votes Opposition to resolutions has come from different quarters The gang of six (and later five) The vetoes in the Security Council Triple, double and single rejections <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1946–1960: the Organization, decolonization and Southern Africa 1961–1975: Southern Africa, decolonization and disarmament 1976–1990: the Middle East and disarmament 1991–1997: a new era? 	91
4. Coincidences and discrepancies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The tools of analysis General trends, 1946–1996 Some signposts The five stages <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The early years: 1946–1960 The emergence of a majority, 1961–1970 The consolidation of the Afro-Asian group, 1971–1980 The rise of the Third World, 1981–1988 A transitional era, 1989–1996 The contours of a new agenda 	117
Epilogue	163
Appendixes	173
Index	215

LIST OF APPENDIXES

- I. List of UN Member States
- II. Non-self-governing territories enumerated by the General Assembly
- III. Total General Assembly resolutions by session: regular, special (S) and emergency (E)
- IV. List of General Assembly resolutions adopted by a recorded vote
- V. General Assembly resolutions adopted with negative votes
- VI. Negative votes cast by UN Member States against General Assembly resolutions, 1946–1996
- VII. Subjects of resolutions adopted by a recorded vote
- VIII Coincidence Index since 1989

PREFACE

The United Nations has been a constant in my personal and professional life. In 1946 my father was invited to join the world organization and for a quarter of a century he was an international civil servant. While still in short pants I visited the UN's provisional offices at Lake Success (in the outskirts of New York City) and later I went quite frequently to the splendid new Headquarters in Manhattan. In my house one spoke often and one spoke well of the United Nations.

My interest in multilateral diplomacy which the UN embodies grew after 1971 when, a year after entering the Mexican Foreign Service, I was posted to the Permanent Mission to international organizations in Geneva. It was to be the first of three tours there (1971–1974, 1977–1978 and 1989–1995). I served twice at the Mission in New York (1975 and 1983–1988). And it was my good fortune to know Isidro Fabela and Luis Padilla Nervo and to work closely with two other convinced internationalists: Alfonso García Robles and Jorge Castañeda.

Multilateral diplomacy can be very frustrating. Progress is slow and the fronts one has to cover are varied and difficult. But to me it is fascinating: first, because I have been lucky enough to represent a country whose foreign policy is relatively consistent and therefore widely respected and, second, because the dynamics of multilateral relations are still being defined. In bilateral relations the differences or asymmetries between countries are always evident (often felt and at times resented). In the multilateral world those differences also appear but there is a different, more egalitarian relationship among States. And the UN General Assembly is by definition the international community's most representative and egalitarian forum. To put it differently, a great virtue of the UN is that it allows us to dream.

For over twenty-five years I attended the autumn ritual of the General Assembly in New York. And I have witnessed how the UN has been used and abused by individual countries or groups of countries. It has had its good times and its not so good times. It had (and still has) its defenders and its detractors. There are those who believe in the UN and those who do not. I believe in the United Nations.

The idea for this study emerged in the mid-eighties when I was accredited as Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN in New York. It was a time of furious attacks against the Organization by some United States officials and institutions, especially the ultra-right Heritage Foundation.

The Executive Branch of the United States is required to submit an annual report to Congress on the "behavior" of countries at the United Nations, that is, how they conduct themselves in relation to US foreign policy objec-

tives and interests. To fulfill that requirement, the State Department developed the practice of classifying countries according to the degree of coincidence with US votes in the General Assembly.

For years, votes cast in the General Assembly have been compared and voting patterns analyzed. The organization Planetary Citizens, for example, identified some twenty resolutions, decided what was the “correct” vote (in favor, against or abstention) in light of certain “world order values” (especially those aimed at strengthening multilateral action) and graded countries accordingly.

For its part, the United States chose ten resolutions of “special interest” and classified countries according to their coincidence with it. This or that country was a friend because in eight or nine of those votes it coincided with the United States. Not one, by the way, coincided in all ten votes with the United States which often found itself alone pressing the red button.

It was precisely to document US isolation in the Assembly that I began to study the negative votes cast since 1946. The initial results of my research appeared in an article entitled “How nations vote in the General Assembly of the United Nations”, published in *International Organization* in the autumn of 1987. Then I became interested in the comparison of the votes of UN Members. The next step was to feed into a computer all the registered votes in the General Assembly Plenary and to design a program to compare the voting patterns of Member States. This produced the “coincidence index” that served as the basis for part of my analysis of how countries vote in the Assembly. With rare exceptions, States do not vote in favor of or against one another; they vote in favor of certain causes and, in general, according to the principles and purposes enshrined in the UN Charter.

In this book I have omitted the academic apparatus (footnotes, bibliography, etc.) which usually accompanies studies such as this one. Almost all bibliographical references are to UN documents which are identified by letters: A/..., in the case of the General Assembly, and S/..., for the Security Council. These are verbatim records (PV. or *procès-verbaux*) of the meetings and official documents, including the texts of resolutions and decisions.

Until 1975 Assembly documents were numbered consecutively. Thus, for example, resolutions were identified by their number and, in parenthesis in Roman numerals, by the session in which they were adopted. The last one was 3541 (XXX). Since 1976, the abbreviations were simplified in such a way that the first resolution of the thirty-first session was 31/1.

This book was written in both English and Spanish. This edition is a revised and abridged version of the text that first appeared in Mexico in 1994, *Votos y vetos en la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas*.

Barcelona, October 1997

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
BWC	Biological Weapons Convention (1972)
CD	Conference on Disarmament
CI	Coincidence Index used in this study
COPUOS	Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
CTBT	Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (1996)
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention (1992)
Dem.	Democratic
DIESA	UN Department of International Economic and Social Affairs
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
DR	Democratic Republic
EEC	European Economic Community
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
ENMOD	Environmental Modification Convention (1976)
EU	European Union
FS	Federated States
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDR	German Democratic Republic
Grena.	Grenadines
Group of 7	Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and US
Group of 77	Group of developing countries (originally 77 in number)
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICJ	International Court of Justice
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Area
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	Non-governmental organizations
NNWS	Non-nuclear-weapon States
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NWS	Nuclear-weapon States
NZ	New Zealand
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
P-5	Five permanent members of the UN Security Council
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PNEs	Peaceful nuclear explosions
PDR	People's Democratic Republic
PTBT	Partial Test-Ban Treaty (1963)
Rep.	Republic
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
TFYR	The Former Yugoslav Republic
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UAR	United Arab Republic
UK	United Kingdom

UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	UN Conference on Trade and Development
UNDOF	UN Disengagement Observer Force
UNDP	UN Development Program
UNDRO	UN Disaster Relief Organization
UNEP	UN Environment Programme
UNEF	UN Emergency Force
UNIDIR	UN Institute for Disarmament Research
UNIDO	UN Industrial Development Organization
UNIFIL	UN Interim Force in Lebanon
UNRWA	UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
UNSOF	UN Special Observer Force
UR	United Republic
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO	World Trade Organization

TABLES

- 1.1 Evolution of UN membership, 1945–1997
- 1.2 Independent countries and UN Members in 1945 and 1997
- 1.3 Regional origin of UN membership, 1946–1997
- 1.4 Administering or colonial Power of countries that gained their Independence since 1946 and decade of their admission to the UN
- 1.5 Regional groups in the United Nations, 1945–1997
- 1.6 Regional origin of the President of the General Assembly, 1946–1995
- 1.7 Composition of the Security Council in 1996
- 1.8 Regional distribution of the seats in ECOSOC
- 1.9 The UN annual regular budget
- 1.10 The ten principal contributors to the UN regular budget (percent)
- 1.11 Index of UN cost per inhabitant in 1994
- 2.1 Allocation of items to the Main Committees
- 2.2 The votes on the question of Cyprus in 1957
- 2.3 The votes on French nuclear testing in 1995
- 2.4 The votes on the question of Korea in 1975
- 2.5 The votes on the question of Spain (1946 and 1950)
- 2.6 The votes on “Zionism is racism” (1975 and 1991)
- 2.7 UN Trusteeship agreements
- 2.8 Individuals who have held the post of Secretary-General
- 2.9 The votes on the representation of China in the UN
- 3.1 General Assembly resolutions: five-year totals, 1946–1996
- 3.2 Resolutions adopted upon recommendation of the Main Committees
- 3.3 Yearly average total votes on General Assembly resolutions
- 3.4 Resolutions with negative votes, 1946–1996
- 3.5 Subjects of resolutions adopted with 30 or more negative votes, 1946–1996
- 3.6 Negative votes of the UN’s 51 Original Members, 1946–1996
- 3.7 Evolution of triple, double and single negative votes, 1946–1996
- 3.8 Vetoes in the Security Council, 1946–1997
- 3.9 Subjects of General Assembly resolutions adopted with one, two and three negative votes, 1946–1996
- 3.10 Subjects of General Assembly resolutions adopted with one, two and three negative votes, 1946–1996 (percent)
- 3.11 Participation in over ten percent of the rejections of General Assembly resolutions adopted with one, two and three negative votes, 1946–1996 (percent)
- 3.12 Negative votes cast by UN Members on General Assembly resolutions adopted with one, two or three votes against: total by quinquennium
- 4.1 Coincidence of US votes with the UK and the USSR: a comparison of the results using two different methods
- 4.2 The median of the Coincidence Index of UN Members and their regional groups, 1946–1996
- 4.3 Impact of issues on coincidence among UN Members, 1946–1996
- 4.4 The median of the Coincidence Index among all UN Members by subjects,

1946–1996

- 4.5 The median of the Coincidence Index of the G-77 by subjects, 1946–1996
- 4.6 The median of the Coincidence Index of the group of Western Europe and Others by subjects, 1946–1996
- 4.7 Subjects of resolutions adopted by a recorded vote, 1946–1996
- 4.8 Southern Africa: CI between South Africa and UN Members, 1946–1974
- 4.9 The ten percent of UN Members closest to the United States, 1946–1996
- 4.10 The ten percent of UN Members furthest from the United States, 1946–1996
- 4.11 The United States and Israel, 1946–1996
- 4.12 The Middle East: CI between Israel and the other UN Members, 1946–1996
- 4.13 The United Kingdom's trans-Atlantic tension: five-year CI with Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United States, 1946–1996
- 4.14 The median of the Coincidence Index of European Union members by subjects, 1946–1996
- 4.15 CI of the permanent members of the Security Council, 1946–1996
- 4.16 CI: human rights, 1946–1996
- 4.17 CI: The colonies, 1946–1996
- 4.18 The transition: Coincidence Index of the permanent members of the Security Council, 1986–1996
- 4.19 The transition in Eastern Europe: CI of 1988 compared to 1989 and 1990
- 4.20 The divisive impact of General Assembly agenda items, 1946–1996

FIGURES

- 1.1 Evolution of UN membership, 1945–1997
- 3.1 Yearly total General Assembly resolutions, 1946–1996
- 3.2 General Assembly resolutions: five-year average, 1946–1996
- 3.3 General Assembly resolutions with negative votes (yearly average)
- 4.1 The median of the Coincidence Index among all UN Members, 1946–1996
- 4.2 The yearly median of the Coincidence Index among UN Members, 1946–1996
- 4.3 The median of the developing countries, 1946–1996
- 4.4 Resolutions adopted by a vote and by a recorded vote, 1946–1996
- 4.5 The yearly IC median of the United States and UN Members, 1946–1996
- 4.6 The median of Western European Group and European Union, 1946–1996
- 4.7 The Coincidence Index and median of the US and USSR, 1946–1996
- 4.8 Coincidence among UN Member States in the voting towards the mid-eighties
- 4.9 Evolution of the majority group within the General Assembly between the seventies and eighties

INTRODUCTION

For five decades the United Nations General Assembly has been meeting every year in accordance with the provisions of the Organization's Charter, an uninterrupted chain of sessions that is unprecedented in the short history of international organizations. Aside from the regular sessions, the Charter also empowers the Secretary-General to convene, upon request from the Security Council or a majority of Members States, the General Assembly in special or emergency session (to be held within twenty-four hours).

The General Assembly is the most representative forum of the international community. Unlike the Security Council, all of its members have the same rights and privileges and in it there is no State with a veto power. Unlike the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, the Assembly's membership is not restricted. All of the Organization's Members (185 in 1997) are represented in it. Moreover, unlike other intergovernmental fora and agencies, the Assembly can discuss any international question. And its agenda includes a wide variety of issues, ranging from international security, disarmament, co-operation for economic development, decolonization and the codification of International Law to specific social questions, such as human rights violations in a given country, elections to other principal organs of the UN, and matters relating to its budget and the Secretariat's personnel.

At the conclusion of its debates, the Assembly makes recommendations on the various items on its agenda. Those recommendations become General Assembly resolutions or decisions. While some resolutions are procedural, many can be considered important, even historic, because of the events they spawned or because they marked a turning point in international relations. These include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the Partition of Palestine, and the recognition of the People's Republic as the only legitimate representative of China in the UN.

The General Assembly can thus be seen as a kind of global parliament or legislature whose resolutions are the formal expression of world opinion on a given question. As in most parliaments, its resolutions are adopted by a majority vote or by acclamation, that is, without being put to a vote. It is widely acknowledged that General Assembly resolutions carry moral weight and can have a significant political impact.

UN Member States attach a great importance to Assembly resolutions. The content of those resolutions has not only had serious repercussions in

some countries, but has also contributed to a body of world opinion, moral and political, which weighs heavily on collective international life and on relations among States. One could argue that it is impossible today for a State to act on the international stage outside the framework which, based on the principles set out in the UN Charter, the Assembly has been developing for over fifty years.

How are the great issues of international life discussed in the UN General Assembly and what conclusions are reached by its Members? The complete answer to that question would fill several volumes. The aim here is much less ambitious—to provide a brief commentary on how the Assembly works and what have been the obstacles it has had to surmount in order to discharge fully the functions assigned to it by the Charter in 1945. The first part of this study is devoted to these questions. How the General Assembly takes its decisions and adopts its resolutions also deserves careful attention. The second part presents a summary and analysis of the votes cast in the General Assembly by UN Member States. In the epilogue I have allowed myself to make some general and rather personal observations regarding the United Nations on the occasion of its recent fiftieth anniversary.

PART ONE

THE STAGE AND THE ACTORS

CHAPTER 1. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S MOST REPRESENTATIVE FORUM

The San Francisco Charter established in 1945 that the Organization of the United Nations would consist of six principal organs: a General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), a Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice (ICJ), and a Secretariat.

The General Assembly includes all UN Members. The Security Council has fifteen members, five of them permanent—China, France, the Russian Federation (formerly USSR), the United Kingdom and the United States—and ten non-permanent elected for a two-year term. ECOSOC has 54 members elected for a three-year term. The Trusteeship Council is composed of those UN Members administering trust territories, permanent members of the Security Council not administering trust territories and as many Members elected for three-year terms by the Assembly as may be necessary to ensure that the total number of members is equally divided between administering and non-administering Member States. And the ICJ is made up of fifteen judges elected for nine-year terms.

The key to any analysis of the work of the first five organs is to be found in the subjects which each one can discuss, the way each one takes its decisions and the legal or political value of those decisions. The General Assembly elects the members of ECOSOC and the non-permanent members of the Security Council. It also elects, together with the Security Council, the judges of the ICJ, as well as the UN Secretary-General. The decisions of the General Assembly, the ECOSOC and the Trusteeship Council are taken by a majority vote and are only recommendatory in nature.

The General Assembly, however, takes some of its decisions by a two-thirds majority. These include the admission of new UN members, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership or the expulsion of Members, budgetary questions, resolutions regarding the maintenance of international peace and security or any other matter the Assembly considers important. Decisions to determine whether a question is important or not are taken by a simple majority.

The decisions of the Court are also taken by a majority of its members but its judgments are only binding if the parties in conflict have so agreed previously. Only the decisions of the Security Council are automatically obligatory; thus the veto power of its permanent members.

The Charter's provision according the permanent members the right to veto any substantive proposal in the Security Council was, without a doubt, the one which gave rise to the most heated discussion at the San Francisco Conference. Upon considering the text proposed by the so-called "Five Great

Powers” regarding the Council’s voting procedure, several delegations expressed serious reservations and, on 11 June 1945, it was necessary to put it to a vote. The results reflected that difference of opinion. Of the 50 countries represented at the San Francisco Conference, 30 voted in favor of the veto (Article 27 [3] of the Charter), two against (Colombia and Cuba), 15 abstained (Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Chile, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Iran, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, Paraguay and Peru) and three were absent (Ecuador, Haiti and Saudi Arabia).

Before the vote, the US delegate had expressed the hope that the text would be adopted “as unanimously as possible”. However, it barely received the support of 60 percent of the participants and even that was the result, in large measure, of a threat made the previous day.

In effect, on 10 June 1945, after several delegations, especially Australia, had insisted that the proposed veto power not be accepted, US Senator Tom Connally reiterated the position of the “Big Five” that without the veto there would be no Charter. Delegates, he added, “would have to face public opinion at home if they reported that they had killed the veto, but had also killed the Charter”. The Senator’s tactics worked well in 1945, and ever since the threat of withdrawing from the Organization has been a powerful weapon of the Great Powers and also of some not so great ones.

Although several countries have threatened to withdraw from the UN or from one of its principal organs, only two have actually done so. The Soviet Union decided to “absent itself” from the Security Council on 13 January 1950 because it objected to the presence of the Taipei delegates as China’s representatives. It returned to the Council on 1 August of that year. However, its brief absence had grave repercussions since on 25 June 1950 the Council condemned North Korea’s attack against South Korea, demanded it withdraw to the 38th Parallel and decided to send UN forces to enforce its resolution. The USSR did not absent itself again from the Security Council. Thereafter, the Council decided that it would meet only if all of its members were present.

The only country that has voluntarily left the UN is Indonesia. It did so in 1965 because of a territorial dispute. A year later it renewed its participation.

The General Assembly can suspend a Member State either for political reasons or for falling behind in its payments to the Organization. Because of its policy of *apartheid*, in 1974 South Africa became the first country to be suspended by the Assembly. In 1994 that suspension was lifted. On the other hand, in 1992 the Assembly decided that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (now reduced to Serbia and Montenegro) could not take the place of the former Yugoslavia, should apply for UN membership and would not participate in the work of the General Assembly.

TABLE 1.1 *Evolution of UN membership, 1945–1997^a*

Year(s)	Total/ Change	Countries ^b
1945	51	Original Members: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Byelorussia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Syria, Turkey, Ukraine, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela and Yugoslavia
1946	55+4	Afghanistan, Iceland, Sweden and Thailand
1947	57+2	Pakistan and Yemen
1948	58+1	Burma
1949	59+1	Israel
1950	60+1	Indonesia
1951–1954		
1955	76+16	Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Lao, Libya, Nepal, Portugal, Romania, and Spain
1956	80+4	Japan, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia
1957	82+2	Ghana and Malaysia
1958	82+1(-1)	Guinea (Egypt and Syria became the UAR)
1959		
1960	99+17	Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Congo-Kinshasa, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Dahomey, Gabon, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Togo and Upper Volta.
1961	104+4(+1)	Mauritania, Mongolia, Sierra Leone and Tanganyika (UAR dissolved)
1962	110+6	Algeria, Burundi, Jamaica, Rwanda, Trinidad and Tobago and Uganda
1963	113+3	Kenya, Kuwait and Zanzibar
1964	116+3	Malawi, Malta and Zambia
1965	118+3(-1)	Gambia, Maldives and Singapore (Tanganyika and Zanzibar became Tanzania)
1966	122+4	Barbados, Botswana, Guyana and Lesotho
1967	123+1	Democratic Yemen
1968	126+3	Equatorial Guinea, Mauritius and Swaziland
1969		
1970	127+1	Fiji
1971	132+5	Bahrain, Bhutan, Oman, Qatar and United Arab Emirates
1972		
1973	135+3	Bahamas, Federal Republic of Germany and German Democratic Republic
1974	138+3	Bangladesh, Grenada and Guinea-Bissau
1975	144+6	Cape Verde, Comoros, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe and Suriname
1976	147+3	Angola, Samoa and Seychelles

TABLE 1.1 (conclusion) *Evolution of UN Membership, 1945–1997^a*

Year(s)	Total/ Change	Countries ^b
1977	149+2	Djibouti and Viet Nam
1978	151+2	Dominica and Solomon Islands
1979	152+1	Saint Lucia
1980	154+2	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Zimbabwe
1981	157+3	Antigua and Barbuda, Belize and Vanuatu
1982		
1983	159+1	Saint Kitts and Nevis
1984	159+1	Brunei Darussalam
1985–1989		
1990	160+2(-1)	Liechtenstein and Namibia (Democratic Yemen and Yemen united)
1991	166+7(-1)	Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Marshall Islands, Micronesia and Republic of Korea (unification of Germany)
1992	179+13	Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, San Marino, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
1993	184+6(-1)	Andorra, Czech and Slovak republics, Eritrea, Monaco and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dissolution of Czechoslovakia)
1994	185+1	Palau
1995–1997		

^a As of 31 December of each year and through September 1997.

^b Country name changes are given in Appendix I which lists UN Members alphabetically.

On several other occasions the General Assembly has had to take a position on some politically and legally sensitive situations. One of the first related to the partition of India in 1947. What was Pakistan's legal situation *vis-à-vis* the Organization? The Assembly decided to recommend that Pakistan submit a request for admission as a new UN Member. And it did so, setting a precedent for the admission of Singapore (separation from Malaysia) in 1965, Bangladesh (partition of Pakistan) in 1974, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (separation from the Soviet Union) in 1991, and Eritrea (separation from Ethiopia) in 1993.

Upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan joined the UN in March of 1992 and Georgia in July of 1992. As a result of the conflict in Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia joined the UN in May of 1992 and Macedonia (with the sobriquet of "The former Yugoslav Republic of") in April of 1993. When the agreement on the dissolution of Czechoslovakia entered into force, the Czech and Slovak republics joined the UN in January of 1993. Here there was no discussion as to which of the two republics would be Czechoslo-

vakia's successor in the UN since the two sides had agreed to apply separately for admission as *new* Members.


But the most complicated situation which the UN has faced in this matter of succession of States was undoubtedly the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in December 1991 and its re-incarnation as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Which of those republics would inherit the USSR's seat in the Security Council? The CIS agreed that it would be Russia (with the name of the "Russian Federation"). The answer from the United States and the European Economic Community was quick, and despite many legal complications, in January 1992 the name of the Russian Federation appeared in the Council Chamber. Upon taking the place of the USSR and participating in the debates and voting, as well as in the Council's Summit meeting—the first in its history—on 31 January 1992, the Russian Federation became a *de facto* permanent member of the Council. For political reasons, the legality of that change was never debated but the Charter had in fact been amended.

Another four cases should be mentioned. Between 1958 and 1961 Syria withdrew from the UN to join Egypt and together they participated as the United Arab Republic. In 1964 two Member States, Tanganyika and Zanzibar, merged into what is now the United Republic of Tanzania. In 1971 the Republic of China (Taiwan) withdrew when the Assembly decided to recognize the People's Republic as the only legitimate representative of China in the UN. (The one China thesis has prevailed in international fora, although in 1991 the GATT accepted to consider Taiwan's adherence request *independently* of that of the People's Republic). Finally, in 1990 Democratic Yemen and the Arab Republic of Yemen became a single State (the Republic of Yemen) and the German Democratic Republic was assimilated by the Federal Republic of Germany (now, once again, Germany).

A universal organization

The League of Nations had sought to become a universal organization. In 1920, a year after its establishment, it had 48 members, but at no time were there more than 58 because of the numerous withdrawals between 1924 and 1939. At the outbreak of World War II, it had only 46 members.

The United Nations has also striven for universality. But the Charter's signatory States, while advocating this goal, were very cautious when considering the various admission requests submitted almost from its beginnings. The criteria for accepting new members were widely discussed during several years. The Charter spoke of "peace-loving states" and so for ten years the trauma of the World War II prevented the admission of several

FIGURE 1.1 *Evolution of UN membership, 1945–1997^a*

^a Through September 1997. Table 1.1 lists UN members in order of their admission.

European and Asian countries. The political changes brought about by the Allied victory in Europe were also the subject of debates concerning, among other things, the legitimacy of some of the new regimes and their geographical boundaries. The case of Spain, whose Government had sided with the defeated Powers, gave rise to bitter exchanges. In the late forties there also began a discussion on the recognition of the emerging Central People's Government of China, at the same time that China was taken to task for its aggression in Korea.

The growing tension, especially in Europe, paralyzed attempts to universalize the UN. With few exceptions, admission requests were vetoed over and over again in the Security Council. Thus, in its first decade, only ten new Members were admitted. The problem derived from Soviet reluctance to accept countries such as Italy and Portugal while the United States refused to recognize several of the Eastern European, post-war regimes.

Although the impasse in the admission of new members was to last until 1955, there were some small steps with regard to the participation of Italy (in some of the specialized agencies and upon considering the liquidation of its

TABLE 1.2 *Independent countries and UN Members in 1945 and 1997^a*

	Independent countries		Member States	
	1945	1997	1945	1997
Africa	4 (5%)	54 (28%)	4 (8%)	52 (28%)
America	22 (28%)	35 (18%)	22 (43%)	35 (19%)
Asia/Oceania ^b	18 (23%)	60 (31%)	10 (20%)	57 (31%)
Europe ^c	35 (44%)	43 (22%)	15 (29%)	41 (22%)
Total	79	192	51	185

^a Through September 1997.

^b Includes Israel, Turkey and the eight Asian republics of the former Soviet Union.

^c Includes Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia, as well as the seven European republics of the former Soviet Union.

colonies in Africa). Finally, on 8 December 1955, the Assembly adopted by an overwhelming majority resolution 918 (X) which endorsed the recommendations drawn up over several years by a Commission of Good Offices (created specifically to find an agreed solution to the question of the admission of new members). As a result, the Security Council was able to consider with different criteria the requests for admission and recommend to the Assembly the admission of sixteen countries. This took place one week later, on 14 December. As the Assembly's President stated:

... [the] vote fulfilled a deep desire which has existed in the General Assembly for many years—the desire to overcome the obstacles preventing the United Nations from becoming a completely international organization representing all peoples and enjoying true universality. It is true that the goal has not yet been achieved. There are still notable absences, but the progress made today marks a historic advance along this way, which cannot but increase the prestige and vigour of the United Nations (A/PV.555).

After 1955 the number of new Members increased rapidly. Appendix I lists UN Member and non-member States. Today there are only seven countries in the world that, for different reasons, have not been able or have not wanted to join the UN. Among the States that were independent in 1945, only two remain outside the UN: the Holy See and Switzerland. Of the countries that gained their independence after 1945, only five are not yet members of the Organization: the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic in Africa and Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga and Tuvalu in the Pacific. Switzerland is by far the “most notable absence”.

The increase in Member States radically changed the regional balance of 1945. In effect, while the total membership has gone from 51 to 185 (a 263 percent increase), the African presence has grown by 1,200 percent and the

TABLE 1.3 *Regional origin of UN membership, 1946–1997^a*

	Original Member 1945	1946 1950	1960 1969	1970 1979	1980 1989	1990 1997	Total	Non- Member 1997
<i>A. Independent countries in 1946</i>								
Africa	4					4		
America	22						22	
Asia/Oceania	10	5	1			2	18	
Europe	15 ^b	12		2		4	32	2 ^c
Total	51	17	1	2	0	6	77	2
<i>B. Colonies that have gained independence since 1946</i>								
Africa		6	33	7	1	1	48	1 ^d
America			45	4			13	
Asia/Oceania		8	4	11	2	3	28	4 ^e
Europe			1				1	
Total		14	42	23	7	4	90	5
<i>C. Nations that have separated from another State</i>								
Africa						1 ^f	1	
Asia/Oceania		1 ^g	1 ^h	1 ⁱ		8 ^j	11	
Europe						10 ^k	10	
Total		1	1	1	0	19	22	

^a Through September 1997.^b Includes Byelorussia (now Belarus) and Ukraine.^c Holy See and Switzerland.^d Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic.^e Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga and Tuvalu.^f Eritrea.^g Pakistan.^h Singapore.ⁱ Bangladesh.^j Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.^k Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania; Moldova; Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia; and the Czech and Slovak republics.

Asian by 470 percent. In contrast, Europe, whose 15 members comprised 29 percent of the UN in 1945, today has 41 States representing 22 percent. The proportion of countries from the Americas has fallen even more, from 43 to 19 percent. What began as a sort of Euro-American club (73 percent of the total members in 1945) has become a predominantly African and Asian organization (59 percent of its present members). Today, after the atomization

of the USSR and Yugoslavia, separatist tendencies persist in Europe and Central Asia and the ranks of those groups will perhaps continue to grow.

Over the last half-century the world has been transformed politically and almost all of its inhabitants now live in independent nations. It is true that there are still some so-called overseas departments and non-self-governing territories and that the map of the world is still sprinkled with enclaves, islands and islets—some of them relics of erstwhile empires—belonging to a handful of nations: Australia, France, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom and United States. Nevertheless, the long and often painful decolonization process has just about ended. And many of today's "new countries" achieved their independence largely as a result of UN efforts. As shown in Table 1.3, decolonization reached its peak in the sixties, when the UN admitted almost half (43) of the newly-independent States.

The 117 countries that have gained their independence since 1945 can be classified in one of two ways: the 22 that separated from another State and the 95 that were colonies. Table 1.4 shows that 76 of those 95, or 80 percent, were British and/or French colonies. The first category includes the republics that have separated from Yugoslavia, as well as Russia and the other fourteen republics that made up the former Soviet Union. Regarding the latter, the cases of Belarus and the Ukraine are especially curious since they entered the UN four decades before gaining their independence.

The rules of the game

The General Assembly is master of its own procedure. As stipulated in the UN Charter and in its own Rules of Procedure (document A/520 and revisions), the Assembly can decide what it pleases regarding substantive and procedural matters.

The Assembly meets annually, in regular session, from the third Tuesday in September to the middle of December at UN Headquarters in New York, *unless* the Assembly itself or a majority of its members decides otherwise. As already noted, the Assembly may also hold special or emergency sessions. Through September 1997, the General Assembly had held 19 special and ten emergency sessions, besides its 51 regular sessions. For more than a decade, the Assembly has left open after December a number of its agenda items, a practice that allows it to reconvene in regular session at any time during the following year. In theory, therefore, the Assembly is in permanent session.

According to the Charter, the General Assembly may discuss any question or any matter and, unless the Security Council is considering it, "may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Se-

TABLE 1.4 *Administering or colonial Power of countries that gained their independence since 1946 and decade of their admission to the UN*

	UN Membership						Non-members
	1946 1959	1960 1969	1970 1979	1980 1989	1990 1997	Total	1997 ^a
Australia			1			1	1
Belgium		3				3	
France	5	14	3			22	
France/United Kingdom	1	1		1		3	
Italy/United Kingdom		1				1	
Netherlands	1		1			2	
New Zealand			1			1	
Portugal			5			5	
South Africa					1	1	
Spain		1				1	1
United Kingdom	7	22	12	6		48 ^b	3
United States					3	3	
Total	14	42	23	7	4	90	5

^a Through September 1997.^b Includes Tanganyika and Zanzibar, as well as Democratic Yemen.

curity Council or to both on any such questions or matters” (Article 10). From the beginning it was agreed that, at the outset of each session, there would be a general debate in Plenary—that today runs for some three weeks—in which some Heads of State and over a hundred Foreign Ministers take part. Later the main committees meet to consider the various items allocated to them by the Plenary. Each committee then has its own general debate before considering draft resolutions or decisions which, once adopted, are recommended to the Plenary. The Plenary, in turn, takes a decision on them.

Each Member State accredits a delegation composed of five representatives, five alternates or deputies and as many advisers as are deemed necessary. There are some very large and some very small delegations. At the 1995 session, for example, the Russian delegation included 115 persons, the United States and Japan more than 80, while Ireland listed only seven, Saint Lucia and Sao Tome and Principe four each, Central African Republic and Dominica three, and Vanuatu one. Moreover, in order to ensure that all Member States send representatives, the UN budget covers the travel costs of two delegates from each country.

Every Member has a place reserved for it in the Hall of the General Assembly and its main committees. Seats are arranged in concentric semicircles according to the English alphabetical order, beginning with the State whose name is chosen at random at the beginning of the Assembly’s annual session.

TABLE 1.5 *Regional groups in the United Nations, 1945–1997*

	1945	1959	1969	1979	1989	1997 ^a
Africa ^b	4	10	42	49	50	52
Asia ^c	8	22	28	40	41	54
Eastern Europe ^d	6	10	10	11	11	19
Latin America and Caribbean	20	20	24	29	33	33
Western Europe and Others ^e	13	21	22	23	23	27
Total	51	83	126	152	158	185

^a Through September 1997.

^b Includes South Africa.

^c Includes Israel, as well as the Transcaucasian and southern Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

^d Includes Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia; as well as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Moldova.

^e Includes the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, as well as Turkey.

To give a picture of the increase in the Assembly's membership, one might recall that in 1946 (and until 1955) Mexico occupied a seat between Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Since 1993 nine countries separate Luxembourg from Mexico and another eight sit between Mexico and the Netherlands.

Delegates may speak in one of the six official languages: Chinese, English, French, Russian, Spanish and, since 1973, Arabic. One may also take the floor in other languages as long as the interpreters are supplied with the text of the statement in one of the official languages. In the beginning the interpretation was done consecutively but soon the Assembly introduced simultaneous interpretation, thus speeding up its work. The working languages—those used in informal meetings and consultations—were originally English and French but Spanish was added in 1948, Russian in 1968 and Arabic and Chinese in 1973. In practice, however, the Organization's lingua franca is English.

For twenty years voting was by a show of hands, a slow and, at times, untrustworthy method. In 1966 the Assembly decided to install a mechanical voting system in the Plenary and a few years later in the meeting rooms of the main committees. This, too, has facilitated its work.

The regional groups

How do countries organize themselves in order to gain a seat in bodies of a limited size? Initially they opted for a "free-for-all" approach and each nation sought to obtain the support necessary to ensure the success of its candi-

TABLE 1.6 *Regional origin of the President of the General Assembly, 1946–1995*

	<u>1946–1965</u>	<u>1966–1995</u>
Western Europe and Others	7	6
Asia	6	6
Latin America and Caribbean	5	6
Africa	2	6
Eastern Europe	0	6

dacy. That system (if it warrants the word “system”) lasted for almost twenty years. Then, after 1960, faced with the considerable increase in Member States, it became necessary to devise a mechanism that would facilitate the organization of the Assembly’s work and the elections to other principal or subsidiary bodies. The idea emerged to

group States by geographical regions.

In 1963 the General Assembly decided to amend the Charter in order to increase ECOSOC’s members from 18 to 27 and suggested a formula to distribute the seats among five regional groups: Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Western Europe and Others. The amendment entered into force in December 1965. It should be stressed that the UN’s regional groups do not always conform to the world’s continental divisions that every student learns in primary school. Moreover, some of the States that entered the Organization in the nineties did not immediately join a regional group, while others, such as the three trans-Caucasian republics of the former Soviet Union, opted for a group beyond their geographic location.

In spite of the foregoing and in order to facilitate the study of the numerical evolution of UN regional groupings, the 185 Member States have been distributed as follows: 54 Asian, 52 African countries, 19 from Eastern Europe, 27 from Western Europe and others, and 33 from Latin America and Caribbean (Table 1.5). Israel and South Africa did not belong to any group. In 1991, however, ECOSOC decided to add Israel to the list of members of the European Economic Commission. In 1994 South Africa joined the African Group. Yugoslavia was never a member of any group although for electoral purposes it was part of Eastern Europe. The United States is an observer in the group of Western European and Others (Australia, Canada and New Zealand) and is considered a member of that group for electoral purposes. Turkey belongs to the Western European group and Cyprus to the Asian.

By 1963 (when the Assembly established the system of regional groups) many countries were bound by political and military alliances: those of the Warsaw Pact and other like-minded countries, on the one hand, and those of NATO and other allies, on the other. The fact that a country’s geographic location did not always coincide with its government’s political leanings rendered the role of regional groups difficult from the beginning. A prime example is Yugoslavia. Moreover, the sixties witnessed the consolidation of

TABLE 1.7 *Composition of the Security Council in 1996*

Africa	3	Botswana, Egypt and Guinea-Bissau
Asia	3	Indonesia and Republic of Korea, as well as China
Eastern Europe	2	Poland, as well as Russia
Latin America and Caribbean	2	Chile and Honduras
Western Europe and Others	5	Germany and Italy, as well as France, UK and US

the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and, with the establishment of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), groupings of an economic nature emerged (the developing countries in the Group of 77, the developed Western nations and the Socialist countries of Eastern Europe). The multilateral disarmament fora opted for a composition that reflected the politico-military division of the Cold War world: NATO countries and allies, Warsaw Pact nations and allies, and non-aligned and neutral States.

The foregoing explains why the Assembly recognized the separate identity of the then ten countries of Eastern Europe (the eight members of the Warsaw Pact, as well as Albania and Yugoslavia). The establishment of the Eastern European Group within the Assembly was the culmination of a campaign spearheaded by the Soviet Union to achieve “symmetry” or “parity” with the West. That campaign had begun in 1945 when it managed to gain the acceptance of Byelorussia (now Belarus) and Ukraine as original Members. Today, with the new order and disorder in Eastern Europe and the former USSR, that group’s reason for being is in doubt.

Within the Group of Western European and Others tension has existed for some time between the countries belonging to the European Economic Community (now European Union) and the rest of the group (and even within the EU itself since it includes NATO members and non-members). That tension has given rise to subgroupings such as the Nordic Group (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) in order to ensure a greater presence of those countries in the bodies of limited composition. The same occurs, but for different reasons, in other regions with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Arab nations, the French-speaking countries of sub-Saharan Africa and the English-speaking nations of the Caribbean.

With the political and economic changes that began in the eighties, it will be necessary to change (or perhaps even to abandon altogether) the regional groupings within the UN system. The truth is, however, that with 185 Members, the smooth running of the Assembly requires some kind of groupings.

For decades regional groups have facilitated elections, consultations and ceremonial acts in the General Assembly. Each one of the five groups elects a chair or spokesperson (a post that rotates monthly according to the English alphabetical order of the Group’s members). With regard to elections, one

TABLE 1.8 *Regional distribution of the seats in ECOSOC*

	Percent of ECOSOC			Percent of UN	
	1946 1965	1966 1973	Since 1974	In 1989	Since 1994
Africa	0.5	25.9	25.9	31.6	28.1
Asia	17.5	18.5	20.4	25.9	29.2
Eastern Europe	16.9	11.1	11.1	7.0	10.3
Latin America and Caribbean	22.2	18.5	18.5	20.9	17.8
Western Europe and Others	38.3	25.9	24.1	14.6	14.6

example will suffice: since 1966 the Presidency of the General Assembly has rotated equitably among by the five regional groups (Table 1.6).

In 1963 the system of regional groups seemed to introduce an element of equity in the organization of the work of the Assembly. In that year there were 32 African countries, 25 Asian, 22 Latin American and Caribbean, 21 Western European and Others and ten Eastern European. It was obvious then, and even more so later with the increase of Afro-Asian countries, that a system such as the “symmetrical rotation” of the Assembly Presidency among the five groups did not satisfy the need for a more equitable geographic distribution in other posts and seats within the Organization.

The Security Council offers a good example of how the General Assembly attempted to adapt the composition of the various organs to changes in the relative weight of the different geographical groups. Between 1946 and 1963 there was a “gentlemen’s agreement” regarding the Council’s composition. It then had eleven members, the five permanent and six more distributed as follows: two for Latin America and one each for Western Europe, the British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Towards 1960 that distribution did not square with the numeric strength of the Afro-Asian countries, nor was it any longer acceptable to think in terms of a “Commonwealth quota”.

In 1963 the General Assembly decided to amend the Charter in order to increase to fifteen the number of Security Council members, distributing the ten non-permanent seats as follows: one for Eastern Europe, two for Latin America and the Caribbean, two for Western Europe and five for Africa and Asia. It has proven difficult for the permanent members to accept a further increase in the Council’s composition. What was agreed in 1963 will, therefore, continue even though the geographic (and even political) distribution remains rather inequitable, as one can see from the Security Council’s composition in 1996 (Table 1.7).

Since the sixties the Afro-Asian and Latin American countries insisted that they be assigned a greater number of seats in the bodies of limited composition such as ECOSOC and its subsidiary organs. And they were partly

TABLE 1.9 *The UN annual regular budget*

<i>Year</i>	<i>Total (dollars)</i>	<i>Change (percent)</i>
1946	19,390,000	—
1950	44,521,000	+129.6
1960	65,735,000	+47.6
1970	168,957,000	+157.0
1980	669,576,000	+296.3
1990	1,067,037,000	+59.4
1996	1,304,137,100	+22.2

successful. ECOSOC grew from 18 to 27 in 1965 and to 54 in 1974, but the distribution of seats still does not reflect the numerical strength of the different regions—especially Africa and Asia—within the UN (Table 1.8).

It is obvious that this system is of little benefit to the Afro-Asian countries, while the Groups of

Western Europe (and Others) and, until the breakup of the USSR and Yugoslavia, of Eastern Europe were over-represented. Moreover, the geographic distribution within ECOSOC is used, *mutatis mutandi*, to determine the composition of many other committees.

How can one justify this rather inequitable distribution? Two main arguments have been advanced. The first is that, in assigning the posts, one should not count the five permanent members of the Security Council which, in light of the privileges granted to them in the Charter, should be included in all of the principal and subsidiary organs. This argument is frequently advanced by the Western countries. And there is an element of truth in it. If, from the outset, one accepts the omnipresence of the five permanent members, it would be unjust to subtract three seats from the Western European countries. For example, in ECOSOC their equitable share would be 15 percent or around eight of the 54 seats, in which one would have to include France, the UK and the US. Countries such as Germany and Italy, or Ireland and Sweden, would not accept that distribution. It thus would appear natural that the Western European Group defend its thirteen seats in ECOSOC.

The second argument is the economic one: the countries that most contribute to the UN budget should have more rights and a stronger voice in the Organization. And the Western European and Others Group pays the most. This approach is shared by the countries of Eastern Europe, as well as Japan.

The UN budget

As occurs in other international organizations, the discussions on the UN budget have consumed a good part of the General Assembly's time. What is the Organization's annual budget to be and how to share equitably the costs among the Member States have been a source of endless debates since the early years of the Organization. Let us see how much the UN spends every year and which countries contribute most to that budget.

TABLE 1.10 *The ten principal contributors to the UN regular budget (percent)*

	1950		1970		1990		1996	
1.	USA	38.12	USA	25.00	USA	25.00	USA	25.00
2.	UK	11.37	USSR	14.18	Japan	11.38	Japan	15.65
3.	USSR	6.98	Germany	6.80	USSR	9.99	Germany	9.06
4.	China	6.00	France	6.00	Germany	9.36	France	6.42
5.	France	6.00	UK	5.90	France	6.25	UK	5.32
6.	India	3.41	Japan	5.40	UK	4.86	Italy	5.25
7.	Canada	3.30	China	4.00	Italy	3.99	Russia	4.27
8.	Australia	1.92	Italy	3.54	Canada	3.09	Canada	3.11
9.	Argentina	1.85	Canada	3.08	Spain	1.95	Spain	2.38
10.	Brazil	1.85	Ukraine	1.87	Netherlands	1.65	Brazil	1.62
	Sweden	1.85						

The UN regular budget consists only of the Organization's current expenses (at Headquarters in New York; the UN offices in Geneva, Nairobi and Vienna; the regional economic commissions—with headquarters in Geneva, Santiago de Chile, Addis Abeba, Bangkok and Amman—and in the seventy information centers spread throughout the world). It does not include extraordinary expenses, that is, those additional funds needed to cover activities such as peace-keeping operations.

The Organization's regular budget is very modest (Table 1.9). Its activities—organizing meetings, interpretation and document translation services, information, diplomatic tasks, etc.—do not resemble those of a government. Perhaps they can only be compared to a ministry of foreign affairs. The UN budget in 1989 was a little over a quarter of the \$3.7 billion assigned to the US State Department and just over half of the \$1.9 billion that the United States was then spending annually on nuclear testing. And, compared to what the world wastes on armaments, it is a joke. In 1970, for example, the UN's \$170 million budget was only 0.009 percent of the world's military outlays for that year (\$183 billion).

UN expenses are shared by its Member States on the basis of two principles: all countries should contribute and they should do so according to their capacity to pay. The scale of assessments is adjusted every three years. In 1997 there were 95 countries that paid the minimum contribution of 0.01 percent, that is, one hundredth of one percent or about \$130,000. Since 1972 the maximum contribution has been 25 percent.

In 1950, the ten largest contributors of the then 60 Members covered 83 percent of the budget; in 1970, when there were 127 Members, it was about the same (82 percent); in 1990 with 159 Members, it dropped slightly to 78 percent, remaining at that level through 1996 (185 Members). In other words, the few countries that cover a large part of UN expenses (Table 1.10) exercise a disproportionate influence in some decisions.

TABLE 1.11 *Index of UN cost per inhabitant in 1994*

Saint Lucia	493
Russia	377
Chad	267
Mozambique	220
United Kingdom	130
France	125
Germany	115
Spain	111
United States	100
Japan	85
Portugal	63
Mexico	56
Singapore	55
Senegal	54
China	30
India	29

However, if the scale of contributions were based only on the criteria of capacity to pay, the results would be an even greater distortion. For example, let us consider what some individual citizens pay annually to the UN. The 1994 UN regular budget was around \$1.3 billion. The world's population was then about 5.6 billion inhabitants. If the principle of equitable distribution were applied, each human being would have to pay around twenty-three cents. If we move to the idea of "ability to pay", then the 1.2 billion citizens of the developed countries—representing 21 percent of the world's population but 85 percent of its gross domestic product (GNP)—would have to pay 85 percent of the budget, that is, around \$1.1 bil-

lion or 92 cents per person. They not only pay less than that, but the distribution is not very even.

The largest contributor is the United States, which accounts for 25 percent of the budget. Its GNP is approximately 25 percent of the world's GNP. So it pays more or less according to the criterion of "ability to pay". Nevertheless, taking the World Bank's data for 1994, one observes the following: of the \$1.3 billion UN budget, the US (whose population was then 255 million inhabitants with a per capita income of \$25,860) paid \$325 million or about \$1.27 per inhabitant. If we divide that amount by the income per person, we get a percentage of 0.000049284. That is what the UN costs every year to each US citizen: 0.000049284 percent of his or her income. By taking as our point of departure the US's "annual cost per inhabitant" (0.000049284=100) it appears that, in relative terms, some countries pay much more (up to five times) while others pay much less (three-tenths). Some examples of what the UN costs each inhabitant of certain countries are given in Table 1.11.

Every three years the UN Commission on Contributions adjusts the Organization's scale of assessments. Quite obviously it would have to correct some distortions and attempt to adjust what each country is assessed to its real ability to pay. But, given the unequal distribution of wealth, it is probable that, far from correcting the present trends, it will accentuate them. The problem is derived in large measure from the arbitrariness of the agreed limits of 25 percent as a maximum and 0.01 percent as a minimum. From the examples given, it is obvious that the UN is very expensive for some countries, such as St. Lucia (which pays the minimum contribution), and relative-

ly cheap for others, such as Senegal (which also pays the minimum contribution). But, could the minimum yearly contribution of some \$130,000 be reduced even further without wounding the concept of Nation-State?

The UN financial crisis worsened in the early nineties. Its budgetary deficit continued to grow. By June 1996, Member States owed the UN \$2.6 billion (\$0.9 billion to the regular budget and \$1.7 billion for peace-keeping). The United States owed a total of \$1.6 billion to both the regular budget and for peace-keeping.

Peace-keeping operations had in fact been multiplying, to the point that by 1991 there were thirteen UN forces in action (a number equal to all such operations between 1946 and 1990). By May 1994 they had grown to eighteen, falling to sixteen in 1996. And the cost of those peace-keeping operations, covered by extraordinary yet voluntary contributions, had grown to another one billion dollars. In other words, the cost of running the UN in 1992 was about \$2.5 billion and, despite the regular budget deficit and the difficulties in finding funds for the peace forces, it continued to receive all kinds of requests for more peace-keeping operations. The UN did what it could but the truth is that, as regards peace-keeping operations, there were simply too many at once. As stated by the Under-Secretary-General in charge of such operations, the "UN is in a constant cash flow crisis". By the nineties it was over-stretched and under-funded.

The veto (and other privileges) beyond the Security Council

According to its Charter, the UN is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members. However, with the exception of the General Assembly where all Member States supposedly act under equal conditions, the distinction between China, France, the Soviet Union (now the Russian Federation), the United Kingdom and the United States, on the one hand, and the rest of the nations, on the other, is an unavoidable daily reality. The five are permanent members of the Security Council with the right to veto any substantive proposal, including the admission of a new member into the Organization. And, although the Charter does not grant them a similar privilege in the other principal organs, their influence is felt throughout the UN system.

The five have been members of ECOSOC almost uninterruptedly since 1946, they have had a disproportionate say in the work of the Trusteeship Council, and citizens of four of them have always sat on the International Court of Justice. Nationals of those five countries appear among the top functionaries of the Organization's Secretariat. Moreover, the Charter itself granted those five countries the right to veto its entry into force in 1945. The

power-wielding attitude derived from the veto is felt well beyond the confines of the Security Council chamber.

French, UK and US citizens have held more than their share of the executive posts within the various agencies that make up the UN system. Nationals of those three countries have occupied them almost 40 percent of time. And US citizens alone have been at the helm of those organizations over one-fifth of the time.

The Assembly is, in theory, the forum where the principle of the equal sovereignty of all UN Members is best applied. Nevertheless, even there one can sense the privileged presence of the five permanent members. For example, there is an unwritten rule that precludes nationals of those countries from holding the Presidency of the Assembly but which, in exchange, ensures that the five invariably figure among its now twenty-one vice-presidents. This, in turn, ensures them a permanent voice and vote in the Assembly's General Committee (or bureau) where important decisions are often taken regarding the work of the Plenary.

Regarding majorities and minorities

The General Assembly is composed of all UN Member States. Each one has one vote and, according to Article 18 of the Charter:

Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. These questions shall include: recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the election of the members of the Economic and Social Council, the election of members of the Trusteeship Council in accordance with paragraph 1(c) of Article 86, the admission of new Members to the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, the expulsion of Members, questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, and budgetary questions.

Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

According to the Assembly's Rules of Procedure (Article 86), the term "present and voting" includes the members that vote in favour or against. Members that abstain in the vote are considered as not voting.

Over the years the General Assembly has adopted, according to the political convenience of the moment, different procedures regarding the same question. It could be said, without fear of exaggeration, that a good part of its debates has been precisely on procedural questions. And, although its Rules of Procedure offer the possibility of putting an end to those debates by a vote, these have been very drawn out and repetitive.

Overwhelming, automatic and meaningless majorities

The validity of General Assembly resolutions has been a subject of constant discussion. The type of discussion depends both on the contents of the resolution and the closeness of the vote. But invariably those that object to a resolution—as well as those that defend it—end up judging its content by qualifying the vote. Here are some examples.

When a resolution obtains a large majority, its supporters refer to the fact that it was adopted “by an overwhelming majority”. For example, in December 1957 the Assembly debated the credentials of Hungary’s representatives. The US delegate recalled that, in its resolution 1133 (XI) of 14 September of that year, the Assembly had condemned the USSR’s armed intervention in Hungary and had declared that “the present régime in Hungary has been imposed on the Hungarian people” by that intervention. He added that the resolution had been approved “by an overwhelming majority” (A/PV.726).

Detractors of a resolution approved by a large (or overwhelming) majority often qualify it as an “automatic majority”. This occurred on 13 December 1958 when the Assembly was about to take a decision on a draft resolution calling for the establishment of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). The draft had been the object of prolonged negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States but there remained important differences between them: first, the draft did not reflect Soviet concerns that military activities in outer space be explicitly prohibited and, second, the Committee’s composition was not balanced (the USSR sought symmetry between the blocs and an equal number of neutral countries, while the US draft proposed a composition in which twelve of the 18 members were US allies). Thus, when Soviet Ambassador Sobolev took the floor, he stated:

An overwhelming majority of the countries represented in the First Committee quite clearly expressed their interest in ensuring the exclusively peaceful use of outer space, and favored the establishment of international co-operation to that end under the auspices of the United Nations. The general tone of the debate in the Committee gave evi-

dence of a desire to reach an agreement acceptable to all States and particularly to the Soviet Union and the United States, since those countries are engaged in fundamental research in outer space. The negative position adopted by the United States delegation, however, made it impossible to reach such an agreement. . . .

The United States flatly refused to consider the military aspects of the problem of outer space, thus revealing its intention to continue and intensify the rocket and nuclear weapons race which constitutes a threat to peace, and its unwillingness to subject to any sort of review its policy of establishing and expanding military bases on the territories of other countries, which are used by it as instruments of its aggressive policy directed against the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist camp and as a means of exerting pressure on the countries on whose territories such bases are established. . . .

Fruitful co-operation in the peaceful use of outer space will be possible only if the composition of the committee which is to lay the groundwork for that important endeavour is satisfactory. The attempt by the United States to force through the membership it prefers by means of an *automatic majority* [italics added] is one more example of the United States policy of dictatorial rule, a policy which never has been and never will be successful where the Soviet Union is concerned. The Soviet delegation is authorized to reaffirm that the Soviet Union will not participate in the work of the *ad hoc* committee proposed by the United States, because its membership would be one-sided and would not ensure an objective scrutiny of this important problem (A/PV.792).

For his part, US Ambassador Lodge stated that the composition of COPUOS was “more than fair to the Soviet Union and its adherents” and he hoped that the USSR would participate in its work. And he added:

We believe in the small countries. We believe in having a big General Assembly in which every country has one vote, and we can never fall in with this Soviet plan to divide the world into two Power blocs where there are just the Soviet Union and the United States that do the talking I heard Mr. Sobolev this evening talk about automatic majorities. One of the things that has impressed me here—and, I think, has impressed quite a number of delegations—is the automatic minority which we see performing fairly regularly. I think that if the day ever comes when the Soviet Union gets a majority in this body—and I

hope that it will come because it will mean that the Soviet Union has changed its policy and its attitude—he will not call it an automatic majority. It is automatic when the other fellow gets it (A/PV.792).

The Assembly approved the draft resolution by 53 votes against nine with 19 abstentions.

The idea that the absence of the Superpowers renders a particular forum useless has been defended by both the United States and the Soviet Union. In the sixties the United States developed a corollary to that argument during the discussions of a draft resolution aimed at establishing what was to become the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). On 18 November 1965, upon its adoption in the Second Committee by 73 votes against eight with twelve abstentions, several countries that had opposed the draft explained their vote. The US delegate said that the voting pattern revealed the existence of conflicting points of view regarding the UN development programs. The adoption of the resolution was “an exercise in futility” since it was not supported by some countries “whose contributions are fundamental” for the proposed fund. He called on all delegations to make a sincere and realistic effort to solve the problems of the impoverished two-thirds of the world’s population. In the absence of such a reconciliation, the “adoption of resolutions by a majority vote is meaningless” (A/C.2/PV.988).

A 180 degree change

The US position in 1965 regarding the UN development programs presaged a fundamental change in its attitude towards the General Assembly. During its first decades, in fact, the Assembly was dominated by the United States and some of its closest allies. With the support of a large majority of Member States, they managed to have the Assembly make recommendations on a wide variety of subjects. In 1948, for example, the Assembly adopted the “Universal Declaration on Human Rights” in its resolution 217 (III). The resolution received the support of 48 of the then 58 Member States. Eight abstained and two were absent.

Confident of its power within the Assembly and in light of the Security Council’s paralysis, a paralysis caused by the USSR’s repeated vetoes, the United States made a proposal in 1950 which was to become resolution 377 (V), known as “Uniting for Peace”. In it the Assembly decided that:

. . . if the Security Council, because of the lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where

there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security. If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency special session within twenty-four hours of the request therefor. Such emergency special session shall be called if requested by the Security Council on the vote of any seven members, or by a majority of the Members of the United Nations.

The resolution was approved by 52 of the 60 countries then represented in the Assembly. Five (Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukraine and USSR) voted against it, two (Argentina and India) abstained and one (Lebanon) was absent.

Aimed at by-passing the Security Council and thus the USSR's persistent vetoes, the "Uniting for Peace" resolution was the culmination of several years of frustration. In fact, as early as 13 December 1946, in its resolution 40 (I), the Assembly had "earnestly requested" the Security Council's permanent members "to make every effort, in consultation with one another and with fellow members of the Security Council, to ensure that the use of the special voting privilege of its permanent members does not impede the Security Council in reaching decisions promptly".

Since there was no question to whom the resolution was addressed, the USSR—together with Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukraine and Yugoslavia—voted against it. But another nine countries, including China and France, abstained.

Many Soviet vetoes in the Security Council during the UN's first decade were a result of its opposition to proposals made by other permanent members regarding the admission of new States. Although the USSR was not against the countries suggested by the United States and its allies, it insisted on the admission of countries such as Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. This issue would finally be resolved in 1955. But for ten years the debate was intense. In 1951, for example, the USSR, submitted a draft resolution aimed at requesting the Security Council to examine once again the admission requests of Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Libya, Mongolia, Nepal, Portugal and Romania (A/2100).

The United States opposed the admission of countries that, "according to the understanding of the majority of Members of the Organization, do not meet the conditions laid out in Article 4" of the Charter which provides that

UN membership “is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter”. The US delegation then added:

The Soviet Union’s practice of vetoing applicants, who qualify for membership according to its own admission, unless its private candidates are admitted at the same time, makes it all the more essential, in our view, that other Members observe scrupulously adherence to the law of the Charter When a permanent member of the Security Council seeks to use its veto powers to coerce its fellow members into a violation of the Charter, they should resist it just as vigorously as they would resist any other form of coercion. The thwarting of the majority will by such methods cannot, we think, be called a deadlock; it is a hold-up (A/PV.369).

“The thwarting of the majority . . . is a hold-up”. Therein lies one of the keys to ensure the effective functioning of the General Assembly. On that occasion the Soviet draft resolution received the support of 22 countries but 21 opposed it and, therefore, it was not adopted because it lacked the two-thirds majority of those present and voting.

During those years almost all USSR initiatives were rejected by the Assembly and many resolutions proposed by Western countries were approved by large majorities over the negative votes of the USSR and its allies. The latter were six in the beginning but, when Yugoslavia broke with Moscow, they became a kind of “gang of five” (USSR, Ukraine and Byelorussia, as well as Czechoslovakia and Poland). These countries, for their part, attacked the “automatic majority” of the “Anglo-North American bloc” (A/PV.370).

There were occasions, however, when the majority did not include the US, France or the UK. And it was then that one of them invoked the two-thirds rule regarding the members present and voting in order to declare the subject being examined as an important question. On many occasions, this motion managed to defeat draft resolutions that enjoyed the support of half, but not two-thirds, of UN Members. But every now and then this parliamentary maneuver failed. This occurred when the Assembly decided to include the definition of aggression in its agenda and to study it in detail. The item had been proposed by the Soviet Union and the corresponding resolution—599 (VI) of 31 January 1952—was adopted by 30 votes to twelve with eight abstentions, that is, by over two-thirds of those present and voting. In spite of this, the United Kingdom tried, without success, to have the resolution rejected. They used the following argument: since two preambular paragraphs had been adopted, in separate votes, by a simple majority (29 to 24 and 29 to 23, respectively), the resolution as a whole was not valid (A/PV.368).

With time the United States began to lose ground in the Assembly and thus interest in its work. As early as the sixties, but above all after 1970 (the year of its first Security Council veto), the US began to feel isolated in the Assembly and to attack its methods of work. And thus its rejection of the majority. Ambassador Lodge's 1958 prediction had come true, but in a most unexpected way: "The majority is automatic when the other fellow gets it".

Consensus...that makes sense

For years the USSR tried to exercise its Security Council veto power in the General Assembly. In the seventies the United States began to do the same. With the backing of some of its Western European allies, it launched a campaign to change or, at least, to re-interpret the decision-making provisions of the Charter and the Assembly's Rules of Procedure.

In the seventies some began to speak insistently about the advisability that the General Assembly adopt its resolutions "by consensus", a term difficult to define since it means "general agreement" or absence of outright opposition. It is argued that resolutions have greater validity if they are adopted without any declared objection. There can be no doubt that a "general agreement" is attractive. In fact, one of the aims of the UN is to be "a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment" of the purposes of the Charter. And consensus could be considered precisely as a process leading to that harmonization of positions. It is a means to attain it, not an end in itself. In other words, it is an instrument to achieve common positions and not, as some permanent members would have it, a device to oppose them.

Many of the Assembly's most important decisions have been adopted by a vote. The Charter itself was voted upon, article by article, at the San Francisco Conference. The Universal Declaration on Human Rights was not, as one would say today, a "consensus text", but rather was approved by a vote in 1948. Both the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban were adopted by a vote. And there are many more examples. Finally, if the rule of consensus is so good, why does the Security Council not adopt it?

CHAPTER 2. A HALF-CENTURY OF DEBATES

During its first five years, the United Nations' General Assembly laid the foundations for its future work and, to a large extent, settled on its main agenda items. The new world organization began to take shape, inheriting many of the functions of the League of Nations. The UN's principal organs approved their rules of procedure. The UN set up many specialized agencies, chose its permanent headquarters, organized its Secretariat and established the guidelines for its budget and the scale of assessments of States.

Besides organizational matters and working methods, during its initial sessions the Assembly tackled the great issues that have remained on its agenda. Here we shall discuss the key questions that have been debated in the Assembly over a half-century in order to see how that forum works. We shall first identify some of the inconsistencies and contradictions that have emerged in its debates and decisions, and then examine both the difficult questions—*apartheid* and the Middle East—and the fundamental issues—decolonization, human rights, economic development, and disarmament—and describe the Organization's functioning.

An ever-heavier agenda

The number of items on the General Assembly's annual agenda has increased considerably since 1946. In the UN's early years, aside from the substantive items, there were many debates on organizational aspects of the UN. Later on, the number of subjects on the agenda began to multiply until, towards the seventies, it seemed possible to apply to the Assembly the saying "each one rode his hobby horse". The Non-Aligned countries managed to introduce items on various aspects of decolonization and on the New International Economic Order. The Soviet Union also contributed to the agenda's inflation, especially between the sixties and the early eighties, with the almost yearly submission of a new item, invariably suggested by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. The number of substantive items went from 77 in 1948 to 93 in 1968 and to 160 in 1995 (Table 2.1). Recent efforts by Member States to reverse this trend with the aim of improving the Assembly's functioning have been successful only in part.

UN Members have been constantly concerned with the functioning of the General Assembly and have examined the matter periodically. In the nineties, in light of the changes in the international situation and of the UN's financial difficulties, that examination has intensified.

TABLE 2.1 *Allocation of items to the Main Committees^a*

	1948	1968	1988	1992	1995
Plenary	1	16	41	43	57
First	9	8	26	23	25
Special Political ^b	11	4	10	10	
Second	7 ^c	16	8	16	7
Third	10	17	23	10	14
Fourth ^b	3	12	7	8	12 ^b
Fifth	26	14	16	28	34
Sixth	10	6	14	13	11
Total	77	93	145	151	160

^a Includes substantive agenda items but no sub-items.

^b Fourth Committee was merged in 1993 with the Special Political.

^c Includes four items examined jointly with the Third Committee.

To deal in detail with its agenda items, the Assembly initially set up six main committees: the First for political and security affairs (including the regulation of armaments); the Second for economic and financial matters; the Third for social, humanitarian and cultural questions; the Fourth for trusteeship issues (including non-self-governing territories); the Fifth for administrative and budgetary matters; and the Sixth for legal questions. As early as 1948, however, it became necessary to establish an additional committee, the Special Political Committee, to examine some of the items originally assigned to the First. It should also be recalled that in the forties some items were considered jointly by two and even three main committees.

In September 1993, after lengthy consultations, the Assembly reduced the number of its Main Committees from seven to six, “to respond better to the requirements of the new phase of international relations” (resolution 47/233). This was achieved by merging the Fourth with the Special Political Committee, now known as the “Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee)”. The Assembly also changed the First Committee’s name to “Disarmament and International Security Committee”. The other committees (Second, Third, Fifth and Sixth) remained unchanged.

Each committee considers the items assigned to it and reports the results of its debates to the Plenary. Those reports usually contain draft resolutions approved by the committee and thus recommended to the Plenary for adoption by the General Assembly. Most draft resolutions are drawn up by a single delegation or a group of delegations that then become the sponsors of the draft. The draft is then presented or “introduced” to the committee by the principal sponsor. Occasionally, a draft resolution is put forward by the committee chairperson. This procedure facilitates the circulation of drafts containing compromise texts which the interested delegations are unwilling to submit themselves.

At first, the Plenary limited itself to receiving committee reports and recommendations. Over the years there has been an increase in the items debated directly in Plenary, i.e., without first being referred to a committee. This is because many countries consider that the best way to give an item greater stature is to discuss it in the imposing Plenary Hall.

Consistency and contradictions

The General Assembly has adopted almost eleven thousand resolutions. In the main, their content has been consistent over the years, thus creating a body of opinion on the principal international problems. On occasion, however, the Assembly has acted in a rather inconsistent and even contradictory manner. Here are some examples.

‘Twixt the cup and the lip: Cyprus and French nuclear testing

The Assembly has to emit an opinion on each one of its agenda items. While some items are considered directly in plenary sessions, the majority are referred to the main committees. After examining their assigned items, the committees make recommendations to the Plenary which are almost invariably in the form of draft resolutions (or decisions) adopted in committee.

For the most part, Member States vote in Plenary the same way they voted in committee. There are, however, many instances of vote changes in the Plenary. They occur for different reasons: to correct a mechanical (or human) error in the committee vote; because in the time between the votes there were new developments regarding the issue under consideration; because in the committee they abstained or absented themselves in order to gain a clearer idea of the voting pattern; or because one of the parties most concerned in the matter exercised pressure to change the vote.

Here are two examples of how some countries have changed their committee vote in Plenary. The first case is the “Question of Cyprus” which, at the request of Greece, the General Assembly considered in 1954 and again in 1956. The goal was to allow the inhabitants of Cyprus, then ruled by the United Kingdom, the possibility of exercising their right to self-determination. But the Assembly did not emit an opinion in that regard, nor did it do so in 1956 on another matter, proposed by the UK, concerning the support which Greece was supposedly giving to “terrorism in Cyprus”.

In 1957, Greece submitted a draft resolution requesting that the people of Cyprus be given the opportunity to decide their future. The draft, however, did not obtain the two-thirds necessary for its adoption, given that the matter

TABLE 2.2 *The votes on the question of Cyprus in 1957*

	<i>In Committee</i>	<i>In Plenary</i>
Yes	33	31
No	20	23
Abstention	25	24
Absent	4	4
Total	82	82

was considered to be an “important question” under the terms of the Charter’s Article 18. There were then 82 UN Member States and the Greek draft needed two-thirds of the countries present and voting.

In committee the draft was supported by 33 of the 53 delegations present and voting, that is, almost

two-thirds. In Plenary, however, the affirmative votes went down while the negative votes went up. The two-thirds majority eluded the Greek delegation. Its opponents sought to change the vote of a handful of delegations. Of the 82 Member States, 77 did not do so (on both occasions 31 voted in favor of the draft, 20 voted against it, 23 abstained and three were absent). The five that “changed their mind” were Argentina, Iraq, Morocco, South Africa and Spain. Argentina and Spain abstained in committee but voted “no” in Plenary, thus supporting Turkey and the United Kingdom which led the opposition to the Greek draft. South Africa, which had been absent during the vote in committee, also joined the British position. Finally, in the vote in Plenary, Iraq and Morocco (which had initially supported Greece) decided, respectively, to abstain and absent themselves.

Just before the Plenary vote, Greece’s Foreign Minister made an impassioned defense of Cyprus’ right to self-determination, recalling that in committee the draft had enjoyed the support of 33 countries and that:

. . . both the favourable votes and the abstentions on that draft resolution show us that, by God’s will, the countries which were colonies are playing queer tricks on certain European countries which had colonies, for the case of Cyprus is that of the last European people living under colonialism. And now this people is beginning to achieve its freedom, thanks to the vote of countries which themselves used to be colonies—an odd and chivalrous revenge taken by former colonies on the countries under whose domination they used to be. All honor to those peoples, which, having found freedom themselves, have come to the rescue of this last fraction of a European people still beneath the colonialist yoke. But this revenge is merely symbolic. It is not and should not be the subject of a lengthy debate.

The decisive hour has come. The time for polemics, even those noble polemics we heard in the Committee, is past. The time has come for us to shoulder our responsibilities: we shall discharge them by the way we vote (A/PV.731).

For its part, the UK insisted that one should not attempt “to impose a solution to this problem in the absence of agreement between those directly concerned”. It added that the Greek draft resolution “brings out the distortion of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples—a distortion under which a campaign has for so long been waged on behalf of *enosis*”. Turkey spoke in similar terms and Argentina also echoed the British argument to justify its change of vote in the Plenary (A/PV.731). Thus, in 1957 the UK was able to convince enough delegations to join it in preventing the Assembly from adopting a Greek-sponsored resolution on Cyprus.

Cyprus entered the UN in 1960, the year it gained its independence as a result of the 1959 agreement reached by Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom and endorsed, in turn, by the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. The conflict between those two communities soon re-emerged and has continued, threatening Cyprus’ independence and territorial integrity.

Our second example of how certain nations have applied some “friendly persuasion” in order to have other delegations change their committee vote in Plenary is drawn from the debate regarding the resumption of French nuclear testing in the South Pacific in 1995. That debate took place in the wake of a number of developments in the nuclear-weapons field.

By the early nineties the five recognized nuclear-weapon States—which by a quirk of fate are the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—had begun to rethink the role of those weapons in a post-Cold War world. This was evident in their so-called defense postures reviews. Moreover, China and France had finally joined Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States in supporting the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Finally, all five had come to the conclusion that they would have to undertake concerted action if they wished to reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation, a threat rendered very real by Iraq.

In seeking concrete steps to counter the nuclear proliferation threat, the five nuclear-weapon States decided to ban all nuclear testing, an activity of diminished importance especially for Russia and the United States. This would prevent other countries from going down the same road they themselves had been traveling for decades. Thus the 1993 decision to begin multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT); and thus their successful campaign to ensure the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT in May of 1995.

On the day after the NPT Conference China, which had continued its testing program throughout the CTBT negotiations, carried out yet another test; within a month the new French President announced that he would resume underground nuclear testing in the South Pacific, which his predecessor had suspended for two years, in order to carry out one last round of tests before signing the CTBT in late 1996.

The resumption of French nuclear testing (which was to end in January of 1996) caused a storm of protests from many of the NPT Parties that had recently accepted the Treaty's indefinite extension and were negotiating in earnest a CTBT. In October of 1995, during the disarmament debates in the General Assembly's First Committee, those nations decided to submit a draft resolution in which the Assembly "strongly deplored all current [i.e., Chinese and French] nuclear testing".

France lobbied intensively against that draft resolution both in New York and in foreign capitals. China and the United Kingdom would of course vote against the draft and, by the time it was put to a vote on 16 November, France had also rallied the support of nine countries (its neighbor Monaco, as well as eight African nations: Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo). What is more, France would benefit from the abstention of no less than 45 countries, many of which had been voting in favor of ending all nuclear testing. It also managed to convince no less than 17 additional delegations, mostly from Arab countries, to at least "absent themselves" during the vote (Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Egypt, Haiti, Jordan, Kuwait, Lao, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Vanuatu and Yemen). Some of these nations were soon to be the beneficiaries of renewed French involvement in the Middle East peace process. Aside from these "tactical absences", i.e., physically present but not voting, there were the eight countries that did not participate in the Assembly's session (Central African Republic, Comoros, Dominican Republic, Iraq, Liberia, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia and Yugoslavia).

Once the First Committee had adopted the draft resolution, France launched an even more intense campaign aimed at increasing the negative votes and reducing the affirmative votes when the Plenary considered the draft in mid-December. And it managed to obtain a significant change in the voting pattern.

Among the UN's 185 Members, 132 voted in Plenary as they had a month earlier in the First Committee: 82 in favor, 12 against and 38 abstentions. To these one must add the eight nations not represented at the Assembly's fiftieth session and another nine that did not attend the Plenary meeting on the afternoon of 12 December (Dominica, Gambia, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Seychelles and Uzbekistan). What happened to the remaining 36 delegations? With one exception, they seemed to have bowed to French pressure. The exception was Sierra Leone which was absent during the Committee vote but supported the draft in Plenary. This was to be expected, since many delegations—especially the smaller ones—cannot always cover all the committee meet-

TABLE 2.3 *The votes on French nuclear testing in 1995*

	<i>In Committee</i>	<i>In Plenary</i>
Yes	95	85
No	12	18
Abstention	45	43
Absent	33	39
Total	185	185

ings but make it a point to vote in the Plenary. This usually translates into an increase of some 30 to 40 votes, mostly in the “yes” column.

What was unusual about this Plenary vote was the number of “tactical absences” and the change of heart of 22 delegations: two (DPRK and Na-

mibia) decided to abstain after voting in favor in Committee; another nine affirmative votes disappeared through absences, six real—Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan—and three “tactical”—Antigua and Barbuda, Honduras (which was one of the co-sponsors of the draft in the First Committee) and Iran; one Committee absence became a no vote (Equatorial Guinea) and three turned into abstentions (Cambodia, Guinea and Sudan); five Committee abstentions changed to negative votes (Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Congo and Madagascar) and another two became absences, one real (Gambia) and one “tactical” (Turkmenistan). The result was that the affirmative votes dropped by ten in the Plenary while the negative votes increased from 12 to 18.

In 1995 France managed to convince a surprisingly large number of countries to vote against the draft resolution, move to an abstention or absent themselves. As a result, a resolution that would have normally received over 150 affirmative votes attained a mere 85, less than half of the UN Members. What France failed to achieve, however, was the support of the majority of its European Union partners: only the UK voted with France, while Germany, Greece and Spain abstained; but the other ten voted in favor (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden). As a result, the French President canceled his planned visits to some of the countries that supported the resolution.

Korea: two contradictory resolutions

From 1947 and for almost three decades, both the Security Council and the General Assembly were seized with the question of Korea. In the beginning, the annual Assembly resolutions reflected the US position, and therefore that of the Republic of Korea. This is borne out by the UN role in the Korean War (1950–1953).

Over the years, however, there was growing opposition to those resolutions and, by the early seventies, supporters of the DPRK (North Korea) were almost as numerous as those who defended South Korea. UN Members were by then divided into three more or less equal groups regarding the Ko-

TABLE 2.4 *The votes on the question of Korea in 1975*

<i>Resolutions 3390 A and B (XXX)</i>		
Yes	59	54
No	51	43
Abstention	29	42
Absent	4 ^a	4 ^a
Total	143	143

^a Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Bangladesh and Gambia, as well as South Africa.

rean question: those supporting South Korea, those defending North Korea and those that sought to remain neutral. It was against this background that in 1975 the "Question of Korea" was again debated. The results were most unusual.

The Assembly had already adopted in 1973 a unanimous statement urging the two sides to

continue their dialogue to expedite their peaceful reunification. Ever since the signing of the Armistice Agreement in 1953, however, the presence of the UN (actually US) Command in Korea remained a problem. The Assembly's debate in the autumn of 1975 thus became a sort of popularity contest between the two Koreas. Under the South Korean draft, the UN Command was to continue until "all the parties directly concerned" agreed on new arrangements for maintaining the Armistice Agreement. In contrast, the North Korean draft sought to dissolve the "United Nations Command" and the withdrawal of all foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the UN flag in order to ensure the success of the negotiations among "the real parties" to the Armistice Agreement.

Resolutions 3390 A and B (XXX) contradicted each other. The position with regard to them had to be consistent, that is, to vote in favor of the first and against the second (or vice versa) or abstain on both. And 118 of the 139 Member States that took part in the vote did exactly that (Table 2.4). There were 21 other countries that, in one way or another, accepted the contradiction. Kuwait voted against the first draft and abstained on the second. Four countries (Burma, Chad, Panama and Uganda) abstained on the first and voted in favor of the second. Another sixteen nations favored the South Korean draft, but abstained on the North Korean one (Austria, Brazil, Ecuador, Greece, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Maldives, Mauritius, Morocco, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand and Venezuela).

From that point on, the Assembly refrained from addressing the Korean question. In 1991 the UN admitted the two Koreas separately.

The repeal of resolutions: the two cases

The contradictory nature of the pronouncements on the Korean question reflected a clear difference of opinion among UN Members. And, unwittingly and on the same day, the Assembly molded that difference into two sepa-

TABLE 2.5 *The votes on the question of Spain (1946 and 1950)*

<i>Resolution</i>	<i>32 (I)</i>	<i>39 (I)</i>	<i>386 (V)</i>
<i>Year</i>	<i>1946</i>	<i>1946</i>	<i>1950</i>
Yes	46	34	38
No	2	6	10
Abstention	0	13	12
Absent	3	1	0
Total	51	54	60

rate resolutions. One thing is to contradict oneself and quite another is to correct oneself. And on two occasions the Assembly has corrected itself by repealing a previous resolution: in the case of the UN's relations with Franco's Spain and the item on Zionism. Both repeals were, quite obviously, the result of changes in the Assembly's political climate.

The question of which States could become UN Members gave rise to prolonged debates at the San Francisco Conference. Article 4 of the Charter provides that, in addition to the original Members, the UN is open to "all other peace-loving states" which accept the Charter's provisions and "are able and willing to carry out those obligations". It then stipulates that such States shall be admitted "by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council". But in San Francisco it had also been decided to exclude explicitly those "States whose regimes had been installed with the help of armed forces of countries which have fought against the United Nations so long as these regimes are in power".

Months earlier, at the Potsdam Conference, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States had agreed not to consider a request for UN admission by "the present Spanish Government" since it was founded "with the support of the Axis Powers" and because, "in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States, does not possess the necessary qualifications to justify admission". In its resolution 32 (I) of 9 February 1946, the Assembly recommended that UN Member States "should act in accordance with the letter and spirit of these statements in the conduct of their future relations with Spain".

In May and June of 1946, the Security Council examined the question of the relations of UN Member States with Spain and unanimously agreed on a series of recommendations which the Assembly endorsed in its resolution 39 (I) of 12 December 1946: first, the "Franco Fascist Government" did not represent the Spanish people since it was imposed on them by force with the aid of the Axis Powers; second, the Franco Government be debarred from membership in international agencies established by or brought into relationship with the United Nations "until a new and acceptable government is formed in Spain"; third, if such a new government were not established "within a reasonable time", the Security Council would consider "the adequate measures to be taken in order to remedy the situation"; and fourth, all UN Members "immediately recall from Madrid their Ambassadors and Min-

isters plenipotentiary accredited there”, and that they inform the Assembly in 1947 of the action they had taken in that regard.

As the Cold War intensified, the “Franco Fascist Government” became a key player in the US crusade against Communism. The wind had changed. In its resolution 386 (V) of 4 November 1950, the Assembly revoked its 1946 recommendations because “the establishment of diplomatic relations and the exchange of Ambassadors and Ministers with a government does not imply any judgment upon the domestic policy of that government” and because UN specialized agencies are “technical and largely non-political in character and have been established in order to benefit the peoples of all nations and that, therefore, they should be free to decide for themselves whether the participation of Spain in their activities is desirable in the interest of their work”. The Cold War had managed to blur the moral vision of 1945 by distorting the essence of the United Nations itself.

The resolutions regarding the case of Spain were adopted by a vote (Table 2.5). The ten countries which in 1950 opposed the repeal of the 1946 resolutions were six from Eastern Europe (Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukraine, USSR and Yugoslavia), three from Latin America (Guatemala, Mexico and Uruguay) and Israel. There were twelve abstentions: Australia, Burma, Cuba, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, India, Indonesia, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

Among the 38 nations that supported the repeal were the six that had opposed resolution 39 (I): Argentina, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador and Peru. Twelve more had abstained in 1946: Afghanistan, Canada, Colombia, Egypt, Greece, Honduras, Lebanon, Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Syria and Turkey. Cuba abstained on both resolutions. Of the remaining 20 that supported resolution 386 (V), 16 had previously supported resolution 39 (I): Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Haiti, Iceland, Iran, Liberia, Luxembourg, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, United States and Venezuela. The others were Iraq (absent in 1946) and Pakistan, Thailand and Yemen that joined the UN after 1946.

The second time the General Assembly repealed one of its decisions was on 16 December 1991 when, by resolution 46/86, it revoked resolution 3379 (XXX) of 10 November 1975 in whose single, short operative paragraph it had declared “that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination”. The change was due primarily to two factors. Firstly, there were many UN Members that wished to right the wrong of 1975 and, secondly, the United States—the great victor of the Gulf War and the main host of the Middle East Peace Conference—wished, as a gesture to the Israeli Government and, therefore, to US Jewish groups on the eve of an election year, to demonstrate its renewed strength within the Assembly.

TABLE 2.6 *The votes on "Zionism is racism" (1975 and 1991)*

Resolution	3379 (XXX)	46/86
Year	1975	1991
Yes	71	111
No	35	25
Abstention	33	13
Absent	4 ^a	17 ^a
Total	143	166

^a Includes South Africa

The truth is that resolution 3379 (XXX) caused much harm to the Organization. It was adopted at a time when the Arab countries, encouraged by the Soviet Union and other nations of the now defunct Socialist bloc, had a disproportionate influence because of what was termed "the oil weapon". By the mid-seventies, moreover, a large part of the international commu-

nity had begun to show signs of a growing impatience with Israel. All of this, however, was translated into a resolution whose content can only be qualified as an affront to the United Nations. What the Arab countries really wanted was to denounce the way Palestinians were being, and continue to be, treated in the territories occupied by Israel since 1967. But what they submitted was a text that said something altogether different.

In November of 1975, when resolution 3379 (XXX) was adopted, 139 of the UN's then 143 Member States took part in the vote: 71 in favor, 35 against and 33 abstentions. Comoros, Romania and Spain were absent, while South Africa had been suspended. In other words, almost half of the UN's membership supported the resolution. Moreover, it obtained the two-thirds of those "present and voting".

In 1991, when the Assembly decided to revoke that resolution, 149 of the then 166 Member States participated in the decision: 111 in favor, 25 against and thirteen abstentions. South Africa was still suspended and 16 countries, mostly Arabs, were absent: thirteen of them had voted in favor of resolution 3379 (XXX) in 1975 (Bahrain, Chad, China, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kuwait, Morocco, Niger, Oman, Senegal and Tunisia), another (Comoros) had also been absent in 1975 and two others (Djibouti and Vanuatu) entered the UN after that year.

In introducing resolution 46/86, US Under-Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger stressed, paraphrasing one of President Reagan's speeches of a decade earlier, that it was "more than time to consign one of the last relics of the cold war to the dustbin of history". On behalf of the Arab Group, Lebanon's representative stated that there was much evidence of the intensification of racial discrimination against Palestinians and other inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories. He added that it was surprising that the United States, having worked assiduously to convene the Madrid Conference and to advance the peace process in the Middle East, should submit a draft resolution whose adoption could jeopardize it. Before the vote, Yemen proposed that the revocation of an Assembly resolution be considered as "an important question" thus requiring a two-thirds majority of those "present and voting".

The Yemeni motion was rejected by a vote of 34 in favor, 96 against and thirteen abstentions (A/46/PV.74).

The international climate in 1991 was in fact very different from that of 1975. Although, in a show of political consistency, the 35 countries that in 1975 had opposed resolution 3379 (XXX) supported its repeal in 1991, another 76 States now joined them: 18 of the 25 that entered the UN after the adoption of the resolution, two (Romania and Spain) that had been absent in 1975, 27 that had abstained, as well as 29 that changed their mind completely: Albania, Belarus, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Gambia, Grenada, Guyana, Hungary, India, Madagascar, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Poland, Portugal, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Ukraine, USSR and Yugoslavia.

On the other hand, only 22 of the 71 countries that in 1975 supported resolution 3379 (XXX) opposed its repeal: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Cuba, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, UA Emirates and Yemen. They were joined by three new UN Members (Brunei Darussalam, DPRK and Viet Nam). No one else opposed its revocation. As already noted, thirteen supporters of the 1975 resolution “absented themselves” in 1991. Two more (Democratic Yemen and the GDR) had merged with another Member State, five (Lao, Maldives, Tanzania, Turkey and Uganda) moved to an abstention and 29 did a complete about-face.

In sum: in the 1975 and 1991 votes, 64 countries maintained their position whereas 76 changed it, most notably the 29 that went from supporting resolution 3379 (XXX) to requesting its repeal and the thirteen countries, mostly Arabs, that decided “to be absent” in 1991.

The difficult questions

Among the many complex international issues considered by the UN, none have been more tangled and entangling than the problems of *apartheid* and the Middle East. Both have been very difficult to solve and both have had a negative influence on the Organization. They have polarized the General Assembly, undermining its work and, on occasion, putting into doubt the role of the UN itself in the search for solutions to those and other questions. Both figured uninterruptedly on its agenda into the nineties, producing the most heated debates and the most drawn out procedural discussions, and were the object of repeated (and repetitive) resolutions.

A perennial item: *apartheid*

Over the years the policy of certain countries has given rise to vigorous condemnations by the international community. In the annals of the UN there are several examples of Members States whose actions were, at one time or another, the subject of unanimous repudiation by the General Assembly. For a time that honor was bestowed upon Portugal because of its obstinate defense of a decadent empire. But, unquestionably, the UN's foremost pariah was South Africa. On the one hand, for several decades it defied the Assembly by trying to remain indefinitely in Namibia, a decolonization case which was finally resolved in 1990. On the other, South Africa maintained, until the nineties, its policy of *apartheid*. That policy of racial segregation legalized in the late forties and imposed by a white minority Government on the black majority of its inhabitants produced more Assembly resolutions than any other single item.

It was not until 1952 that the question of *apartheid* appeared on the Assembly's agenda. Since 1946, however, the racial policies of the South African Government had been discussed with regard to a related issue, submitted by India: the treatment given persons of Indian origin in the then Union of South Africa. An attempt was made to resolve the matter through talks between the two governments concerned, bilateral negotiations that later became trilateral when Pakistan joined the UN.

For South Africa the question of *apartheid* was an internal matter and could therefore not be addressed by the UN. At the behest of several delegations, however, it was inscribed on the General Assembly's agenda in 1952, the year when several modest steps were taken: first, to study the racial situation in South Africa and, second, to ensure that all Member States acted in conformity with their Charter obligations to promote the observance of human rights and basic freedoms. The re-inscription of the item on the agenda for 1955 was hotly debated and finally accepted by a vote. Of the then 60 UN Members, 50 voted in favor of inscribing the item, six against (Australia, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, South Africa and United Kingdom) and four abstained (Dominican Republic, Netherlands, New Zealand and Turkey). In other words, the great majority of Western European countries, as well as Canada and the United States, gave their consent to discuss the item on *apartheid* in the Assembly (A/PV.476). A year later, on 6 December 1955, the adoption of resolution 917 (X) on *apartheid* was to cause the South African delegation to withdraw from the Assembly. South Africa had voted against the resolution together with the other five States that had opposed the inscription of the item from the beginning.

In 1955 South Africa withdrew voluntarily from the General Assembly Hall. Eighteen years later, its withdrawal was not so voluntary.

For some, the UN was going too far with regard to South Africa. For others, it was not doing enough. The truth was that, with the admission of numerous African countries, the Assembly began to take ever more energetic measures. In the sixties pressure mounted to suspend South Africa from the Assembly. The question was raised when the Assembly considered the report of the Credentials Committee, the body charged with verifying that the credentials of the representatives of Member States are in order. In December 1965 several delegations had objected to the credentials of "the representatives of the racist Government of Pretoria". South Africa's representative (and later Foreign Minister), Pik Botha, defended himself by arguing that there were two criteria applied until then to accept a delegation's credentials: first, that the delegation represent a UN Member State and, second, that the credentials be signed by the corresponding constitutional authority. He added that his delegation had fulfilled both requisites (A/PV.1407).

The Assembly took no action in 1965 regarding the South African case, but the matter was raised year after year until 1970, when it decided, in resolution 2636 A (XXV), to approve the Credentials Committee's report "except as regards the credentials of the representatives of South Africa". That same formula was used in the 1971, 1972 and 1973 sessions. In 1974, however, a more definitive step was taken when, on 12 November, the Assembly, by a vote of 91 to 22 with 19 abstentions, endorsed a ruling by its President (Algerian Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika) interpreting the annual rejection of South Africa's credentials as a repudiation of South Africa's participation in the work of the Assembly. It was not an expulsion, but its effect was the same.

The "parliamentary maneuver" by the General Assembly's President was successful because there was a widespread feeling that "something had to be done" regarding South Africa. Earlier in the session, in its resolution 3207 (XXIX) of 30 September 1974, the Assembly had called upon the Security Council to review "the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa in the light of the constant violation by South Africa of the principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights". Of the then 137 UN Members, 125 voted in favor of the resolution, including such countries as Australia, Canada and New Zealand, as well as Portugal which until that year had voted in tandem with South Africa on similar issues. Only South Africa voted against it and nine countries abstained: France, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as the Shah's Iran, Israel, Banda's Malawi, Somoza's Nicaragua, Stroessner's Paraguay and Franco's Spain. Equatorial Guinea and Swaziland "absented themselves".

In October 1974 the Security Council debated the question of "the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa". A draft resolution (S/11543) was submitted by Cameroon, Kenya and Mauritania, who were

joined later by Iraq. The draft recommended that the Assembly immediately expel South Africa from the UN in accordance with Article 6 of the Charter which reads: "A Member of the United Nations that has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council".

It was a drastic measure but one which, as the draft resolution noted, was fully justified for three reasons: first, South Africa refused to abandon its policy of *apartheid*; second, it continued to refuse to withdraw its forces from Namibia; and third, it was supporting the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia by sending military and police forces in violation of the pertinent Security Council resolutions. Ten Council members lent their support to the draft resolution when it was put to a vote on 30 October 1974: Australia, Byelorussia, Cameroon, China, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Mauritania, Peru and the Soviet Union. Two countries (Austria and Costa Rica) abstained, while France, the UK and the US voted against it.

As a result of that triple veto in the Security Council, the General Assembly intensified its condemnation of South Africa. The number of resolutions increased and the criticism of certain Western countries, especially France, the United Kingdom and the United States, multiplied. They were condemned, at times "energetically", for their continued collaboration with the Pretoria Government, their collusion with South Africa in the nuclear field, their chrome and nickel imports from Southern Rhodesia and for allowing their companies to go on exploiting Namibia's natural resources. And they were condemned by name. This, in turn, gave rise to the stridency of the campaign waged in the eighties by the United States and others against the so-called "name-calling" in the Assembly.

Towards the late eighties, but especially after Nelson Mandela's release from prison in 1990 and the South African Government's decision in 1991 to begin dismantling its *apartheid* regime, there were remarkable changes in the situation in Southern Africa. Moreover, with the end of the Cold War, Namibia achieved its independence and a process of national reconciliation began in Angola and Mozambique. The most symbolic event of those changes was the accession of Nelson Mandela to the Presidency of the Republic of South Africa on 10 May 1994. He concluded his inaugural address with the following words: "Never, never and never again shall it be that this beautiful land will again experience the oppression of one by another and suffer the indignity of being the skunk of the world".

On 23 June 1994, when South Africa resumed its participation in the General Assembly, its Foreign Minister insisted that "his country's long night of diplomatic isolation had finally come to an end" (A/48/PV.95).

The Middle East: mission impossible?

How has the United Nations approached the problem of the Middle East? From the beginning the relations between that region and the UN were turbulent and after 1967 the epicenter of that turbulence became, according to the General Assembly, the State of Israel and its treatment of the Palestinian people. The problem was raised as early as April 1947 in the United Kingdom's request to include the "question of Palestine" on the agenda of the Assembly's following regular session. There the UK had the intention of giving an account of how it had administered its League of Nations mandate over Palestine, and requested the establishment of a special committee to study the question *before* the regular session. To appoint the members of that special committee, the UK further requested the early convening of a special session of the Assembly. And this is how the Assembly's first special session (from 28 April to 15 May 1947) came to be. The only item discussed was the constitution of the special committee on Palestine. Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria tried unsuccessfully to include a second item entitled "Termination of the international mandate over Palestine and the declaration of its independence".

On 15 May 1947 the Assembly set up the eleven-member UN Special Committee on Palestine (Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia). It had full powers to investigate all questions regarding the situation in Palestine and to make recommendations.

On 31 August the Committee submitted a report containing two different proposals. The first—underwritten by Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay—recommended the partition of Palestine into two independent States: one Jewish and the other Arab. The City of Jerusalem was to be placed under an international regime administered by the UN and the three entities thus created would be linked by an economic union. The second proposal, known as the minority plan because it had been endorsed only by India, Iran and Yugoslavia, recommended the establishment of one federal independent State, that would include one Arab and one Jewish State, whose federal capital would be Jerusalem. Australia held that both proposals went beyond the Committee's mandate and thus refrained from supporting either.

With the so-called majority plan for the partition of Palestine and with the growing violence in that territory, the British Government hastened to withdraw from the region. By the middle of 1947 the die was cast.

In September of 1947 the Assembly again considered the question of Palestine and, on 29 November, it endorsed the majority plan in its resolution 181 (II), adopted by a vote of 33 to thirteen with ten abstentions. The

violence continued. The Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees was established. And Israel joined the UN in May 1949. The withdrawal of the European Powers from the region was completed after July 1956, when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal Company. The conflict ended in early 1957 when the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) entered the Gaza/Sinai zone. The first stage of the UN's involvement in the Middle East had concluded.

In June 1967, soon after Egypt requested UNEF's withdrawal, the so-called Six-Day War put an abrupt end to the second phase of that history. Since then and after Security Council resolution 242, the atmosphere in the Assembly became increasingly radical in favor of the Palestinian cause. Arab delegations stepped up their attacks against Israel. As a result of the 1973 Yom Kippur War and Security Council resolution 338, Israel was increasingly isolated until President Sadat's dramatic visit to Jerusalem in 1977. With the 1979 Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel, the Arab position weakened within the UN. Consequently, Egypt was ignored by and excluded from several fora of Arab countries until the late eighties. However, with the 1991 Gulf War and the Soviet Union's collapse, the more radical Arab nations softened their position in the face of United States omnipresence which, in the fall of that year, resulted in the launching of a peace process with the participation of all the parties involved in the Middle East conflict. The first important fruit of that peace process was the signing in September 1993 of an agreement between Israel and the PLO, which was brokered by Norway and would become, after the one in 1979 with Egypt, the first of several understandings between Israel and its neighbors.

For years there had been talk of convening, under UN auspices, a peace conference on the Middle East. However, neither the Security Council nor the General Assembly, which were at the center of the debates on this question, are directly involved in the conference convened by the United States, as well as, in theory, by the then Soviet Union.

The tendency to by-pass the UN in the search for solutions to the world's major problems has also been evident in the field of disarmament and international economic relations, two issues of fundamental importance to the life of multilateral organizations. In both cases, the principal military and economic Powers turned initially to the General Assembly, but over the last several decades they have downplayed its role.

The fundamental issues

The United Nations' principal objectives can be summed up in a few words: decolonization, human rights, development and disarmament. Of the four,

decolonization is undoubtedly where the Organization has had its most tangible successes.

A farewell to colonies: the weight of the files

The General Assembly has spoken out with an unequivocal voice on almost all of the specific cases of decolonization since 1945. And the results are there: almost one hundred of today's UN Members gained their independence since the founding of the Organization.

In some decolonization cases the UN made extraordinary efforts. The clearest example is that of Namibia. Administered by South Africa under a League of Nations mandate, Namibia (formerly South West Africa) achieved independence only in 1990. After defying the international community for two decades, South Africa lost its mandate in 1966, when the Assembly decided to place the Territory under direct UN responsibility. For almost a quarter-century the Council on Namibia administered the Territory, although South Africa continued to govern it *de facto*.

The Namibian case is proof of the Assembly's intense involvement in some decolonization matters. That intensity was generated in response to the persistence of the opprobrious *apartheid* regime and South Africa's intransigence with regard to Namibia.

At the other extreme are the rare decolonization cases on which the General Assembly remained silent. The most obvious is the Vietnamese people's anti-colonial struggle for over two decades. It is true that the case was raised in many speeches beginning in the fifties. It is also true that Secretary-General U Thant repeatedly referred to the Viet Nam War and that the item was included in the Security Council's agenda in the sixties at the request of the United States (and thus from a very different viewpoint). But, except for certain human rights aspects, the Assembly never pronounced itself on the substance of the question. The Assembly's silence can perhaps be explained in part by the fact that some countries interpreted Viet Nam's anti-colonial struggle as another chapter in the East/West rivalry whose discussion would only polarize the UN further. In the end, however, there was no one in the Assembly who was willing to bell the cat.

In most decolonization cases the Assembly devoted itself patiently to the task of putting together the pertinent files whose own weight was, in the end, the key to convincing colonial Powers to change their policy.

The problem of non-self-governing territories was debated fully at the San Francisco Conference and the UN Charter enshrined the principle of self-determination of peoples. There were those who, like Marshall Smuts of South Africa, favored a single regime for all those territories. But, in the end,

TABLE 2.7 *UN Trusteeship agreements*

<i><u>Territory</u></i>	<i><u>Administering Power</u></i>
1. Nauru:	Australia, on behalf of NZ and UK as well
2. New Guinea:	Australia
3. Ruanda-Urundi:	Belgium
4. Cameroon:	France
5. Togo:	France
6. Somalia:	Italy
7. Western Samoa:	New Zealand
8. Cameroon:	United Kingdom
9. Tanganyika:	United Kingdom
10. Togo:	United Kingdom
11. Pacific Islands:	United States

it was decided to deal separately with the non-self-governing (Chapter XI of the Charter) and the trust territories (Chapters XII and XIII).

Which were those territories and how should the General Assembly proceed? As early as 1946 it had identified 74 non-self-governing territories (colonies, protectorates, overseas territories or provinces and associate states) belonging to UN Member States: Australia, Belgium, Denmark,

France, Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States. In 1960, and after several years of debates, the Assembly added the territories of Portugal and Spain. Those territories are listed in Appendix II.

On the other hand, the UN's international trusteeship system covered territories under League of Nations mandates, territories "detached from enemy States" after World War II and others voluntarily placed under the system (Article 77 of the Charter).

In its early years, the UN adopted eleven trusteeship agreements: ten by the General Assembly and one—the so-called Pacific Islands—by the Security Council (Table 2.7). The latter included the Marshall, Marianas (except for Guam) and Caroline Islands. They had previously been administered under a Japanese mandate. Given their strategic nature, the agreement regarding this territory was approved, in accordance with the Charter, by the Council instead of the Assembly.

Having identified the non-self-governing and trust territories, the General Assembly had to decide how to proceed to ensure for the inhabitants of those territories the exercise of their right to self-determination. With that aim, the Assembly drew up and approved, in its resolution 742 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, a detailed list of "factors indicative of the attainment of independence or of other separate systems of self-government".

On the other hand, according to the UN Charter (Article 18 [2]), General Assembly resolutions on territories under the international trusteeship system were subject to the "important question" rule, that is, they required a two-thirds majority. And, in its resolution 844 (IX) of 11 October 1954, the Assembly reiterated its view that any decision regarding the question of Namibia required a two-thirds majority. This was confirmed by the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion of 7 July 1955.

With regard to the non-self-governing territories the thesis of a simple majority was accepted for the adoption of Assembly decisions. In the early fifties, however, there were those that began to insist that the matters related to Chapter XI of the Charter also required a two-thirds majority. Others defended the view that the simple majority rule should continue to apply in matters regarding non-self-governing territories (A/PV.459).

At the Assembly's eleventh session (1956–1957), an attempt was made to rescind that interpretation. It was achieved by a tactical procedure applied to one of the draft resolutions recommended by the Fourth Committee. The draft sought to reaffirm the Assembly's competence with regard to the information on non-self-governing territories that UN Members had the obligation to transmit according to the Charter's Article 73 (e) which reads:

Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibility for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost . . . the well-being of the inhabitants of those territories, and, to this end, . . . to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purpose, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapter XII and Chapter XIII apply.

In line with the draft recommended by the Fourth Committee, the Assembly would have established an *ad hoc* committee to study how the provisions of Chapter XI applied to the recently-admitted Member States. The idea was to analyze their reports and place the Assembly in a better situation to act upon them. The co-sponsors of the draft obviously had in mind two of the 16 States that joined the UN in December of 1955: Portugal and Spain. On 20 February 1957, Portugal's representative made a long and dramatic defense of his nation's unity, including its overseas provinces. He noted that soon after entering the UN, his Government had received a communication from the Secretary-General asking whether, for the purposes of Article 73 of the Charter, Portugal administered non-self-governing territories. His Government had replied on 8 November 1956 that "it did not administer any territory to which that Article of the Charter might apply". He then reviewed in detail the history of Portugal's territorial unity, referring to Angola, Sao Tome, Goa and the rest of Portugal's overseas "provinces" (A/PV.656).

Spain sided with Portugal, arguing that to concentrate on the “recently-admitted Members” was an unacceptable discrimination (A/PV.657). The Assembly was by then considering a motion by Sweden to the effect that the draft resolution under consideration constituted an important question whose adoption was subject to the two-thirds rule (A/PV.656). Several delegates reacted immediately to the Swedish motion, and it was perhaps the representative of Yugoslavia who best described the situation when he stated:

The question whether draft resolutions or, it may be more correct to say, some draft resolutions, relating to the application of Chapter XI of the Charter should or should not be voted upon by a two-thirds majority is, as everyone in this Assembly knows, not a new one. It has been raised in the past and, significantly enough, almost always in cases where the interests of one or more Administering Powers were involved. In this case, I submit that reason is the same (A/PV.656).

The Swedish motion was approved by a vote of 38 in favor, 34 against and six abstentions. That same day the draft resolution recommended by the Fourth Committee was rejected by a vote of 35 in favor, 35 against and five abstentions. Sudan’s delegate then took the floor to say:

Unlike other resolutions, the draft resolution does not conflict with our aims and policies of defending the rights of all the Non-Self-Governing Territories and peoples who are unable to come before this body and do so themselves. . . . [W]e shall bring it up once again, and if it is again defeated we shall, in accordance with our principles, come back to it, for weariness will certainly not overcome an idea which is based upon an essential principle (A/PV.657).

Twenty years later, as a result of the political changes that followed the “Revolution of the Carnations”, Portugal was to accept, later rather than sooner, the independence of its overseas “provinces”.

The position taken by Spain and especially Portugal towards the end of the fifties was a somewhat exaggerated repetition of what other colonial powers had tried to do in the UN: to prevent the Organization from discussing their territories in Africa, Asia, Latin America or Oceania. They sought to postpone, as far as possible, the inevitable, arguing that these were not colonies but rather “overseas provinces” and, therefore, subject to Article 2 (7) of the Charter, i.e., that the UN cannot “interfere in matters that are essentially of the internal jurisdiction of States”.

The attitude of the colonial Powers was contrary to one of the basic principles of the Charter: the self-determination of peoples. Since 1946 the vast

majority of UN Members sought to set in motion an irreversible process of decolonization. And, as the UN redoubled its efforts to achieve this aim, the few countries with colonial skeletons in their closets became increasingly isolated in the Assembly. During a first stage—from 1946 to the adoption in 1960 of the Declaration on Decolonization—information regarding the non-self-governing territories was gathered and the Fourth Committee listened to the inhabitants or petitioners of those territories. Then, after 1960, the Assembly became increasingly impatient, especially with Portugal, South Africa and, to a lesser extent, Spain.

Not all of the colonial powers reacted like Portugal or, even less, like South Africa. Belgium resisted the loss of its 2.4 million km² in the Congo, whose independence came about in 1960 upon the precipitate withdrawal of Belgian forces and its tragic consequences. The United Kingdom, perhaps to avoid a repetition of its sad experience in Ireland, was able to manage better the crisis of the dismantling of its empire, opting for a policy closer to the call by the UN and the aspirations of the peoples of the territories it administered. Something similar was done by the Netherlands, while the future of the Italian colonies was largely resolved in 1945 by the Allied victory.

France lacked some *savoir-faire*. In fact, immediately after World War II, the French Government hastened to incorporate several of its colonies as overseas departments or territories. Thus, when the Assembly drew up in 1946 the list of non-self-governing territories on which Member States would have to transmit information to the Secretary-General, France did not include Algeria. Moreover, in 1947 France stopped transmitting information regarding Guyana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, New Caledonia, Reunion and Saint Pierre and Miquelon since they were overseas departments or territories. However, the question of Algeria was indeed considered by the Assembly and France had to accept it even though, as it noted in 1957, it had no intention to withdraw from that territory since “its absence would trigger anarchy and misery and, probably, even civil war”, adding that it would never renounce its right under Article 2 (7) of the Charter (A/PV.700).

With regard to trust territories, there was greater solidarity among the administering authorities. As early as 1952, in its resolution 558 (VI), the Assembly had requested those administering authorities to report on the “period of time in which it is expected that the Trust Territory shall attain the objective of self government or independence”. In this way the Assembly sought to accelerate the process of self-determination in those territories. In early 1957 the Assembly again insisted that “concrete dates” be fixed for the attainment of the autonomy or independence of the trust territories, especially Tanganyika and British Cameroon, French Cameroon and Togo and Ruanda-Urundi. Resolution 1064 (XI) of 26 February 1957 received fourteen negative votes, including those of the United Kingdom, France and Belgium,

as well as Australia, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United States. Except for Portugal, all of them had trust territories (A/PV.661).

The decolonization process, now virtually complete, was for decades the source of an almost permanent tension between the UN and the colonial Powers. The Assembly played a key role in demanding that those Powers fulfill the provisions of the Charter and transmit information to the UN regarding their non-self-governing or trust territories.

The importance of the foregoing was underlined by Julius Nyerere who, more than any other post-war independence leader, embodied the link between the anticolonial struggle and the UN's efforts in that field. For years he participated as a petitioner of a trust territory in the work of the Assembly's Fourth Committee. Therein lies the very special significance of his presence in the Assembly on 14 December 1961, the day Tanganyika was admitted to the UN. In his address to the General Assembly, Prime Minister Nyerere expressed his gratitude for the contribution of its Members to his country's struggle for independence. He said it was not easy to thank others for what had been achieved by the people of Tanganyika. But the fact that his country had been a trust territory under British administration had contributed much to the peaceful attainment of its independence. He added that colonialism could no longer continue and the only thing left was to choose between the immediate independence of all colonies and orderly independence under the supervision of an international organization. And Tanganyika was an example of the latter.

Nyerere stressed that every society required order and a legal system in which the supreme authority has the approval of the majority and, if the case arose, could impose itself upon a dissident minority. The hasty withdrawal of some metropolitan authorities had caused great damage. But perhaps it was the only way possible given the suspicion of colonial peoples regarding the administering powers' true intentions. Since they were unable to judge impartially their own actions, the UN should assume the role of arbiter. He suggested that any power that was truly interested in promoting the development of the peoples in its colonies should treat them as trust territories and submit annual reports to the UN on the advances made in the establishment of a local authority to which they could transfer the responsibility of government. Nyerere welcomed the change in the position of the United Kingdom which, having resisted for years, would transmit annually to the UN information on all of its territories. And he expressed the hope that the other colonial powers would follow Britain's example (A/PV.1078). Not all of them did.

Human rights: a problem of definition

The self-determination of peoples is one of the basic human rights. After World War I, when US President Wilson spoke of the “principle of self-determination”, he had in mind the new political situation in Europe, especially the cases of Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia. Twenty-five years later, the San Francisco Charter enshrined that principle by expressly mentioning it in the chapters regarding non-self-governing or trust territories. This was a decisive step and in the UN’s early years an intense debate developed regarding the significance and scope of the self-determination principle: What was understood by self-determination or self-government? Was it a right or a principle and what constituted “a people”? What were the rights of the minorities? Some insisted that one could not speak of “the right to self-determination” as if it were part of the rights and freedoms of the individual. Over time another point of view prevailed: human rights cover both the rights and freedoms of individuals as well as the collective rights of peoples.

In 1946 the UN established its Human Rights Commission which, beginning in 1947 and under the guidance of Eleanor Roosevelt, devoted itself to the drafting of a declaration on the subject. After the adoption in 1948 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the UN concentrated on the negotiation of a series of international instruments covering different aspects of the subject: a statute on refugees, genocide, slavery, torture, racial discrimination, *apartheid*, the rights of women, children, invalids and the mentally retarded, as well as migrant workers.

In 1966 the General Assembly adopted both the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Those Covenants refer to collective rights, beginning with the right of all peoples to self-determination. Their adoption was not easy since the idea of the covenants themselves had been resisted for years by those countries that wanted the UN to confine itself to the defense of individual rights, as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In fact, it was not until 1955 that the Assembly decided to continue drafting those Covenants whose texts had been drawn up by the Human Rights Commission. However, the proposed inclusion of the right to self-determination had proved to be very controversial. That was finally achieved in 1952 at the initiative of Chile but only after a significant vote. Among the then 60 UN Members, 36 supported the inclusion of that principle, eleven voted against (Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States), another twelve abstained (Argentina, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Hondu-

ras, Iceland, Israel, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, Uruguay and Venezuela), while South Africa did not participate in the vote.

Belgium explained the reasons for its opposition to such a right. In the first place, because it did not refer to the problem of minorities:

In reality we are concerned today not with the right of peoples to control their own fate, but the right of majorities, or of the governments elected by these majorities, to control the fate of peoples. It is because we champion human rights for all, and in particular the rights of minorities, that we oppose this draft resolution.

In the second place, because:

It is well to proclaim the right of peoples to self-determination, and certainly no one will repudiate so noble a principle. But the principle must be surrounded by a variety of guarantees and technical procedures. We must be told to whom a people which desires to vindicate its right to self-determination should submit its claim, a point not answered in the draft resolution. We should also be told at what point, and at what stage of political maturity a people will be entitled to claim this right. None of these matters, I repeat, is mentioned in the draft resolution on which we are about to vote. That is one of the chief reasons why we shall not support it (A/PV.374).

The United States, the United Kingdom and France spoke in similar terms (A/PV.374 and 375). On the other hand, the Chilean proposal was defended by several countries, including the Socialist group, Mexico and Saudi Arabia (A/PV.374 and 375). On the day of the vote, 5 February 1952, Saudi Ambassador Jamil Baroody declared:

The indigenous people of the world will no longer be soothed or calmed down by being presented with documents which promise them protection of life by law without adequate food, which promise them freedom from servitude without the security of work, which promise them, in other words, a multitude of political and civil rights without those economic and social conditions without which liberty and the sanctity of life become mere words. The indigenous people seething with unrest will no longer be beguiled by empty promises but may revolt, they may fight, and they may die fighting, with the result that in the upheaval and turmoil political and civil rights will be suspended for many years. It is indeed tragic that rebellion and revolution should

be resorted to once in a while in history as the method for bringing about reform in the world.

. . . [the representative] of Belgium seemed to make fun of the draft resolution on the right of self-determination . . . simply because it so happened that he belonged to a minority. Every time a minority meets with a defeat some of its members try to rationalize their stand and engage in sarcasm and make fun of either the incoherence or the unintelligibility of a certain text (A/PV.375).

The subject of human rights has given rise to long debates and innumerable oratorical contests in the Assembly and other multilateral fora. The discussion has often revolved around the attempts by some to favor the so-called rights of the individual and by others to defend the so-called collective human rights, including the right to development. The first have argued that the 1948 Universal Declaration is the point of departure for the multilateral consideration of the subject, while the latter have insisted on the primacy of the Covenants approved in 1966, the year when UN membership began to reflect better the reality of a post-colonial world. At both the first World Conference on Human Rights (Teheran 1968) and the second (Vienna 1993), the debate revolved around that same dichotomy and it will probably continue for some time. The problem is in part one of definition, but it is also the product of the constant politicizing of the human rights question. We shall attempt to shed some light.

The United Nations and human rights

Let us begin with the obvious. When speaking of “instincts” one could probably draw up a list of what is generally understood by “instinctive behavior” or “reflex action”. Though this is common to all animals, in many mammals instinctive behavior is overlaid by acquired or learned patterns. If we accept the existence of a survival instinct, we can proceed from there to the question of security.

Almost all animals appear to be concerned about their security, i.e., their survival. But only some, like beavers or human beings, can do something about it. The sources of insecurity are their habitat—the terrain, the elements, the availability of food and water, etc.—and other animals. Beavers can build dams in streams or rivers to ensure a safe environment but they cannot save their skins from hunters.

For human beings, nature also poses security threats; but the greatest insecurity comes from fellow human beings. Like persons, countries are

subjected to constant threats: military, economic and political. In the words of Benito Juárez, “Among individuals, as among nations, respect for the rights of others is peace”. To be secure is to live and develop in peace.

Whether international, regional or subregional, security is indissolubly linked to peace. That is the basic message of the UN Charter. Moreover, today its Chapter VII (“Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression”) is being interpreted in a much broader sense than its drafters probably intended in 1945.

But, whose security are we talking about? Is it the Nation-State, the government of a Nation-State or the individuals who happen to inhabit the territory of a given State, or all three? In a country where there have been no elections for years, the holding of elections can pose a threat to the permanence, i.e. the security, of its government. In countries that have periodic elections, these are a source of security, i.e., stability, etc.

Today we are told that haphazard economic growth gives rise to insecurity; but, was it not so when the Industrial Revolution began? How many governments fell because of haphazard economic growth? Individuals, yes, many were affected. The health risks to coal miners is an obvious example. Now we are told that “sustainable growth”, i.e., environment-friendly economic development, is the right way to do things. The right way for whom? For those living in a certain region or for the inhabitants of another, very distant one?

Regional security in Europe, as certified in Paris in November of 1990, is often given as a model for the rest of the world. Cynics would say then that the way to achieve security is this: grow industrially for almost 200 years, pollute your rivers, destroy your environment, export your people en masse to other regions, carve yourself overseas empires and drain those colonies, wage many wars, including a couple of world wars with tens of millions of victims, and then get vast sums of money to rebuild; rule the waves and the airwaves, sell your manufactured products dear and buy commodities cheap, and, yes, stockpile the greatest concentration of weapons—nuclear, conventional and other—the world has ever seen. Is this the model to be emulated?

According to the 1985 UN study on *Concepts of Security*, security “is a condition in which States consider that there is no danger of military attack, political pressure or economic coercion, so that they are able to pursue freely their own development and progress” (A/40/553). Countries the world over have been subjected to political pressure, economic coercion and military attack. Those are obvious security concerns. A less obvious concern is to be derived from the changing perception of the role of the Nation-State.

Some countries are today placing greater emphasis on the preservation and enhancement of individual rights. A few have gone as far as to call for “humanitarian intervention” in order to protect human beings from their own

national authorities. All these ideas seek to modify a more than five-hundred-year old order based on the Nation-State. They are derived from noble sentiments. But the UN's point of departure is the Nation-State and the maintenance of security among nations, i.e., international security or the sum total of national securities. And yet, at the same time, many of the UN's shortcomings can be traced to the Nation-State.

Cases of widespread or massive human rights violations are legitimate subjects for debate in international fora. Why are some cases ignored or papered over by the multilateral human rights machinery? This is a question which needs to be addressed.

Another question is who will decide when to intervene "for humanitarian reasons". The huge military response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was sanctioned by the UN Security Council. But, one thing was to force Iraq out of Kuwait and quite another was to force Saddam Hussein out of Iraq. The first was the public, official reason for the Gulf War; the second was its undeclared or unspoken objective. And the results were mixed. On the one hand, Iraq withdrew from Kuwait; on the other, Saddam Hussein remained the head of Iraq's government, a diminished government to be sure, but a government still in power.

The Iraqi case poses some interesting questions regarding the so-called right (some have even described it as a duty) to intervene for humanitarian purposes. The people of Iraq were to be saved from their own ruler, but the ruler was saved—or saved himself—while his people were not spared.

Examples abound of military action taken in response to a non-military threat to one's own security. Countries have used force in order to ensure a supply of water or foodstuffs, to preserve navigation rights or to gain access to the sea. But, can human rights violations in another country be construed as threat to one's own security and thus find justification for intervention under present International Law?

What is there about the idea of humanitarian intervention that makes so many advocates of human rights so uneasy? Who is to decide when to intervene and where? The immediate answer is: the Security Council. Let the new and improved Council decide. But, far from being "new and improved", it is rather outdated. Its composition certainly does not represent (or reflect) the present international order. Moreover, in recent years, and specifically in the Gulf War (which is often cited as an example of the "new" Council), it did not act in conformity with the UN Charter. In the first place, when the UN is asked to embark on military action, the pertinent decision has to be taken "by an affirmative vote of nine members [of the Council] including the *concurring votes* [italics added] of the permanent members" (Article 27 [3]). And yet, decisions were approved over the abstention one permanent mem-

ber (China). Second, the Council supposedly must act, not on behalf of its members alone, but on behalf of the UN Members in general.

For what so-called humanitarian reason should the Council intervene? In cases where atrocities are being committed? Its record in Somalia is not exemplary and it hedged on the question of genocide in Rwanda and never acted decisively in the prolonged agony of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In cases where a government is behaving in a way that is flagrantly contrary to shared human values? Well, there is no clearer example of institutionalized discrimination than South Africa's *apartheid* regime, and yet the Council never contemplated an intervention.

Examples of double standards abound. Here's one: after almost a century of colonial presence in Hong Kong, the British authorities decided, on the eve of withdrawing, that the colony was in need of certain democratic improvements. What took them so long to realize this? Another example: the origins of today's human rights are traced to the eighteenth century. Indeed, the American and the French Revolutions are the source of many of those rights. And yet Thomas Jefferson who, in the US Declaration of Independence wrote that "All men are created equal", was himself a slave owner. And what about the right to self-determination and the right of a people to choose freely their government? Well, a few decades after pronouncing the three magic words—*liberté, égalité et fraternité*—the French and other Europeans embarked on the colonization of Africa. How were these contradictions and double standards justified?

It is to the sixteenth century that we must trace the beginnings of this so-called right to intervene for humanitarian reasons. Faced with a large population of Indians, the Spanish Crown struggled to legitimize its invasion and conquest of America. And the Catholic Monarchs found intellectuals who were ready to sanctify that conquest in spiritual and legal terms. And the Bernard Kouchners of the early 1500s turned to the writings of Spanish jurists, especially Francisco de Vitoria, who was among the founders of International Law and the laws of war. His treatises planted the seeds of today's so-called right of humanitarian intervention. Vitoria wrote that conquest was difficult to justify, but that it was permitted if it was carried out in order to protect the innocent from cannibalism or human sacrifice. War was just if it was fought to spread the faith. And, Vitoria concluded, it was not justified except as defense against aggression or to right a very great wrong.

In their eagerness to spread the faith and protect the innocent from cannibalism and human sacrifice, the Spaniards decimated the Indian population of America. In Mexico alone, the 25 million inhabitants in 1500 were reduced to two million by 1700. Humanitarian intervention can certainly have its drawbacks.

No one would advocate turning a blind eye to human suffering. And here we again encounter the question of instinct. Survival is pursued instinctively whereas helping your neighbor is part of those “learned patterns” of behavior. We all have our dose of compassion and there is a good Samaritan somewhere in all of us. And yet as Nation-States we are hard put to act in a selfless, compassionate manner. On the other hand, no one today would dare to justify a repressive, undemocratic regime. Nor can the leaders of such regimes seek refuge in what some characters in *West Side Story* proposed, to wit, “I’m depraved on account of I’m deprived”.

Economic inequalities

In the UN Charter’s Preamble, Member States commit themselves to join together in order “to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom” and “to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples”. The “international machinery” was to be the Economic and Social Council (Chapter X of the Charter) which, among other things, was to be the link between the UN and the “various specialized agencies, established by intergovernmental agreement and having wide international responsibilities, as defined in their basic instruments, in economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related fields” (Article 57).

The Charter’s Chapter IX (International Economic and Social Co-operation) recognizes that lasting peace required economic development and undertook the task to create “conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples”. To that end, the UN would have to promote, *inter alia*: “higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development”, as well as “solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems” (Article 55).

The idea that peace and development are two sides of the same coin has been a constant in the UN’s work. It has been the point of departure of all documents that have emerged from UN bodies charged with economic matters. Thus, on 31 January 1992, at the end of its first summit meeting on the question of its responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council stressed the importance of social and economic development since “peace and prosperity are indivisible” and lasting peace and stability required “effective international co-operation for the eradication of poverty and for the promotion of a better life for all in greater freedom” (S/PV.3046).

From its beginnings, ECOSOC established a number of subsidiary organs: regional economic commissions, committees of experts, as well as committees on statistics, population, social development, program and coordination, natural resources, transnational corporations, the legal status of women, human rights (with a subcommission and several working groups), etc. Those committees and subsidiary organs report periodically to ECOSOC which, in turn, informs the General Assembly.

In the field of international economic relations, ECOSOC launched in 1946 a very ambitious program. It convened an International Conference on Trade and Employment whose preparatory work culminated in the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). When the Conference met in Havana, it also considered an International Trade Charter covering all aspects of economic development, full employment, investment, commodities, restrictive trade practices and the establishment of an International Trade Organization. The Havana Charter, however, never obtained the necessary number of ratifications. On the other hand, GATT's contracting parties adjusted the Agreement in 1955 and again in 1965 and held several rounds of negotiations, including the successful Uruguay Round that ended in December of 1993 with the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO). It had taken a half-century.

Over the years ECOSOC began losing ground in the economic and even the social field. Its authority has been undermined and in the last decades it has turned into a mere bureaucratic step between its operative committees and working groups and the General Assembly proper. Important economic and social issues—the rights of women, human rights, population, development, the environment, etc.—have also been the subject of high-profile world conferences convened by the Assembly.

The erosion of ECOSOC's role is due to several other factors as well. Because of its limited (and even unbalanced) composition, it was never a favorite forum of the developing countries. It was (and still remains) a very European forum. Until 1991, ECOSOC held its spring session in May in New York and its summer session in July in Geneva. This allowed Old-World delegates to spend four weeks on the shores of Lac Léman before continuing their vacations in August in their home countries. For non-European members this was always a problem, given the cost of sending their New York-based delegations to Geneva. Since 1992, ECOSOC holds a single annual session that alternates between New York and Geneva.

Another important factor in the history of ECOSOC's demise was the establishment of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) at the behest of ECOSOC itself. Tailor-made to suit the interests of the developing countries, UNCTAD held its first session in 1964 and that same year it became a subsidiary body of the Assembly. In the seventies and early

eighties it was at the center of the developing countries' efforts to achieve a more equitable international economic order. By the late eighties, however, it had lost much of its relevance. At UNCTAD VIII, held in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, in 1991, its role was redefined and changed substantially from a negotiating forum to a more deliberative and academic one. This new role, which was confirmed in 1996 at UNCTAD IX (Midrand, South Africa), was also an outgrowth of the reforms introduced in the UN economic and social structure by Secretary-General Boutros Ghali and by the success of the GATT's Uruguay Round. UNCTAD was not the first nor the last of ECOSOC's defeats at the hands of the Assembly in the economic field.

The problem of economic under-development has figured on the General Assembly's agenda from the beginning. And for almost 20 years the discussion revolved around on the type of UN machinery and structure needed to promote development. That first phase included the creation in 1958 of the UN Special Fund for Development and culminated in 1964 with the first UNCTAD and the establishment of the Group of 77 as a negotiating mechanism for the developing countries. The initial steps were very modest. The funds to ensure an adequate program of multilateral aid for development were always insufficient. Like its successor (the UN Development Program of 1965), the Special Fund relied on voluntary contributions and was seen by the developed countries as a means to promote private investment in the developing world. But it has never been possible to "de-bilateralize" multilateral technical assistance and the flow of financial resources.

From the outset, economic problems, especially the question of under-development, were linked to population issues. In resolutions such as 1217 (XII), the General Assembly requested UN Member States, particularly developing countries, to pay greater attention to the relationship between development and population and to provide data on their situation and demographic projections. These trends were highlighted in the three UN-sponsored World Population Conferences (1974, 1984 and 1994).

Development issues were increasingly linked to environmental questions as well. This was evident in the eighties, but especially in the nineties after the 1992 Rio de Janeiro Conference. Moreover, GATT (and later the WTO) and UNCTAD began to examine the relationship between trade and environment.

By the seventies developing countries had managed to establish a list of priorities that better reflected their own interests and the guiding principles of the UN. During those years significant advances were registered in several fields, especially with regard to international economic relations and disarmament. Nevertheless, developing countries proved unable to consolidate their predominant position within the Organization and very soon—at the beginning of the eighties—they began to lose ground precisely to certain

Western countries, including some that have never really wanted to give the UN a major role in international economic relations.

Since the eighties, the UN's work has not only stagnated in those fields, but there have even been significant reversals. No one speaks any longer about the New International Economic Order and the 1978 Disarmament Declaration is now a dead letter. Developing countries have been making unilateral concessions to Western countries. They have accepted, for example, the consensus rule in several subsidiary organs of the Assembly, which is tantamount to giving certain Western countries a veto. On the other hand, in the nineties it has become patently clear how tenuous was the supposed unity of the developing world. It is repeatedly divided, even on those issues which it once promoted vigorously.

The arms race

The United Nations is, by definition, the multilateral instrument in charge of international peace and security. With regard to disarmament, the Charter assigned a central role to the Security Council. Its Article 26 provides:

In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

The Military Staff Committee never fulfilled the role contemplated at the San Francisco Conference. Because of disagreements among its permanent members, the Security Council was also unable to formulate plans for the regulation of armaments. In contrast, the Charter states, in its Article 11 (1):

The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or the Security Council or to both.

Although the Charter confers on the General Assembly a relatively modest role in the disarmament field, with time the Assembly widened its sphere of action, in large part due to the Security Council's paralysis. But, before

describing the growing importance of the Assembly's role in disarmament matters, it might be useful to recall why the Charter is silent regarding concrete disarmament measures and why it contains no reference to nuclear weapons, the weapons which spawned and shaped the military confrontation during the four decades of the Cold War.

The San Francisco Charter was signed in June of 1945, soon after the collapse of the Third Reich and just before Japan's surrender. The Allies drafted the Charter in the euphoria of military victory. On 1 January 1942, they had issued the "Declaration by United Nations" and the Charter was seen as the political culmination of that military alliance. The UN's original Members, especially the Council's permanent members, established themselves as the architects and custodians of the post-war world order. They would decide who would be allowed to join the Organization. These would of course have to be "peace-loving" nations that were ready to behave in accordance with the Charter's Purposes and Principles. The UN, moreover, would ensure that non-member States "act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security" (articles 2 and 4). The original Members defined the new order and would see to it that it was maintained. There was no need to be concerned with the arsenals of others and even less so with those of the vanquished. Moreover, the Allies had a *de facto* monopoly over armaments. The "system for the regulation of armaments" envisaged by the Charter was to be administered by the Security Council's five permanent members.

The Charter's silence regarding nuclear or atomic weapons is due to the simple fact that they made their tragic appearance in August of 1945, six weeks *after* the Charter was signed. This, however, has not prevented the United Nations from making its greatest, though largely rhetorical, disarmament efforts precisely in the realm of nuclear weapons.

In fact, from the first day of its first session, on 10 January 1946, the Assembly was seized with the issue of atomic weapons. Two weeks later, in its very first resolution—1 (I) of 24 January—the Assembly established the Atomic Energy Commission. Composed of the members of the Security Council and Canada, that Commission was instructed to submit to the Council specific proposals for ensuring the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only, for the elimination of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction and for the establishment of a system of safeguards, including inspection, to prevent violations and evasions. A year later, on 13 February 1947, the Council, upon recommendation of the Assembly, established the Commission for Conventional Armaments with the mandate to draw up measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces, as well as an effective system of guarantees.

Therein lies the key to a full understanding of the efforts toward disarmament deployed over fifty years by the UN: elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction under effective international control and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces.

By 1948, however, the euphoria of the victory over the Axis Powers had been tempered by the growing ideological competition between the US and the USSR. It soon became evident that the military alliance signed in 1942 by 26 United Nations was nothing more than a marriage of convenience that began to dissolve soon after the shooting stopped in 1945.

It is true that, in a way, the UN Charter was seen by many as a kind of political pact derived from that short-lived military alliance. During the spring of 1945, after the surrender of Nazi Germany, and through the San Francisco Conference and the establishment of the United Nations Organization, many differences between East and West were glossed over. But the seeds had been sown of what would soon become Superpower rivalry. The swords of World War II were never turned into plowshares. Even worse, the efforts to “preserve succeeding generations from the scourge of war” were to give way to history’s biggest and most dangerous arms build-up. Military strength became once again the basis for political leverage in the world. The real legacy of World War II was not, as the Charter states, to unite for the maintenance of international peace and security and for the promotion of social and economic progress, but rather the division of Europe and the carving up of the rest of the world into spheres of influence. And for four decades the world was bi-polar.

Until the late eighties, General Assembly disarmament debates were dominated by the military confrontation and political rivalry between East and West. In view of the Security Council’s paralysis, the Assembly attempted to take on the Council’s functions but was successful only in part. On the one hand, it intensified its deliberative role, through pronouncements on the unbridled arms race and the dangers posed by nuclear weapons. It broadened the role of the UN Secretariat and convened countless meetings, including three special sessions of the General Assembly itself (1978, 1982 and 1988) and a proposed fourth in 1999.

From the fifties the Assembly tried to strengthen the UN’s role as the center for the negotiation of disarmament agreements. But it was stymied by the military superpowers who at first limited the functions of the various negotiating fora and later, once they began to reach understandings among themselves, by circumventing the UN entirely. In fact, the US and USSR not only negotiated outside the UN but opposed attempts to have the Assembly emit an opinion on the course of those negotiations, refusing even to inform the Organization of the agreements reached, such as SALT I and II.

What the General Assembly has managed is to carve out for itself a kind of supervisory role over the course of disarmament efforts in general and over the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in particular. A product of the Cold War, the CD has been meeting in Geneva since 1962. Its establishment was promoted by the Non-Aligned countries which were invited to take part by the principal military Powers. Co-chaired by the United States and the Soviet Union, the CD was originally composed of 18 nations countries (five from NATO and five from the Warsaw Pact, as well as eight non-aligned or neutral). At the Assembly's 1978 special session, the CD was enlarged to 40 members and the co-chairmanship was abolished. It works by consensus and is the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament. In 1996 its membership was increased to 61.

The treaties produced by the Geneva disarmament forum are of two types: first, the banning of weapons, weapons-related activities or weapons systems that the major military powers have either renounced unilaterally or were willing to give up provided others undertook not to acquire them—the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, the 1977 Environmental Modification Convention (ENMOD), the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); and second, the prevention of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by nations other than the five “recognized” nuclear-weapon States (NWS): the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

To achieve these treaties the CD and its predecessors have resorted to a variety of negotiating techniques: “basement diplomacy” whereby two or three nations (i.e., the US and USSR, and occasionally the UK as well) produce a first draft (PTBT) and then the rest agree; “symbolic multilateral negotiation” whereby the same two or three nations draft a text which is later subjected to minor changes in light of the reaction of other CD members (BWC); “truncated agreement” whereby a draft is sent to the General Assembly despite a lack of agreement among all CD members (NPT, ENMOD and CTBT); and “genuine multilateral negotiation” whereby all CD members participate on an equal footing in the drafting of agreements which later all endorse (CWC).

The struggle for the disarmament agenda

The non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological) and their delivery systems is the priority issue in the field of disarmament and international security. In the case of nuclear weapons it is easy to exaggerate their threat; but it is just as easy to ignore it. Although there are tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, they are in the hands of rela-

tively few countries, a number much lower than some imagined in the fifties when non-proliferation concerns moved up the list of international priorities. Then one heard the arguments about the “Nth Power”, the dangers of living in a world where there were twenty or thirty nuclear-weapon States (NWS). Happily that has not happened. Today over 180 nations are committed, in legally binding, multilateral instruments such as the NPT or in nuclear-weapon-free regional treaties, to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons. And that is very significant. “To go nuclear” is a decision that not too many countries want to make. In most, reason has prevailed. Canada, for example, decided to forego the nuclear option from the dawn of the nuclear age. Others, such as Sweden, remained undecided until the NPT put an end to an internal debate in the sixties. Some, such as Germany or Japan, never had a choice because of constitutional constraints.

Instead of multiplying the nuclear players, what occurred was an incredible nuclear arms build-up in five countries, especially the US and the former USSR. Initially that build-up was uncontrolled; later, after the SALT agreements of the seventies, it was more orderly and almost predictable. And a central element of the nuclear-arms race was the testing of weapons and weapons systems.

At first nuclear testing was chaotic, haphazard and very unfriendly to the environment. The enormous mushroom clouds of the late forties and fifties embodied the power and the terror which the nuclear age inspired around the globe. Those atmospheric tests also became the focus of a broad-based, worldwide movement to ban nuclear weapons. That movement has continued for decades with its ups and downs. The intensity of the Cold War seemed at times to wear it down. The move to underground testing, after the 1963 PTBT, also reduced the visibility of the nuclear threat. For some, it was out of sight, out of mind.

Others persisted. The fear of the nuclear menace and its proliferation moved individuals, communities and nations to do what they could. Cities, towns, neighborhoods and even single homes were declared nuclear-free. After 1959 Antarctica was to remain totally de-militarized; in the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco, Latin America and the Caribbean countries pledged not to acquire nuclear weapons and secured a formal, legally binding commitment from the NWS not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them. There followed the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga (South Pacific), the 1995 Bangkok Treaty (Southeast Asia) and the 1996 the Pelindaba Treaty (Africa).

On an international scale, the NPT was concluded in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. It codified the division of the world’s nations into two groups: the non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) and the five recognized NWS. The NPT’s NNWS promised to remain just that—non-nuclear—and

the NWS (the USSR, UK and US at first and China and France in recent years) agreed to move towards nuclear disarmament, including both quantitative and qualitative measures.

Unlike other multilateral treaties, the NPT was not of indefinite duration. Many of the principal countries to whom it was addressed (Germany, Italy, Japan and Switzerland) insisted on a short duration, a kind of trial period, as well as review conferences, in order to ensure that the NWS would disarm before rendering permanent their own non-nuclear-weapon status. When the initial twenty-five-year period ran out in 1995, the NPT's Parties met to review the situation and decide on whether to extend the Treaty indefinitely or for another fixed period. They opted to extend it not only indefinitely but unconditionally as well. This unanimous decision will have important repercussions in the disarmament field.

Before and during the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the NWS demonstrated their continued attachment to nuclear weapons and refused to contemplate the possibility of engaging in negotiations for their phased elimination. By accepting the unconditional extension of the NPT, the NNWS squandered an opportunity to redress in part the imbalances of the NPT. In contrast, at the 1994 General Assembly, a group of NNWS had successfully raised the question of the legality of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In 1995, after the NPT Conference and in the wake of the resumption of French testing, many of those nations protested vigorously and at that fall's General Assembly not only did they "strongly deplore" French and Chinese tests but called on the CD to commence negotiations in 1996 on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework.

Why are NWS so reluctant to begin a process of genuine nuclear disarmament? It is largely due to the inertia of old habits, habits developed over decades. But in part it is also because of the fear of losing their status, a status they would deny others. In fact it might be said that the last to proliferate—the last to "go nuclear"—became an ardent proponent of horizontal non-proliferation. This was true of the US after 1945, then the USSR (1949), the UK (1952), and finally France (1960) and China (1964).

NWS are wrong on both counts. Initially, they attempted to rationalize their possession of nuclear weapons because of the Cold War. Now that the Cold War is over, they speak of unforeseen threats. They say they need them "just in case". But why are their so-called national security needs more important than those of others? Why do they insist, as adults to children, that the rest of the world "Do as I say, not as I do"?

Some will argue that in recent years there has been much progress in the field of nuclear disarmament. Some will even recite a litany of measures taken, especially by the Russian Federation and the United States. They will

add that, although the total number of nuclear warheads is today still greater than it was in 1970 (when the NPT entered into force), their actual firepower (kilotons) is much smaller. But it is not a simple question of numbers. It is rather how NWS view nuclear weapons and how NNWS view NWS.

The real issue is far more important and goes to the very heart of the question of the kind of world we want our children and grandchildren to live in. Are we ready to accept a world where nuclear weapons are a permanent feature or do we want their existence to have been a momentary phase in history? Do we seek a nuclear-weapon-free world or will we accept for the foreseeable future the permanence of the five so-called recognized nuclear-weapon States and a host of potential others?

The situation regarding the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is today rather complicated. The technology for their manufacture has been improving and what was once the monopoly of one, later two, three and eventually five nations has now become accessible to many. What you invent today to enhance your security has a tendency to reappear later elsewhere as a threat. The development of different and more sophisticated weapons and weapons systems has a way of boomeranging. They seem to offer security until they are developed by others. The cycle then repeats itself.

Some tend to forget that the world was once a nuclear-weapon-free zone. And the goal should be to return to that status. How did it happen that seemingly rational human beings would end up justifying the acquisition, the use and continued development of these weapons of mass destruction?

In the mid-forties US efforts to build an atomic bomb were viewed as part of the crusade against the Axis Powers. By the summer of 1945, however, the war was over in Europe and was about to end in the Pacific. Nonetheless the bomb was tested in July and used in August. At that moment the relationship to the "ultimate weapon" changed in the US and elsewhere. Incredible as it seems, the bomb became acceptable to leaders in many nations. The Cold War would only serve to obfuscate the moral argument. But, what would they have said had Nazi Germany and not the United States acquired the bomb first? Probably, "an evil weapon in evil hands". One need only recall the West's reaction to the Soviet Union's first test in 1949. In short, there was no legal or moral justification for acquiring and using atomic bombs then, and there is none today.

Two hundred years ago the world faced a similar moral dilemma. The odious institution of slavery, though upheld and defended by many, came under increasing attacks and by the end of the nineteenth century it had been abolished almost everywhere. Today no one would dare to defend it; it seems so foreign to our shared values. But slavery was upheld by politicians, just as there are those today who defend the possession of nuclear weapons and their possible use.

The NWS must set the example and pave the way towards nuclear disarmament. They should put forward a comprehensive nuclear disarmament program. They should begin by committing themselves to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by a given date. Then they should identify and take, again within a specific timeframe, concrete steps to reduce the nuclear threat. Finally, they should identify those disarmament measures which they could take unilaterally, bilaterally, with other NWS and multilaterally within a given period or periods (five or ten years, for example). This would have a most beneficial effect on the way the NNWS view the relationship of NWS with their nuclear arsenals.

There will be some who will insist that nuclear disarmament is a very complicated matter and that NWS cannot pursue it in a timebound framework. To be sure, the nuclear arms race and build-up did not follow a script. But it often responded to specific goals that had to be met by a certain date. The efforts to build the first bomb in the forties are one example of this. The move from atomic to hydrogen bombs is another. The same occurred with the development of delivery vehicles as demonstrated by the evolution of missile technology. In short, if countries developed their nuclear arsenals by earmarking resources for specific projects to be completed by, or at least planned for, a given date, it does not seem unreasonable to ask them to do the same when they build-down and dismantle their nuclear arsenals.

Did the indefinite extension of the NPT solve the problems of verifying compliance which the Iraqi case revealed? Did it resolve the present nebulous status of the so-called threshold nations? Did the NWS give adequate security assurances to NNWS regarding the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons? Did it halt the production of fissile material for weapons purposes and resolve the question of existing military and civilian stockpiles? Did it ensure the conclusion of measures aimed at the elimination of nuclear weapons? In a word, did it further the vertical and horizontal non-proliferation of nuclear weapons? And, more importantly, did it change the NWS' attitude and relationship to those weapons of mass destruction? And here one returns to the moral and legal aspects of nuclear weapons.

For years there has been much discussion regarding the legality of nuclear weapons. Three decades ago the UN General Assembly began addressing this question and has been considering it ever since. There is, for example, an annual resolution calling on the CD to commence negotiations on a draft convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons under any circumstance. Moreover, in 1993 the World Health Organization requested an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality of the use of such weapons given their health and environmental effects. At its 1994 session, the UN General Assembly requested another opinion on the

broader question, “Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law”?

NWS were not very happy with these requests to the ICJ. And they were even less happy with the Court’s advisory opinion of 8 July 1996. That decision has provided a new legal basis for questioning the threat or use of nuclear weapons and thus the possession of nuclear weapons themselves. It also recognizes that the provisions of Article VI of the NPT go beyond a mere obligation of conduct—to pursue nuclear disarmament negotiations in good faith—and actually involve an obligation of result, i.e., to *conclude* those negotiations. The Court has thus strengthened the hand of the proponents of the elimination of nuclear weapons at a time when the prospects for genuine nuclear disarmament seemed to have been undermined by the NPT’s indefinite and unconditional extension.

The NWS have rejected the Court’s opinion. And the reason seems to be the same that led them to advocate the NPT’s indefinite *and* unconditional extension. This reveals their true intentions regarding the permanence of nuclear weapons. While all NWS have begun to rethink the role of those weapons in the post-Cold War era, the results are neither clear nor encouraging.

For decades NATO refused to commit itself to the doctrine of no first-use, arguing that it reserved the right to resort to nuclear weapons if confronted with a massive conventional attack in Europe. They had in mind the USSR. Now the Russians, who for years advocated a no first-use policy, have changed their view and have embraced NATO’s doctrine. They have in mind China. China, in fact, is the only NWS that still adheres to a no first-use policy.

When asked to give negative security assurances to NNWS, the NWS cannot agree. They are willing to give such guarantees to the Parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco but they hesitate to do the same when it comes to NPT Parties. In fact, NWS seem reluctant to grant those guarantees to *all* NPT States. This makes for an interesting exercise in speculation.

There is a third item on which NWS have also been less than candid: a ban on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. For many years NWS have been producing highly enriched uranium and plutonium for both military and civilian uses. Now the United States and the Russian Federation have unilaterally ceased production because they simply have too much of this material. The next step is to call for an international ban on such production. What they are asking is that all future production be ceased, but nothing is said about existing stockpiles, including those for civilian reactors which use fissile material that can also have military applications. This has sparked an increasingly heated debate in New York and Geneva.

Many countries wish to address the question of existing stockpiles of fissile material as well as banning its future production.

What the NWS have stated or implied with regard to these issues is not very reassuring. To be sure, their policies are not uniform on such matters as PNEs, the future of nuclear energy for civilian purposes, negative security assurances to NNWS and several other questions. But the overall impression that they give is that of business as usual. The Cold War may be over and, yes, the strategic nuclear competition between the Russian Federation and the United States shows signs of abating, but the relationship of NWS to their own nuclear weapons has not registered the kind of basic change that one might expect. They continue to rely on nuclear weapons and do not seem prepared to give them up in the foreseeable future. Quite the contrary, they are looking for ways to freeze the NPT's dichotomy between the nuclear haves and the nuclear have-nots. This does not bode well for the NPT or nuclear non-proliferation in general.

The Conference on Disarmament's current agenda reflects the disarmament priorities established in 1978 by the international community: nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction come first and conventional armaments are to follow. Over the last decade, but especially since the end of the Cold War, there have been calls to bring that agenda into line with the so-called "new international reality". No one is quite sure as to the exact nature of that reality but no one can doubt that there have been important, not to say momentous, changes in the world scene.

The discussion of the CD's agenda is part of a larger debate—the ongoing "struggle for the multilateral disarmament agenda". That struggle is taking place mainly, though not exclusively, at the UN General Assembly and may be summarized as follows: an increasingly numerous group of countries, mostly European and NATO (including both members and aspirants), is calling for greater emphasis on conventional disarmament, while an ever-smaller group of Non-Aligned or developing nations still defends, for different reasons, the idea that nuclear disarmament should remain the top priority.

For most UN Members the CD is the international community's only permanent negotiating body for disarmament. As such it plays a key role in furthering (or stalling) the multilateral disarmament agenda. The General Assembly can "request" the CD to do something, but the CD is really only answerable to itself. Therein lies both its strength and weakness.

Through General Assembly resolutions and at the CD some NNWS seem to be seeking what they failed to obtain at the 1995 NPT Conference: a commitment by the NWS to genuine nuclear disarmament. How firm can a Nation-State be in today's world? Quite obviously many are vulnerable to economic pressure. But even among the major Powers, economic interest often prevails over principle. Witness how Western nations deal with China

in matters of human rights and trade, or consider where some countries of the South Pacific drew the line with regard to the consequences of French nuclear testing. Or examine the General Assembly voting patterns on the 1995 resolution on nuclear testing.

In assessing the future of multilateral disarmament negotiations, one should bear in mind a number of lessons drawn from the past. First and foremost, the five NWS, but especially the US and USSR, would have never joined, much less created, a negotiating forum designed to disarm them. Second, disarmament agreements in the CD are only possible when the major military powers give their consent. Third, as long as the NWS remain “attached” to their nuclear arsenals, little will be accomplished in the field of genuine nuclear disarmament in CD or anywhere else. Fourth, without the Cold War there would have never been a CD; with the end of the Cold War, the CD is, more than ever, a body for negotiating disarmament of the NNWS. Fifth, in contrast to other multilateral fora (such as those on the environment, human rights or women’s issues), the CD is by and large immune to “public opinion pressure”. Sixth, in the nineties it is more likely for the P-5 to agree among themselves than it is for the NNWS to reach common positions. Seventh, despite the end of the Cold War, NWS continue to be attached to a nuclear posture that reflects the “way it was” and NNWS are in no position to change that. Eighth, the proponents of nuclear disarmament attained their greatest strength in the eighties; since then, many nations once firmly in the nuclear-disarmament-first camp have, for different reasons, waffled, and the proponents of conventional disarmament appear to be gaining the upper hand.

In sum, although it was probably never intended to be so, the CD has turned out to be a forum where agreements are sought on measures aimed at disarming (or ensuring the non-armament) of all nations except the P-5. And this situation is likely to persist until nations decide to pursue a genuine disarmament agenda. That means, first and foremost, an agenda geared to disarm those that have the weapons, beginning with nuclear weapons, and not just to codify unilateral disarmament measures, important as they are, or preventing others from acquiring weapons and weapons systems.

The codes of conduct

The UN’s fundamental task is to ensure that its Member States act in conformity to the norms of International Law. The Organization’s permanent body for the promotion of the progressive development of International Law and its codification is the International Law Commission. And the Organization’s Charter is its point of departure.

Over the years and often with the support of the International Law Commission, the General Assembly has also sought to draft a series of norms on a wide variety of issues relating to the behavior of States. In the sixties, for example, it undertook the drafting of two documents whose adoption in 1970 served to commemorate its twenty-fifth anniversary: the Declaration on principles of International Law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on the strengthening of international security.

The list of issues which the Assembly has tried to codify is long: Law of the Sea, laws of war, peaceful uses of outer space, international co-operation to combat drug trafficking, hijacking of planes, terrorism, the taking of hostages, mercenaries, individual and collective human rights, refugees, the legal status of women, protection of children, decolonization, economic development, the environment, etc. Taken together, those instruments constitute a series of codes to guide the internal and external conduct of States.

The Assembly has not always been successful in drawing up behavior standards for States. For example, the UN Charter speaks of "acts of aggression" and UN Members set out to define the terms. But the committee charged with the question of defining aggression met for years without achieving its goal. The same happened to the groups set up to draft codes of conduct on the transfer of technology and transnational corporations. As to the latter, its elaboration began in the mid-seventies with the aim of regulating their activities, especially of those corporations operating in the developing countries. That exercise had the support of the then recently-established UN Center on Transnational Corporations. In the early nineties, when work on that code was interrupted, the world had changed radically and the Center became one more subsidiary body of UNCTAD with a new mandate: the promotion of direct foreign investment. In this and other fields the UN has already changed and will continue to change.

The Organization's functioning

Since 1945 UN Members have been examining the Organization's functioning. The subject has been discussed widely and almost constantly in the General Assembly. The most relevant aspects of that discussion have been four: the role of the Secretary-General; the Security Council's paralysis (at least from 1950 to 1990) and the need to amend the Charter; the presence (until 1971) in the UN of the representatives of Chiang-Kai shek's Government; and the role of the Organization. Let us look at these questions, as well as the significance which the years 1960 and 1990 had for the UN.

The Secretary-General: more secretary than general

The role of the Secretary-General has been a source of continuous debate among UN Members. According to the Charter, the Secretary-General is “the highest administrative officer of the Organization” and is appointed by the General Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council. His election, therefore, is subject to the explicit approval of the Council’s five permanent members. This is the key to understand how little room the Secretary-General has for action in the Organization. The talents of someone whose activities require the blessing or, at least, the neutrality of the five permanent members are hamstrung from the outset.

Quite obviously, not all UN Members share this vision of the Secretary-General’s role. One might even say that the great majority would prefer him (or her) to be a more energetic person, with more initiative. But the Security Council veto and the understandable resistance of its permanent members to surrender part of their privileges have ensured that the post is filled by persons little inclined to take initiatives contrary to the interests of one or another of the permanent members.

UN Secretaries-General have been nationals of Norway, Sweden, Burma (now Myanmar), Austria, Peru, Egypt and Ghana. The election in 1946 of Norway’s Trygve Lie reflected the strength of the Western European countries within the UN and would have never occurred once the Cold War began. In 1950 his appointment was renewed directly by the Assembly (a rather unorthodox move since it by-passed the Security Council) for a three-year period. But Soviet opposition prevented him from completing his term. Before assuming the post, he had been a labor leader in Norway. His successors, on the other hand, have been five career diplomats and an international civil servant.

The Swede Dag Hammarskjöld tried to give the post a dynamism and autonomy that were strongly criticized by the permanent members of the Security Council. The Congo crisis in 1960 served to define the limits of the role of the Secretary-General.

In July 1960, a few days after achieving its independence from Belgium, the Republic of the Congo became the scene of public disorders that accompanied the hasty withdrawal of the Belgian authorities and troops. A civil war broke out soon after Katanga province attempted to secede. The internal rivalries within the new republic were promoted by neo-colonialist interests of some European countries and that division was reflected in the debates both of the Security Council and the General Assembly. At the request of the new Congolese authorities, the UN established and dispatched a peace force, known as UN Operation in the Congo. But the situation in the country continued to deteriorate and the UN was unable to follow a consistent policy.

TABLE 2.8 *Individuals who have held the post of Secretary-General*

Trygve Lie	1 February	1946—10 November	1952
Dag Hammarskjöld	10 April	1953—17 September	1961
U Thant	3 November	1961—31 December	1971
Kurt Waldheim	1 January	1972—31 December	1981
Javier Pérez de Cuéllar	1 January	1982—31 December	1991
Boutros Boutros Ghali	1 January	1992—31 December	1996
Kofi Annan	1 January	1997—	

There was an impasse in both the Council and the Assembly. On 20 December 1960, the Secretary-General deplored the UN's paralysis and announced that he would personally continue to execute the UN Congo operation in keeping "with previous decisions" and "with utmost energy" (A/PV.958). Several countries took issue with the Secretary-General. The Soviet Union, for example, stated:

The Secretary-General must bear in mind that less than half the Member States voted for new instructions to be given to him that would consolidate the existing situation in the Congo, while at the same time about one-third of the Member States, including the leading countries of Africa and Asia, sharply criticized his activities and called for decisive changes in the Congo, the convening of Parliament and the restoration of the Government and of all constitutional procedures, and the decisive cessation of the colonialists' interference in the life of the Congolese people. Let the Secretary-General heed the voices of these States and peoples and draw the proper conclusions (A/PV.959).

Since then the Secretary-General has acted more cautiously. Although U Thant and Pérez de Cuéllar paid attention to the voice of the people, in the end they did what Waldheim did better than any one else: pay greater attention to the voices of the governments, especially to those of the five permanent members. U Thant and Pérez de Cuéllar retired voluntarily after serving out two five-year terms. Waldheim, in contrast, was unable to win a second re-election in 1981 because of the opposition of China which put its Security Council veto at the disposal of a Third World, preferably an African, candidate. The three Western permanent members, however, never accepted the most popular candidate, Salim Salim of Tanzania. And after dozens of votes, Pérez de Cuéllar appeared out of nowhere as the compromise candidate.

During his mandate, Pérez de Cuéllar had to wrestle with the United States. First, because President Reagan encouraged his country's Congress to adopt a highly critical attitude towards the UN, based on the ferocious at-

tacks of ultra-conservative organizations such as the Heritage Foundation, which resulted in the US Congress cutting off a good part of the dues that it was obligated to pay to the UN. And second, because President Bush decided to turn to the UN in 1990 to achieve the international community's authorization for the use of military force to push Iraqi troops out of Kuwait.

For decades, African countries had campaigned openly for the post of Secretary-General. In 1971 that campaign intensified after another European was selected. A decade later, a Latin American candidate emerged to break the deadlock in the Security Council. In 1991, when it became necessary to find a successor to Pérez de Cuéllar, many thought that, in view of the changes in the world, it would be someone very close to the United States, perhaps even a European. The African countries, however, insisted that the new Secretary-General be drawn from their ranks. Zimbabwe's Bernard Chidzero had wide support in the Security Council, but lacked the backing of the United States. Egypt's Boutros Boutros Ghali, in turn, obtained it.

Boutros Ghali served only one term. In 1996 he sought re-election and secured the support of all UN Members except one. The United States vetoed him. It was his misfortune that UN bashing became a part of the US Presidential campaign that year and both Democrat and Republican politicians attacked the Organization and its Secretary-General. Following an unwritten rule that each geographic region holds the post for ten years, a number of other African candidates came forward and, in spite of some resistance from France, Ghana's Kofi Annan, drawn from the ranks of the UN itself and the head of its peace-keeping operations, was appointed.

The Security Council and Charter review

In 1945 the "Big Five" managed to agree on a system for the maintenance of international security whose operative mechanism was to be the UN Security Council. This explains its limited composition and the privileged situation of its permanent members. Soon after the end of World War II, however, great differences emerged among them which, in one way or another, defined the course of international relations for over four decades thus defining the UN's role as well. The Council never played the role the Charter assigned to it in 1945 because of those differences which very soon resulted in the division of Europe into two rival military blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

The history of the failure of the Security Council can be summed up in the indiscriminate use of the veto by its permanent members. This is especially true in the case of the USSR between 1946 and 1970, and with regard to the United States from 1970 to 1990. The Soviet Union's constant vetoes during the UN's first decade led the United States and its allies to broaden

the role of the General Assembly in the maintenance of international peace and security, and thus overcome the Council's shortcomings. In order to achieve this, the US had the support of a significant majority of UN Members. Many of those countries had advocated in 1945 a General Assembly with greater attributions and functions with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security. But it was precisely the US and the USSR that openly opposed those proposals. It is, therefore, ironic that a few years later the United States should have spearheaded an effort to strengthen the role of the Assembly. The Soviet Union resisted then and thereafter, although no longer isolated in the Organization, it was to maintain the attitude it assumed in 1946 and consolidated in the fifties regarding the Security Council: faced with a hostile majority in the General Assembly, the Soviet Union sought refuge in the Security Council where its weight was equal to that of the other four permanent Members.

As to the Council's non-permanent seats, there was from the beginning a tacit agreement regarding their geographic distribution. The Soviet Union had insisted, and the others had accepted, that one of those seats be reserved for an Eastern European country. Since 1946 that seat had been occupied successively by Poland, Ukraine and Yugoslavia. Between 1952 and 1955 there was no Eastern European country on the Council. For 1956–1957 Yugoslavia was elected but it withdrew after only one year. To fill that vacancy the Assembly held an election on 7 December 1956 with the following results: the Philippines with 51 votes, Czechoslovakia with 20, and Afghanistan, Spain and Yugoslavia with one vote each. The USSR's action in Hungary during that autumn had obviously influenced the mood of the great majority within the Assembly and it was reflected in their rejection of Czechoslovakia's candidacy. The Soviet representative reacted violently:

. . . the Charter provides that the non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected with due regard to geographical distribution. . . . The vote which has just taken place merely illustrates the regrettable fact that the United Nations is steadily dwindling in importance as a centre of co-operation between nations with equal rights. The vote shows that the activities of the United Nations are increasingly being directed and governed not by the principles of the Charter but by considerations of expediency and by the designs of a group of countries, foremost among them the United States, which is using this Organization for its own selfish purposes (A/PV.612).

The role of the Security Council was the subject of constant analysis and growing criticism. To overcome the Council's paralysis with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security, the majority of UN Member

States came up with alternative mechanisms and tried to re-interpret some of the provisions of the Charter in order to strengthen the role of the General Assembly.

The transfer of the Security Council's functions to the General Assembly was made evident in 1950 in two specific cases. The first was the adoption of resolution 377 (V) of 3 November entitled "Uniting for Peace". In it was recognized that, among other things, if the Council, because of a lack of unanimity among its permanent members, failed to carry out its responsibilities, the Assembly would examine the matter immediately in order to make recommendations, including the adoption of collective measures to repel an aggression. That resolution was approved by 52 of the then 60 Members of the Organization. Five States voted against it (Belarus, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukraine and USSR). Two abstained (Argentina and India) and Lebanon did not participate in the vote.

The second example of the transfer of Security Council functions to the Assembly—some would qualify that transfer as "usurpation"—is provided by resolution 492 (V) of 1 November 1950. In that resolution, the Assembly decided that, since the Council had not managed to reach agreement regarding a recommendation for the appointment of a Secretary-General, it would extend the Trigve Lie's mandate for a three-year period. The resolution was approved by 46 votes against five, with eight abstentions.

Another indication of the preponderant role that the UN original Members assigned to the General Assembly is the fact that during its first five years it was in almost permanent session. Besides its five regular sessions, it held two special sessions and, even more significantly, it set up a permanent committee of the whole (known as the "little Assembly") which was to meet intersessionally.

In addition to the "Uniting for Peace" resolution and the intersessional or "little Assembly", there was pressure to review the UN Charter. That pressure had been growing since the San Francisco Conference when, in order to weaken the resistance to some of the proposed provisions, it was agreed to hold a general conference to review the Charter (Article 109). However, because of Soviet opposition, it was impossible to review the Charter's provisions pertaining to the peaceful settlement of disputes. Many ideas and proposals were abandoned or forgotten. Others were not.

In 1956, Argentina submitted a draft convention for the establishment of a regime of consultations within the UN in order to guarantee the possibility of carrying them out with the necessary speed and effectiveness when there appeared situations that threatened international security. The USSR strongly opposed that proposal, arguing that it was contrary to the UN Charter whose provisions already included "the necessary system that allows for timely action, with sufficient speed and effectiveness" (A/PV.637). Nevertheless,

on 11 January 1957 the Assembly adopted resolution 1014 (XI) by 58 votes against eight and four abstentions, transmitting the Argentine proposal to Member States for consideration during the eventual general conference for Charter review, a conference which, by the way, has never taken place.

The idea of Charter review has been suggested periodically. Until now the only changes introduced in the Charter have been regarding those articles on the composition of the Security Council and ECOSOC. The proposals for amendments go from the modest suggestions to eliminate from the Charter the phrases regarding "enemy States", that is, the enemies of the Allies in World War II, up to the granting of the veto to other countries whose political and economic weight is equal or superior to that of some of the permanent members.

In the nineties the debate has intensified on the composition of the Security Council. Are its fifteen members representative of an Organization that has grown to 185? Do its five permanent members reflect the real distribution of power in today's world? These questions shall be examined later. Here we must consider another question regarding the Security Council: Who was China's representative in the UN? It was debated for many years and gave rise to intense political pressure by some countries, especially the United States, but it was finally resolved to the benefit of the Organization.

The representation of China

Mao Tse-tung's triumph over the Kuomintang in 1949 raised the question of who was the legitimate representative of China at the United Nations. Although its territory had been reduced to the island of Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek's Government continued to send representatives to the Assembly. In November 1949 the new Government of Mao Tse-tung in Beijing informed the Assembly and the Secretary-General that Taipei's Government could not speak on China's behalf in the Organization; in January 1950 it called on the Security Council to expel Taipei's representatives from the Organization.

Over the following 20 years the "Question of the representation of China in the UN" was debated intensely. The Soviet Union proposed in January of 1950 that the Security Council reject the credentials of the representative of Taipei. When this proposal was not accepted, the USSR announced that it would no longer participate in the Council until "the representative of the Kuomintang" was expelled and that the Soviet Government would not recognize the decisions taken by the Council during its absence. As already noted, the Soviet Union was absent (with grave consequences) from the Council until 1 August 1950. On that date the USSR took over the Presidency of the Council and in that capacity made a ruling to the effect that "the

TABLE 2.9 *The votes on the representation of China in the UN*

	Year	resolution (session)	Votes				Total UN Members
			In favor	Against	Abstention	Absent	
Postpone consideration:	1952	609 A (VII)	42	7	11	0	60
	1953	800 (VIII)	40	10	2	8	60
	1954	903 (IX)	43	11	6	0	60
	1955	990 (X)	42	12	6	0	60
	1956	1108 (XI)	47	24	8	1	80
	1957	1135 (XII)	47	27	7	1	82
	1958	1239 (XIII)	44	28	9	1	82
	1959	1351 (XIV)	44	29	9	0	82
	1960	1493 (XV)	42	34	22	1	99
Two-thirds majority:	1961	1668 (XVI)	61	34	7	2	104
	1965	2025 (XX)	56	49	11	2	118
	1966	2159 (XXI)	66	48	7	1	122
	1967	2271 (XXII)	69	48	4	2	123
	1968	2389 (XXIII)	73	47	5	1	126
	1969	2500 (XXIV)	71	48	4	3	126
	1970	2642 (XXV)	66	52	7	2	127
Restitution of PRC's rights:	1971	2758 (XXVI)	76	35	17	4	132

Kuomintang band did not represent China” and, therefore, could not participate in the Council’s work. That ruling was rejected by the Council.

In the General Assembly the question was debated when the report of the Credentials Committee was considered, and in the sessions from 1950 to 1952 it was raised unsuccessfully. In 1952, for example, the Assembly decided “to postpone, for the duration of the seventh session, the consideration of any proposal aimed at excluding the representatives of the Republic of China and admitting the representatives of the People’s Central Government of the People’s Republic of China”. Between 1953 and 1960 attempts were made, again unsuccessfully, to include the item on the Assembly’s agenda. In those years the Assembly approved resolutions that put off any debate, thus rejecting the proposal to include the item on its agenda.

By 1960, however, the vote was closer and the abstentions had multiplied. Taiwan’s defenders were obliged to switch tactics and in 1961 they submitted a draft resolution in which the Assembly decided that any change in the representation of China constituted an “important question” in accordance with the Charter’s Article 18 and, therefore, required a two-thirds majority of the countries present and voting. That maneuver was successful and that Assembly decision was renewed, by a simple majority, until 1970.

In 1971, in its resolution 2758 (XXVI), the Assembly decided “to restore to the People’s Republic of China all its rights and to recognize the representatives of its Government as the legitimate representative of China in the

United Nations". It also decided "to expel immediately the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the seat that they illegally occupied in the United Nations and in all its related Organizations". Thus ended one of the most difficult and sad chapters of the Organization. The expulsion of the Taiwan Government was based on the idea that China was juridically indivisible and, therefore, a "two China" policy was unacceptable. In the nineties, however, the "two China" approach reappeared in the GATT.

1960: the consolidation of a bi-polar world

The evolution of the results of the yearly votes on the representation of China in the United Nations was a harbinger of a shift in the balance of power in the Assembly. And in that evolution the year 1960 is an important milestone.

The autumn of 1960 was significant for several reasons. In the first place, a large number of heads of State or Government attended the General Assembly on the occasion of the UN's fifteenth anniversary. Eisenhower, MacMillan and Khrushchev headed their respective delegations. Several East European Heads of State were also present. Their appearance in the General Assembly Hall served to legitimize governments that for years were challenged by some Members of the Organization. The Movement of Non-Aligned countries was strengthened with the meetings in New York of Nehru, Tito, Nkrumah, Sékou Touré, Castro and Sukarno, among others.

In 1960 the Assembly established new negotiating fora for disarmament. It also approved resolution 1514 (XV) entitled "Declaration on Decolonization", originally proposed by Khrushchev but whose final text reflected rather the position of the Non-Aligned countries.

The 1960 Assembly in fact signaled the beginning of a more active policy in international fora by the Soviet Union and the Non-Aligned Movement. The Declaration on Decolonization can be considered as the first successful Soviet initiative in the UN. Much remained to be done in 1960 with regard to decolonization. As Jawaharlal Nehru stated on 3 October of that year, "Colonialism still has its strong foot-holds in some parts and racialism and racial domination are still prevalent, more especially in Africa" (A/PV.882).

The adoption of the Declaration on Decolonization, however, was a belated recognition of an irreversible trend promoted by the UN itself. This in no way diminished its importance or the intensity of that moment. The US delegation correctly described the UN's decolonization efforts:

Through all its life, the United Nations has been deeply concerned with the progress of dependent peoples towards self-government and

independence. That progress has embraced nearly 800 million people. It has become the greatest tide of political liberation in all history.

This year, with the admission of seventeen newly-established nations to our midst, the independence movement has reached a climax. It is well, therefore, in the presence of so many nations which have achieved independence in recent times, that this session of the General Assembly should consider the future of this momentous movement. The movement itself is natural, just, and irresistible. It is determined not so much by what we say here as by historic forces which cannot be reversed. But it seems reasonable to hope that our deliberations here may help to speed it, and to make it more orderly, more peaceful and more just for the scores of millions whose future is bound up with it (A/PV.937).

1960 also witnessed the intensification of parliamentary feuds in the Assembly. The so-called “automatic majority”, which during fifteen years had ensured the prevalence of the US point of view in the UN, began to erode. The question of the representation of China is the best example. In cases such as Palestine, the United States turned increasingly to an established tactic: that of invoking the two-thirds rule to reject the more unacceptable sections of draft resolutions that undoubtedly were supported by a simple majority (see, for example, A/PV.993). This procedure gave results since it permitted the United States to vote in favor of the now “clean” draft as a whole. Occasionally, this tactic resulted in shifting the thrust of the original draft to such an extent that its co-sponsors were forced to vote against it or at least abstain.

In 1960 South Africa’s growing isolation within the Assembly became evident. In several votes it was the only country to cast a negative one while the only abstentions came from those Western countries that had yet to overcome fully their colonialist past: Australia, Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom.

We can also see in 1960 the line of resistance which Spain and Portugal, together with South Africa, were to maintain with regard to decolonization. Spain, for example, vigorously protested the “strange appearance of Ceuta, Melilla, Ifni and the Spanish Sahara” in a speech by the delegation of Morocco (A/PV.988).

In contrast, the United Kingdom was to begin to distance itself from the Government of South Africa, especially with regard to its policy of *apartheid*. In 1961 it voted, for the first time, in favor of a resolution regarding the treatment of people of Indian origin in South Africa because it considered that “this aspect of *apartheid* is no longer a purely internal matter”

(A/PV.981). With time the United Kingdom would come to recognize that the *apartheid* regime, as it affected South Africa's black majority, was also an international concern.

1990: the end of an era

Thirty years later, the post-war, bi-polar world fell apart with such ease that it shocked even its most devoted critics. From Moscow Mikhail Gorbachov triggered a process of change in the countries of Eastern Europe which, by the end of 1991, had swallowed up the Soviet leader himself. Reforms were already underway in Poland and other European countries of the now defunct Socialist bloc, but what happened between 1989, including the fall of the Berlin Wall, and December 1991, with the dismemberment of the USSR, was the greatest historical (and ideological) shake up of the twentieth century. The rise of the Russian Revolution and the Soviet Union's irruption (from 1945) upon the world scene pale in the face of the rapidity and totality of the collapse of what US President Ronald Reagan called the "Evil Empire". From one day to the next, hundreds of millions of persons realized that someone had pulled the rug from under them. It was not just a matter of what had happened but also of how it had come about.

When the history of 1989–1991 is written, some will point to the deal which was undoubtedly struck in September 1989 by US Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Edvard Sheverdnaze in their meeting in the Wyoming mountains. In effect, in his speech to the US Congress, on 21 January 1992, President George Bush would declare without hesitation: "America won the Cold War". That is the message that the West gave with different emphasis and that is the message emphatically given by the last Soviet and the new Russian leaders and those of other Eastern European republics. It seems incredible, but that is what Gorbachov and Sheverdnaze did: the first by asking for help from the West to dismantle his country and the system that had given it power, and the second by going to NATO Headquarters as if he were just another ally of that military organization created precisely to offset the supposed threat represented by the USSR.

The Cold War defined to a great extent the limits of the UN's action until 1990. The disappearance of a bi-polar world has forced its Members to rethink a series of questions which the ideological rivalry between the two military blocs had defined, in one way or another, for the rest of the international community. The so-called "new international reality" became evident at the Security Council's summit meeting on 31 January 1992.

The role of the UN

During that summit meeting, the question was raised once again regarding the need to increase the Security Council's composition and its number of permanent members (S/PV.3045 and 3046). Venezuela's President urged the UN to adapt its structure to the new international realities. India's Prime Minister recalled that the membership in the General Assembly had tripled since 1946 and that the Security Council could not remain the same. Japan's Prime Minister went even further by stressing that his country's contribution to the UN's regular budget was greater than that of France and the UK combined. As expected, the permanent members did not refer to this question which is of increasing interest to everyone else.

The question of the composition of the Security Council involves two basic aspects. First, it obviously reflects an outdated concept of the concert of nations, since for some time Germany and Japan have overtaken some of the "Big Five" of 1945. That phrase sounds strange in the nineties, especially in light of the economic might of those two countries.

After its reunification in 1990, Germany began to act in a more independent manner in its international relations. A clear example of this was its hasty recognition of the republics of Croatia and Slovenia. German public opinion also began to criticize the Council's composition, as evidenced by the biting editorial "Anachronism at the UN" in Munich's *Süddeutsche Zeitung* newspaper, which appeared on 3 February 1992, a few days after the Council's summit:

Well-intentioned, but of no consequence. That is how the results of the United Nations summit can be briefly described. The "nonbinding" resolution passed by the Security Council reflects an international organization with all its earlier weaknesses, not the strong instrument which would actually be needed. That is no surprise, as the United Nations in its current form is a child of the international order which arose from the ruins of World War II.

Of the "Big Five", none can be described as a victorious power today. Permanent membership and veto rights are in the hands of two worn-out medium-sized powers, an impoverished and explosive ex-superpower, a crusty geriatric dictatorship and a Western world power that once again threatens to sink into navel-contemplation.

Security Council reform has become the symbol of the UN's adaptation to the new realities of the post-Cold-War world. There is talk of "democratizing" its structure. Some seek to eliminate the veto of the permanent mem-

bers; others wish to increase their number. The General Assembly's committee entrusted with this issue was unable to produce agreed recommendations in 1994. Shortly thereafter Japan began a public campaign to secure support for a permanent seat on the Council. Germany did the same.

The debate intensified as the Organization's fiftieth anniversary approached and it has continued. The fact is that the United Nations cannot exist without the active presence of the main military and/or economic Powers and these will not participate in its work if they do not have the veto.

The Security Council has the principal responsibility in the UN for the maintenance of international peace and security (Article 24 of the Charter). Over the last years the Council has multiplied its peace operations and related activities. But its composition does not reflect the new international reality nor do its decisions always enjoy the open support of the other UN Members. And therein lies the key to the problem that will have to be resolved if the UN is to become a truly multilateral instrument of peace and thus attain the noble aims set by its founders in 1945. The solution to this problem will have to be sought in a balance between the recognition of the role of the great Powers, on one hand, and the need that they act in accordance with the will of the majority of UN Members, on the other.

The United Nations finds itself once again actively involved in the search for solutions to many international crises. In the nineties it has gone from an almost forgotten debating society to an increasingly relevant forum. Its image has changed and, as in the late forties and early fifties, it is today seen, rightly or wrongly, as holding the answer to many of the world's problems.

Yet world public opinion is not always aware of what can reasonably be expected from the UN. It is often perceived as an institution independent of its Member States. And when things go wrong, there are those who unwittingly criticize "the UN" as if it had a life of its own. The problem is further compounded by the absence of a clear set of rules to guide its many peace-making and peace-keeping operations. The public and the media cannot always distinguish a UN observer force that is dispatched to prevent the outbreak of hostilities between two opposing factions from a UN military force, similar to a national army, with a mandate to restore peace in a given area.

The Security Council is often asked to pass judgment on a certain situation and then appears powerless to redress it. Furthermore, the troops Member States decide to put under a UN command are seen by some as part of a humanitarian exercise, while others view them as part of an interventionist or punitive scheme. And the UN should not be called on to perform humanitarian missions in a given conflict (similar to those which, with studied neutrality, the International Committee of the Red Cross has been undertaking for over a century) and, at the same, required to pass judgment on that same conflict and, even worse, to take sides in it.

In short, the UN should resist undertaking parallel and often contradictory missions with regard to the same problem. More importantly, it should avoid becoming a “complementary actor” in the solution of crisis situations, one charged with mopping up after someone else has intervened, as in Somalia, Rwanda or Haiti. Nor should the UN lend itself to a role of “cover” for someone else’s intervention as in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina where the UN’s mission is led by NATO.

PART TWO

VOTING PATTERNS

CHAPTER 3. THE RESOLUTIONS AND THE VOTES

United Nations General Assembly resolutions cover a broad range of issues. These include pronouncements on the international political situation and the state of the world economy; endorsement of treaties and other multi-lateral legal instruments; opinions on specific cases, condemnations of certain acts committed by States and value judgments regarding the policy of an individual country or group of countries; the organization and functioning of the principal and subsidiary organs of the United Nations, its relationship with other international and regional fora and agencies, as well as with its Member States, non-member nations, liberation movements in various parts of the world and non-governmental organizations.


Taken together, General Assembly resolutions constitute a body of world opinion unparalleled in history. How many resolutions has the Assembly approved and how have they been adopted? Here we shall attempt to answer those questions. Next we shall examine the negative votes cast by countries upon the adoption of those resolutions and the cases where they were rejected by only one, two or three countries.

An ocean of resolutions

At the end of its sessions the Assembly takes a decision on its agenda items. It has done so in each of its sessions except in 1964 when, because of a financial crisis (there were simply no funds), the Assembly only discussed the impact of that crisis on the Organization. Appendix III contains a list of the yearly total of resolutions.

The Assembly assigns a number to each one of the resolutions it approves. Between 1946 and 1975 they were numbered consecutively in Arabic numbers followed by a Roman numeral in parenthesis that indicates the session: the first of those resolutions was 1 (I) and the last was 3541 (XXX) of the thirtieth session in 1975. Since 1976 the Assembly has simplified the numbering of its resolutions, identifying them first by session and then by number: the first of these resolutions was 31/1 of the thirty-first regular session. Resolutions adopted in special or emergency sessions are identified by the initials S and ES, respectively.

When the Assembly adopts more than one resolution on a single item it adds a letter (following the English alphabet) after the number. Thus, for example, the 18 separate resolutions adopted under the item "General and Complete Disarmament" at its fiftieth session all came under the number "50/70" but are identified as "50/70 A", "50/70 B", etc., through "50/70 R".

FIGURE 3.1 *Yearly total General Assembly resolutions, 1946–1996*

Since 1946 (and through September 1997) the General Assembly has held 51 regular sessions, 19 special sessions and ten emergency sessions. As a result of over a half-century of debates, the Assembly has adopted 10,815 resolutions. That number does not include the several thousand *decisions* which, in general, are of an organizational nature (inscription of items on the agenda of the following session) or of little importance, such as those that merely “take note” of the reports of other bodies. On the other hand, that total does include all resolutions with a different number, as well as those which, under one single number, have two or more letters or include several sections that were voted upon separately.

Although the total number of resolutions has varied, at times significantly from one year to the next, the five-year averages reveal the following trends: after a small drop in the early fifties, there is a constant rise (very sharp in the seventies) until 1985, followed by an almost constant decrease.

TABLE 3.1 *General Assembly resolutions: five-year totals, 1946–1996^a*

Quinquennium	Total	Without a vote	By a vote	Recorded vote	Without negative votes	Without objection
1946–1950	594	241	353	90	130	371
1951–1955	571	138	433	75	200	338
1956–1960	657	235	422	114	248	483
1961–1965 ^b	558	292	266	92	135	427
1966–1970	745	322	423	155	205	527
1971–1975	947	400	547	363	262	662
1976–1980	1,441	846	595	555	240	1,086
1981–1985	1,727	961	766	748	190	1,151
1986–1990	1,656	1,016	640	640	161	1,177
1991–1995	1,604	1,252	352	352	86	1,338
1996–	315	237	78	78	21	258
Total	10,815	5,940	4,875	3,262	1,878	7,818

Percent							
Quinquennium	Yearly average	Percent change	Without a vote	By a vote	Recorded vote	Without negative votes	Without objection
1946–1950	118.8	—	40.6	59.4	25.5	36.8	62.5
1951–1955	114.2	-4	24.2	75.8	17.3	46.2	59.2
1956–1960	131.4	+15	35.8	64.2	27.0	58.8	73.6
1961–1965 ^b	139.5	+6	52.3	47.7	34.6	50.8	76.5
1966–1970	149.0	+7	43.2	56.8	36.6	48.5	70.7
1971–1975	189.4	+27	42.2	57.8	66.4	47.9	69.9
1976–1980	288.2	+52	58.7	41.3	93.3	40.3	75.4
1981–1985	345.4	+20	55.6	44.4	97.7	24.8	66.6
1986–1990	331.2	-4	61.4	38.6	100.0	25.2	71.1
1991–1995	320.8	-3	78.1	21.9	100.0	24.4	83.4
1996–	315.0	-2	75.2	24.8	100.0	26.9	81.9
Total	216.3		54.9	45.1	66.9	38.5	72.3

^a Through September 1997; 50 years (no resolutions in 1964).^b Four years.

In its first five years (1946–1950) the Assembly approved an average of 119 resolutions per year. In the following five years (1951–1955) it dropped to 114, mostly because many of the decisions regarding the organization and structure of the UN had already been taken. From then on, the yearly average increased until 1985, when it peaked at 356 resolutions. (The average during the 1981–1985 period was 345 or three times that of 1951–1955).

Several factors serve to explain that increase. As UN membership tripled (from 51 original Members to 159 in 1984) the range of concerns within the Assembly broadened. The actors and voices multiplied. Moreover, some of the questions which the Security Council could not (or would not) solve

TABLE 3.2 *Resolutions adopted upon recommendation of the Main Committees*

	Year: 1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995
<i>Plenary</i>	12	24	31	13	14	21	56	47	47	75
<i>Main Committees</i>										
1. Disarmament/security	14	8	6	10	20	30	44	72	54	46
Special Political	15	4	5	6	15	17	20	25	24	— ^a
2. Economic	16	5	20	21	24	44	71	70	54	43
3. Social/humanitarian	14	4	13	23	23	29	59	73	93	62
4. Decolonization	19	21	27	24	15	23	13	15	17	23 ^a
5. Administrative/budgetary	31	38	43	35	41	44	44	39	42	63
6. Legal	15	7	3	11	9	9	14	15	11	13
<i>Total</i>	136	111	148	143	161	217	321	356	342	325

^a Combined Fourth and Special Political Committee.

were added to the Assembly's agenda which, towards the late eighties, contained twice as many items as forty years earlier.

As Member States became aware of the complexity and variety of matters relating to disarmament, economic development and humanitarian and social questions, the agenda began to grow. In contrast, the number of resolutions on legal and administrative and budgetary matters has remained more or less the same over the years, while those regarding decolonization diminished after 1960 as dozens of nations gained their independence, tangible proof of the UN's success in this field.

The number of resolutions adopted directly in Plenary has varied from year to year with a marked increase since the eighties. In 1995, for example, almost one-fourth of the resolutions were approved directly in Plenary whereas the proportion in 1950 had been only one-tenth. This was due largely to the inclusion of numerous political items not assigned previously to one of the main committees, as well as several aspects of the situation in the Middle East, especially the plight of the Palestinian people, which some delegations insisted that they be examined directly in Plenary.

Some resolutions are very short, no more than one line, while the text of others runs for several pages. At first, there were resolutions whose content turned out to be innovative in different fields. With time, and especially since the sixties, they became very repetitive. Drafting is today a rather mechanical process and the texts adopted on the same issue contain a plethora of identical paragraphs.

After almost eleven thousand resolutions, it is, of course, not easy to draft an original text on a much-discussed issue. But the inclusion of identical texts and the automatic reiteration of well-known positions render many resolutions inconsequential. The interest they awaken beyond the Assembly Hall is thus minimal.

With very rare exceptions, the media no longer covers the Assembly's debates or its resolutions. In contrast, during its early years, the UN was the

center of attention for many reporters. Some of the more influential newspapers accredited several correspondents to the Organization, and their ranks increased when the Assembly was in session. Quite a few newspapers went so far as to assign one reporter to each main committee. But with time interest waned, in part because of the change in attitude towards the UN of some of its more powerful Member States and in part because many began to consider its work less and less relevant.


For years the Assembly itself has been discussing the significance of its resolutions. It has established committees and working groups to examine the rationalization of its work and invariably one of the recommendations is to strive to reduce the number of resolutions. This is already happening and, besides adopting fewer resolutions, the Assembly is resorting to fewer votes for their approval.

Voting is the only procedure contemplated in the UN Charter (Article 18) and reproduced (and broadened) in the Assembly's Rules of Procedure (articles 82 to 95) for the adoption of resolutions. The Assembly, however, may decide to adopt them without a vote.

At its first few sessions the Assembly adopted the vast majority of its resolutions by a vote. In 1950 and 1951 it peaked at 78 and 84 percent, respectively. Since the early fifties the general trend has been downwards and by the nineties a mere 22 percent of resolutions were being put to a vote (Table 3.1). Since 1946 (and through September 1997) the Assembly has approved 5,940 resolutions (or 55 percent of the total) without a vote. The President simply announces that, unless there is a delegation that wishes to proceed otherwise, the resolution "is adopted" and bangs the gavel.

When a resolution is put to a vote, the vote can be by roll-call (the name of each country is called one at a time), recorded or with no record at all (by a show of hands until the seventies and later by means of a mechanical system). There is a record for only 3,262 (67 percent) of the 4,875 resolutions adopted by a vote. This is due mainly to the fact that for almost three decades there was no mechanical voting system and delegations preferred to avoid the drawn out procedure of a roll-call vote. As a result, between 1946 and 1975, a mere 36 percent of the votes were recorded.

Not all resolutions that are put to the vote receive negative votes. Some are adopted with a few abstentions while others are approved unanimously. The sum of these resolutions and those adopted without a vote gives us the total resolutions approved without formal opposition, that is, without any objection. The proportion of such resolutions has varied between 59 percent (in the early fifties) and 83 percent (in the nineties) and will probably continue to grow (Table 3.1 and Appendix III).

FIGURE 3.2 *General Assembly resolutions: five-year average, 1946–1996*

The negative votes

At its first session in 1946 the General Assembly adopted 38 resolutions by a vote. They received an average of 38.4 votes in favor, 5.1 against and 5.2 abstentions. With the increase UN Member States, it was to be expected that those averages would also grow. But that is not exactly what happened.

After rising steadily for fifty years, the affirmative votes registered a sharp drop in 1995 while the abstentions and absences rose. The evolution of the negative votes reveals that in 1960 the average fell to 3.9 and in 1990 it

TABLE 3.3 *Yearly average total votes on General Assembly resolutions*

Year	Yes (percent)	No	Abstention	Absences
1946	38.4 (69.8%)	5.1 (9.3)	5.2 (9.5)	6.3 (11.5)
1960	72.6 (73.3)	3.9 (3.9)	11.1 (11.1)	11.5 (11.6)
1990	129.9 (81.2)	4.1 (2.6)	13.6 (8.5)	12.4 (7.8)
1995	123.4 (66.7)	7.0 (3.8)	26.0 (14.1)	28.6 (15.5)
1996	130.9 (70.8)	7.0 (3.8)	21.6 (11.7)	25.5 (13.8)

was 4.1, that is, *below* the 1946 level. Since then it has climbed to 7.0 (Table 3.3).

Since 1946 the General Assembly has adopted 4,875 (or 45 percent) of its resolutions by a vote. As already noted, there is a record for only about two-thirds of those votes. However, it has been possible to trace and identify the paternity of almost all the negative votes through the explanations of vote contained in the verbatim records of the meetings.

Through September 1997, 22,528 votes had been cast against resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. There have been, of course, many thousands more negative votes if one takes into account all other votes that have taken place in the Assembly, that is, those that resulted in the *rejection* of a draft resolution or those taken separately on preambular or operative paragraphs of countless draft resolutions. On occasion separate votes have even been requested on one or two words of the text of a draft resolution. Here we shall examine only the votes on draft resolutions adopted *as a whole* and the countries that rejected them.

What is the significance of the negative votes cast against General Assembly resolutions? To begin with, they are, in the main, a clear and convincing signal of rejection of the majority's will. They are the formal expression of disagreement with a resolution's content or part of the text. That inconformity can be the result of several considerations, some philosophical and, more often, political—an objection to the ideology that seems to be behind certain pronouncements. This occurred in the seventies and eighties, for example, with resolutions on the establishment of the New International Economic Order and, more recently, with those on the so-called right of humanitarian intervention with which some wish to endow the Organization. Other negative votes are motivated by more mundane considerations: because they refer to a country by its name (the complaints in the eighties regarding so-called “name-calling”) or because they condemn an act committed by a State (human rights violations, colonialism, aggression, etc.).

The fact is that of the three votes possible—in favor, against or abstention—the negative votes are the most interesting. A country can go along with the majority without much enthusiasm, almost by inertia, and thus avoid distinguishing itself from the rest. It can also seek the comfort that goes with the limbo of an abstention. But to vote “no” is often an imperative

TABLE 3.4 *Resolutions with negative votes, 1946–1996*


<i><u>Votes against</u></i>	<i><u>Total resolutions</u></i>	<i><u>Percentage</u></i>
1	555	18.5
2	603	20.1
3	190	6.3
4	106	3.5
5	222	7.4
6	130	4.3
7	75	2.5
8	89	3.0
9	146	4.9
10	125	4.2
11 to 14	258	8.6
15 to 19	270	9.0
20 to 29	158	5.3
30 to 39	42	1.4
40 to 49	21	0.7
50 to 57	7	0.2
Total	2,997	99.9

necessity, an act of conviction (for large, medium and small countries) or the result of bilateral pressure of larger nations. To go against the will of the majority thus requires a decision that can have some unpleasant consequences for the country in question, especially if it is a relatively small one.

Resolutions adopted by a vote

Since the early seventies the proportion of resolutions adopted by a vote has been decreasing. As already noted, in some of its early sessions, the Assembly approved over 80 percent of its resolutions by a vote. In the eighties it was around 40 percent and in the early nineties it fell to 22 percent.

On the other hand, more and more resolutions that are put to a vote receive negative votes. Approximately 60 percent of the 4,875 resolutions adopted by a vote since 1946 have had negative votes. Initially, the percentage was 63, falling to a minimum of 41 in the period 1956–1960. Then it increased and has remained at about 75 percent since the early eighties (Table 3.1). To put it another way: the proportion of resolutions adopted by a vote *but without negative votes* has been decreasing almost constantly since the end of the fifties. This trend, together with the fact that fewer and fewer resolutions are being put to a vote and the increase in the percentage of resolutions adopted with only one or two votes against, indicates that an ever-smaller group of countries was opposing more and more resolutions.

FIGURE 3.3 *General Assembly resolutions with negative votes (yearly average)*

Resolutions with negative votes

Through September 1997, the General Assembly had adopted 2,997 resolutions with one or more negative votes (Table 3.4). Only 70 (or 2.3 percent) resolutions were approved with 30 or more votes against, of which seven received over 50 negative votes: three on the representativeness of certain governments (2642 [XXV] of 1970 on China and the UN, 3238 [XXIX] of 1974 on the legitimate rights of Cambodia's Royal Government of National Unity in the UN and 3390 A [XXX] of 1975 on Korea); another three (48/124 of 1993, 49/180 of 1994 and 50/172 of 1995) on respect for the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs

of States in their electoral processes; and a seventh (50/33 of 1995) dealt with foreign economic interests that impede the decolonization process.

Given the relatively small number of UN Members until 1960, it was not until then that a resolution was adopted over the opposition of 30 countries. Those resolutions revealed a deep division within the Assembly. Significantly, 33 (or 47 percent) of them have been adopted in the nineties. As shown in Table 3.5, 18 have been on various aspects of human rights. The question of China, together with other cases of credentials in the Assembly and the problem of Korea, gave rise to 15 of those 70 votes. The Assembly's pronouncements on East Timor and Western Sahara also encountered stiff opposition. In contrast, among the hundreds of resolutions on South Africa, only five were adopted with a significant number of negative votes. And, of the hundreds of resolutions on the Middle East, a mere four—including the one on Zionism—have had more than 30 votes against.

Table 3.4 indicates that one-fourth of resolutions adopted with negative votes had over eleven votes against. In other words, 75 percent were approved with *ten or less* negative votes. Significantly, almost two-fifths (38.6 percent) of them had only one or two votes against. And it is precisely those resolutions with ten or less negative votes that merit a closer analysis.

Opposition to resolutions has come from different quarters

To quantify the degree of a country's opposition to General Assembly resolutions we have taken all resolutions with negative votes and determined the frequency with which a given nation has participated in those rejections. As already noted, we have managed to identify the authors of 22,013 (or 97.7 percent) of the total negative votes cast since 1946.

Only the Organization's 51 original Members have been able to participate in all votes since 1946. Their rejection of resolutions goes from less than 0.5 to 50 percent. The United States heads the list, with the United Kingdom (29 percent) a distant second, followed by another eight States with over 20 percent, seven with 11 to 17 percent and eight with 3 to 8 percent. The remaining half have rejected less than 3 percent of resolutions (Table 3.6).

At certain times some countries have pressed the red button more than others (Appendix VI). Until the mid-sixties, the Soviet-bloc nations topped the list of opponents to Assembly resolutions. At first they rejected up to 60 percent of those resolutions and later, after 1955, they did so less and less: 50 percent in the 1956–1965 decade, 20 percent in the period 1966–1985 and a mere 3–7 percent of those approved since 1986.

TABLE 3.5 *Subjects of resolutions adopted with 30 or more negative votes, 1946–1996*

<i>Subject</i>	<i>1946</i> <i>1960</i>	<i>1961</i> <i>1965</i>	<i>1966</i> <i>1970</i>	<i>1971</i> <i>1975</i>	<i>1976</i> <i>1980</i>	<i>1981</i> <i>1985</i>	<i>1986</i> <i>1990</i>	<i>1991</i> <i>1995</i>	<i>1996</i>	<i>Total</i>
Human rights			3		1	2	1	7	4	18
Credentials										
China	1	2	5	1						9
Korea				3						3
Other		1		1	1					3
Disarmament/security			1			1		4	4	10
Economic								6	1	7
South Africa								5		5
East Timor					3	2				5
Middle East				1	2			1		4
UN budget/personnel					1	1				2
Western Sahara				1	1					2
Multilingualism								1		1
Terrorism				1						1
Total	1	3	9	8	9	6	1	24	9	70

In the case of other countries the trend is exactly the reverse. The United States began rejecting about eight percent of resolutions but in the 1986–1995 decade it voted against 80 percent of them, i.e., ten times its rate of rejection 40 years earlier. Israel went from one to 2.6 percent in the first two decades, then to 15 percent in 1966–1975, 42 percent in 1976–1985 and 52 percent since 1986, i.e., fifty times greater than in the 1946–1955 decade. The United Kingdom also registered a constant increase but much less spectacular: from 16 to 36 percent. Something similar occurred with South Africa until its suspension in 1974. The countries that decade after decade have rejected over 10 percent of Assembly resolutions are relatively few: Australia, Belgium, France, Germany (since its admission in 1973), Portugal (since 1955), South Africa (until 1974) and the United Kingdom.

At different times certain countries have found themselves more and more isolated in their opposition to Assembly resolutions. In the eighties a handful of nations systematically rejected resolutions approved by overwhelming majorities. From an analysis of all resolutions with negative votes, it is evident that the percentage with over ten votes against fell from 44 in 1981 to 28 in 1986, 22 in 1991, 19 in 1992 and 17 in 1993, rising to 23 in 1994, 26 in 1995 and 25 in 1996. In contrast, those with five or less votes have increased from 50 to 75 percent. Moreover, in recent years resolutions with a single negative vote have gone from a minimum of 12 percent in 1979–1980 to a high of 28 percent in the 1986–1990 period.

TABLE 3.6 *The negative votes of the UN's 51 Original Members, 1946–1996^a*

1. United States	49.61	27. Costa Rica	2.90
2. United Kingdom	29.06	28. China	2.84
3. Poland	25.99	29. Uruguay	2.50
4. Soviet Union	25.89 ^b	30. El Salvador	2.47
5. Czechoslovakia	25.86 ^c	31. Chile	2.30
6. Ukraine	25.59	32. Ethiopia	2.24
7. South Africa	25.06 ^d	33. Brazil	2.04
8. Belarus	24.99	Honduras	2.04
9. France	23.86	35. Paraguay	2.00
10. Belgium	20.35	36. Egypt	1.90 ^e
11. Luxembourg	17.22	37. Dominican Republic	1.84
12. Netherlands	17.18	Saudi Arabia	1.84
13. Canada	16.82	39. Argentina	1.77
14. Australia	14.18	40. Iran	1.74
15. New Zealand	11.71	41. Haiti	1.40
16. Norway	11.58	Liberia	1.40
17. Denmark	11.54	43. Bolivia	1.37
18. Cuba	7.97	44. Lebanon	1.23
19. Turkey	7.00	45. Philippines	1.10
20. Syria	6.00 ^e	46. Peru	0.87
21. Yugoslavia	5.15 ^f	47. Panama	0.80
22. India	3.67	48. Colombia	0.70
23. Nicaragua	3.47	49. Ecuador	0.57
24. Iraq	3.39 ^g	50. Venezuela	0.50
25. Greece	3.00	51. Mexico	0.47
26. Guatemala	2.97		

^a Per cent of 2,997 resolutions with negative votes since 1946 and through September 1997.

^b And later Russian Federation.

^c And later Czech Republic as well as Slovakia (25.79 percent).

^d 1,168 resolutions (through 30 September 1974) and 157 since 1994.

^e Includes five negative votes cast by the United Arab Republic.

^f 2,719 resolutions (through 22 September 1992).

^g 2,890 resolutions (through September 1995).

The gang of six (and later five)

Initially the most persistent opposition came from the group of Eastern European countries: Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Ukraine, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. When Marshall Tito distanced himself from the Soviet bloc in 1948, the “gang of six” was reduced to five. In 1950, for example, that quintet rejected almost three out of every four (73 percent) resolutions adopted by the Assembly. No other State came close to them. Australia, South Africa and the United Kingdom placed a very distant second with 12 percent. The United States was even further down on the list with 5 percent, while France had a mere 1.7 percent of rejections.

After 1955, with the admission of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, the Soviet camp was strengthened in the UN and the number of resolutions with nine negative votes multiplied. In the sixties the Socialist bloc’s

TABLE 3.7 *Evolution of triple, double and single negative votes, 1946–1996 (percentage of five-year totals)*

	Total Resolutions	With negative votes		Votes against				Percent of total with negative votes
		Total	Per cent	Three	Two	One	Total	
1946–1950	594	223	37.5	2	11	24	37	16.6
1951–1955	571	233	40.8	9	19	24	52	22.3
1956–1960	657	174	26.5	6	10	26	42	24.1
1961–1965 ^a	558	131	23.5	4	20	24	49	37.4
1966–1970	745	218	29.3	5	59	37	101	46.3
1971–1975	947	285	30.1	17	61	51	129	45.3
1976–1980	1,441	355	24.6	21	48	55	124	34.9
1981–1985	1,727	576	33.4	33	126	118	277	48.1
1986–1990	1,656	479	28.9	49	137	134	320	66.8
1991–1995	1,604	266	16.6	30	94	54	178	66.9
1996 ^b	315	57	18.1	14	18	7	39	68.4
Total	10,815	2,997	27.7	190	603	555	1,348	45.0

^a Four years (no resolutions in 1964).^b Through September 1997.

ranks continued to grow, with the admission of Mongolia and other nations with regimes backed by the USSR. With the triumph of the Cuban Revolution, Havana also joined the Soviet bloc in many votes. And from 1973 to 1990 that bloc also had the GDR's unrestricted support. On the other hand, Romania began to follow a path different from its military allies on certain multilateral issues, while in December 1961 Albania broke off completely with the USSR when it supported China in the ideological rift between Beijing and Moscow.

As the USSR reduced its opposition to Assembly resolutions, the United States increased its own. By 1986 Soviet-bloc rejection had dropped to 8.6 percent. In contrast, opposition from some Western European countries and Israel had climbed to the 20–40 percent range. The US, however, had reached a rejection rate of 81 percent, higher than the USSR's in the fifties and Portugal and South Africa's at the end of the sixties and early seventies.

The vetoes in the Security Council

Since 1946 (and through September 1997) there have been 285 vetoes in the Security Council: 216 single vetoes, 15 double and 13 triple. The Soviet Union (now Russian Federation) has resorted to a veto 126 times, the United States 85, the United Kingdom 33, China 23 and France 18. The USSR was the first permanent member to exercise its veto power. Eighty of the USSR's vetoes took place during the UN's first decade and 46 of them were cast to block the admission of a country backed by the United States.

TABLE 3.8 *Vetoes in the Security Council, 1946–1997^a*

	1946 1950	1951 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	1991 1995	1996 1997	Total
China		1				4	1	16			1	23
France	2		2			2	5	4	3			18
USSR (Russia)	50	30	15	11	2	9	4	3		2		126
United Kingdom			2	1	2	9	4	7	8			33
United States					1	11	10	37	23		3	85
Total	52	31	19	12	5	35	24	67	34	2	4	285

^aThrough September 1997.

Rejection of General Assembly resolutions runs parallel to Security Council vetoes. In 1970 the United States cast its first veto in the Council. That year its formal objection to Assembly resolutions rose to 32 percent, a significant jump over the 7 percent of 1960 or the 5 percent of 1950. During the seventies the US resorted to a veto in the Council on an average of twice a year. In the eighties that average was six vetoes per year, another enormous increase.

In contrast, the Soviet Union, which cast its first veto in February of 1946 (on “The Syrian and Lebanese Question”) and exercised that right ten times each year at the end of the forties, cast only three between 1981 and 1984 and two since then. Fifty-one of the Soviet Union’s 126 vetoes were on proposals to admit new members.

France cast its first veto in June of 1946 when it joined the Soviet Union in rejecting a draft resolution on “the Spanish Question”. Ten of its 18 vetoes were on questions regarding Southern Africa, as were 26 of the United Kingdom’s 33 vetoes. The first UK veto was in 1955 when, together with France, it rejected a draft resolution on “The Situation in the Middle East”.

China’s first veto, which also came in 1955, was to prevent the admission of Mongolia. And 19 of its 23 vetoes were cast in votes to elect a Secretary-General: in 1971 it vetoed Waldheim on two occasions before abstaining and permitting his nomination to go forward; in 1976 it vetoed him once before abstaining to allow his re-election; and in 1981 it vetoed Waldheim 16 times preventing his second re-election.

Among the US’ 85 vetoes, 30 were cast on Israel’s policy in the Middle East, 8 on its own activities in Central America and the Caribbean, 20 on Southern Africa, 16 to prevent the election of Salim Ahmed Salim as Secretary-General in 1981 and one to deny Boutros Ghali a second term in 1996.

TABLE 3.9 *Subjects of General Assembly resolutions adopted with one, two and three negative votes, 1946–1996^a*

	1946 1950	1951 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	1991 1995	1996	Total
Workings of UN	14	10	4	4	7	11	4	13	10			77
Credentials of Members			6	2	1	2						11
Non-member States	4	5				3	1	1				14
Disarmament/Security		1	1	5	15	23	31	48	84	32	6	246
Economic issues	2		1	3	3	10	11	15	19	5		69
Human rights	1	1		1	4	2	3	7	14	11	3	47
Other social issues	2	2	2	2	3	7	8	15	9	1		51
Decolonization	9	15	11	17	18	16	6	20	21	14	2	149
Southern Africa	2	14	11	12	42	40	4	16	28	10		179
Middle East	2		1	2	3	13	52	136	124	98	24	455
Other	1	4	5	1	5	2	4	6	11	7	4	50
Total	37	52	42	49	101	129	124	277	320	178	39	1,348

^a Through September 1997.*Triple, double and single rejections*

Of the 2,997 General Assembly resolutions adopted with negative votes, 1,348 (or 45 percent) received from one to three votes against. For the first twenty years, the annual average of those resolutions was a mere nine; over the following fifteen years (1966–1980) it rose to 24; between 1981 and 1985 it sky-rocketed to 55; during the following five-year period (1986–1990) it climbed to 64, but it has dropped significantly in the nineties (35 per year).

Those resolutions hold the key to a full understanding of what has been occurring at the UN over the past decades. There are two issues that caused the growing isolation of certain countries in the Assembly: Southern Africa and the Middle East. Let us analyze this trend by periods: 1946–1960, 1961–1975, 1976–1990, and 1991–1996.

1946–1960: the Organization, decolonization and Southern Africa

Until 1960 the votes in which a country ended up alone or almost alone in the General Assembly were on resolutions that dealt basically with three items: the work regarding the functioning of the UN, its principal and subsidiary organs (including their rules of procedure), the Secretariat and the budget; questions regarding decolonization; and the wide range of issues relating to Southern Africa. Between 1946 and 1960, 68.7 percent of all triple, double and single rejections was precisely on resolutions adopted on those items. Table 3.12 lists the countries that have cast most of those negative votes.

TABLE 3.10 *Subjects of General Assembly resolutions adopted with one, two and three negative votes, 1946–1996 (percent)*

	1946–1960	1961–1975	1976–1990	1991–1996	Total
Workings of UN	21.4	7.9	3.7		5.7
Credentials of Members	4.6	1.8			0.8
Non-member States	6.9	1.1	0.3		1.0
Disarmament/Security	1.5	15.4	22.6	17.5	18.2
Economic issues	2.3	5.7	6.2	2.3	5.1
Human rights	1.5	2.5	3.3	6.5	3.5
Other social issues	4.6	4.3	4.4	0.5	3.8
Decolonization	26.7	18.3	6.5	7.3	11.1
Southern Africa	20.6	33.7	6.7	4.6	13.3
Middle East	2.3	6.5	43.3	56.2	33.8
Other	7.6	2.9	2.9	5.1	3.7
Total	100.0	100.1	99.9	100.0	100.0

The first triple rejection was in the vote in 1949 on resolution 367 (IV), the brief text of which invited the Secretary-General to prepare, after consulting the ECOSOC, a draft rules of procedure for non-governmental conferences. The second time there was a trio of negative votes was in 1952 when the Assembly, in its resolutions 611 and 612 (VI), addressed the cases of Tunisia and Morocco, respectively. France refused to participate in the vote, but its position was endorsed through the negative votes of Belgium, Luxembourg and South Africa. The solidarity among some of the colonial Powers was evident on many occasions in the fifties and there were other instances in which the colonial Power directly involved refused to take part in the votes on one of its non self-governing territories.

The first case of a double rejection of an Assembly resolution occurred in 1946 a few weeks after the beginning of its first session. When it took up the question of the “Relations between Members of the United Nations and Spain”, El Salvador and Nicaragua voted against resolution 32 (I).

Since 1946 the Assembly has adopted 555 resolutions with a single vote against. The first case was on 29 January 1946 when a couple of amendments to the (then still provisional) Rules of Procedure of the Assembly itself were put to a vote. The second amendment referred to the possibility that the ECOSOC, in keeping with “the spirit of Article 62” of the Charter, convene world conferences on “international trade, labor, equitable price adjustments in the world market, and health”. The amendment was approved—resolution 17 B (I)—by 38 votes in favor, the United States against and two abstentions.

Until 1960 the countries that took part most in triple, double and single rejections were South Africa, Belgium, the United Kingdom and France which together cast a total of 84 (or 71 percent) of the 119 negative votes that have been identified. And a good part of those rejections were on resolutions regarding decolonization questions.

TABLE 3.11 *Participation in over ten percent of the rejections of General Assembly resolutions adopted with one, two and three negative votes, 1946–1996^a (percent)*

	1946 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	1991 1995	1996	Total
United States	7.3	42.7	81.2	79.1	71.9	66.7	53.0
Israel	4.4	44.4	52.0	44.1	59.0	66.7	36.3
South Africa	40.5	* ^b	*	*			12.3
United Kingdom	8.5	5.6	12.6	15.0	11.8	10.3	11.1
Portugal	28.3			0.9			8.8
France	4.9	8.9	4.0	11.3	6.7	5.1	6.8
Albania	6.3	24.2	1.4	2.5			5.0
China	4.0	10.5				0.3	2.4

^a Through September 1997.^b Suspended during these years.

The items on Southwest Africa (now Namibia) gave rise to a growing number of pronouncements by the Assembly in the fifties and sixties and the support for South Africa, which was never very large, began to erode. At times South Africa secured the company of five or six European nations in its rejections, on occasion only two. Later, in the sixties, the number of resolutions in which it found itself alone or accompanied only by Portugal multiplied. In 1954, for example, when resolution 844 (IX) on Southwest Africa was adopted, France and the United Kingdom were the two UN Members that, together with South Africa, voted against it. Those three would reject several more resolutions on that same item and on *apartheid*. At times—as in resolutions 1141 and 1142 (XII) of 1957—the trio was Belgium, South Africa and the United Kingdom.

There were other trios: China, Cuba and Greece jointly opposed the admission of Albania in 1955—resolution 995 (X)—and, in April 1961, Spain and Portugal accompanied Congo-Leopoldville (later Zaire) in opposing resolution 1601 (XV) on the situation in the Republic of the Congo.

1961–1975: Southern Africa, decolonization and disarmament

From 1961 to 1975 the items on Southern Africa and decolonization continued to be the source of over half of the votes with isolated rejections. To these one would have to add several questions regarding disarmament and international security. During that period South Africa continued to top the list of opponents, taking part in half of the rejections of resolutions adopted with one, two or three negative votes. But there were changes in the principal actors: Belgium, for example, disappeared completely from the list once its colonial empire was liquidated in 1960. In contrast, Portugal became South Africa's most frequent companion. That situation would last until 1974, the year of South Africa's suspension from the Assembly and the col-

lapse of the Portuguese empire. Between 1961 and 1974 Portugal and South Africa opposed, in tandem, no less than 89 resolutions.

Until 1965 the countries that participated in most triple rejections were the United Kingdom, Belgium, France and South Africa and, to a lesser degree, Australia, Portugal and the United States. Between 1966 and 1975 Portugal, South Africa, the UK and the US continued to appear on the list of triple rejections, but there were other trios, some of them rather curious: in 1967 Panama, Saudi Arabia and South Africa opposed resolution 2339 (XXII) on the “International Year on Human Rights”; in 1968 Brazil joined South Africa and Portugal in voting against resolutions 2395 (XXIII) on the territories under Portuguese administration; in 1969 Australia followed the US and Portugal in their rejection of resolution 2603 A (XXIV) on chemical and biological weapons; Byelorussia, the Ukraine and the USSR opposed resolution 2634 (XXV) of 1970 on the report of the International Law Commission; in 1971 Costa Rica and Guatemala accompanied Israel in opposing resolution 2792 E (XXVI) on the UNRWA; later it fell to Nicaragua to reject, together with the United States and Israel, another two resolutions on UNRWA—3089 E (XXVIII) of 1973 and 3419 C (XXX) of 1975—and 3247 (XXIX) of 1974 regarding the PLO’s participation in the Conference on the Representation of States in their Relations with International Organizations, as well as 3481 (XXX) on the implementation of the Declaration on Decolonization and 3521 (XXX) on the elimination of discrimination against women because they included references to the Palestinian people. In 1974 Albania, China and France rejected resolution 3257 (XXIX) on the complete prohibition of nuclear testing, while India joined Albania and China in rejecting resolution 3261 D (XXIX) on the denuclearization of Africa because it contained unacceptable (to them) references to the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; in 1975 Germany, the UK and the US rejected resolution 3486 (XXX) on the implementation of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, a document adopted a year earlier by a vote of 120 in favor, six against and ten abstentions.

In the early seventies the United States began to distinguish itself by solitary negative votes and increased rejections in tandem or trios. The issues of those rejections were varied: UNCTAD, UNDP, UNEP, HABITAT, *apartheid*, monetary questions, transfer of financial resources to developing countries, the Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States, development and environment and a study on the economic and social consequences of the arms race. In those years the US also began to join Israel in its rejection of some Middle East resolutions. This trend increased in the eighties.

From 1961 to 1970 Albania was left all alone on seven occasions in its rejection of Assembly resolutions. After 1971, however, when the People’s Republic of China occupied its lawful UN seat, Albania found support for its iconoclastic positions in the Assembly. There thus emerged a kind of Tira-

na/Beijing axis that systematically opposed resolutions on a comprehensive nuclear test ban and other disarmament questions.

1976–1990: the Middle East and disarmament

Towards the mid-seventies the wind began to change in the General Assembly. In the 1976–1980 period certain trends emerged which would be consolidated in the eighties. The great difference between before and after 1975 is to be found not only in the growing proportion of resolutions adopted with one, two or three negative votes, but also in the subjects of those resolutions.

In effect, of the 1,348 Assembly resolutions adopted since 1946 with one, two or three negative votes, 938 (or 70 percent) have been approved since 1976. On the other hand, the subjects of those resolutions changed significantly in the seventies. Until 1975 half of those resolutions were on Southern Africa and decolonization. Afterwards, those two items ceded their place on the list of the most resolutions with the least opposition to disarmament issues—which rose to 22 percent of the total—and, above all, to those regarding the Middle East which, from 2.3 percent in 1946–1960 and 6.5 percent in 1961–1975, jumped to 46 percent after 1976.

In the period 1976–1980, Israel and the United States replaced the colonialist duo of South Africa and Portugal in the Assembly. Between them they accounted for one half of the isolated rejections. For its part, the United States would go from 25 percent in 1976–1980 to almost 50 percent in the eighties, while Israel remained between 25 and 30 percent until the nineties when it increased to 39 percent (Appendix VIII, Table 2). The main reason for that growing isolation was the situation in the Middle East and Israel's policy in open defiance of the Assembly's pronouncements and the principles of the UN Charter. Before describing the isolation of Israel and the United States in the eighties, we should examine another aspect of UN action in the Middle East which gave rise to a minority rejection in the Assembly on the part of countries such as Syria and Albania: peace-keeping operations.

In the early nineties the UN multiplied its peace-keeping operations. Besides the several forces in the Middle East, it sent contingents of blue helmets to a number of regions, including Angola, Central America, Iraq-Kuwait, Cambodia, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The funds to finance those peace operations, as well as its several observation missions, were approved by the Assembly in resolutions adopted without a vote. However, until 1989 the question of financing peace-keeping forces was objected to by an ever-smaller group of countries.

In effect, between 1973 and 1988 the Assembly adopted 62 resolutions on the financing of various UN peace contingents in the Middle East: the Emergency Force (UNEF), the Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and, after 1978, the Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Only one was

TABLE 3.12 *Negative votes cast by UN Member States on General Assembly resolutions adopted with one, two or three votes against: total by quinquennium*

	1946 1950	1951 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	1991 1995	1996 ^a	Total
One												
United States	2				2	9	16	77	86	20		212
Israel	1		1	2	1	3	22	32	25	18	3	108
South Africa	3	9	4	6	8	17	* ^b	*	*			47
France			1	1	2	2	3	6	13	2		30
Albania	*	*		5	2	2	8		1			18
Belgium	4	5	5									14
Portugal	*	*	1	3	4	2						10
United Kingdom	3	1	1	2	1	1	1					10
Others	6	2	12	2	8	10	5	3	9	14	4	75
Not identified	5	7	1	4	9	5						31
Total	24	24	26	25	37	51	55	118	134	54	7	555
Two												
United States	1					5	23	122	130	87	16	384
Israel			2		1	1	23	96	99	73	15	310
South Africa		5	3	17	48	33	*	*	*			106
Portugal	*	*	1	16	49	32						98
United Kingdom	2	3		1	2	3	1	21	25	12	1	71
Albania	*	*				11	17	1	2			31
China		4				10	12					26
France	1	4	2	1		1	2	1	5	4		21
Syria			1			1	5	1	3			11
Others	4	9	5	5	9	10	13	10	10	12	4	91
Not identified	14	13	6		9	15						57
Total (x 2)	22	38	20	40	118	122	96	252	274	188	36	1,206
Three												
United States		1		2	1	7	14	26	37	21	10	119
Israel						6	10	16	17	14	8	71
United Kingdom	1	2	5	3	1	3	5	14	23	9	3	69
France		1	3			1	6	4	18	6	2	41
Syria						5	5	3	5	1	1	20
Albania	*	*				6	5	3	5			19
Canada							3	12	3			18
India						1	1	4	5	6	1	18
Bhutan	*	*	*	*	*		1	4	5	6	1	17
Mauritius	*	*	*	*			1	4	5	5	1	16
South Africa		5		3	3	2	*	*	*			13
Libya	*	*				5			2	3	1	11
Portugal	*	*	2	1	3	2			3			11
Others		9	7	3	7	11	12	9	19	19	14	110
Not identified	5	9	1			2						17
Total (x 3)	6	27	18	12	15	51	63	99	147	90	42	570

^a Through September 1997.^b Non-Member or suspended.

adopted without a vote and the votes against the other 61 resolutions went from one to 16. The evolution of those rejections allows us to measure how the climate in the Assembly has changed since the mid-seventies.

Until 1989 Syria and Albania were the most persistent rejecters of resolutions regarding the financing of peace-keeping operations in the Middle East. Between 1973 and 1977 they voted together on twelve occasions and at times they were joined by Libya. During the period of 1976–1980 Albania continued to distinguish itself by rejecting (at times accompanied by China) certain resolutions, especially those on disarmament issues, on which it took a position diametrically opposed to that of the military Superpowers. It also rejected many resolutions on UN peace-keeping operations in general and, of course, voted with Syria in the case of the Middle East peace forces.

In 1978 Iraq joined Syria and Albania in four votes regarding UNEF and UNDOF. On two others, however, the opposition came from Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, the Ukraine and the USSR. Until 1985 that group of nine countries—together with Albania, Iraq and Syria and, occasionally, Poland, Afghanistan, Grenada, Lao and Viet Nam—rejected 28 resolutions. They objected above all to the financing, after 1978, of UNIFIL. From 1979 to 1985 there were eight resolutions that received between two and five negative votes. Syria and Albania were joined by Democratic Yemen on one occasion and by Iraq on five, one of which also included Grenada and, by mistake (it simply pushed the wrong button), Angola.

In 1986, as a result of the political changes in the USSR, the Soviet bloc ceased to reject the resolutions on the Middle East peace forces. The opposition to those resolutions was thus reduced to one, two or three votes in 1986, 1987 and 1988. In those three years nine resolutions were adopted on the financing of UNDOF and UNIFIL. Syria opposed all of them except for 41/44 B which, by mistake, it voted in favor. Albania voted against the seven resolutions approved in 1986 and 1987 but ended its opposition in 1988. Syria and Albania were joined by Libya on two occasions and once by Comoros (by mistake). In 1988 Syria and Libya voted against resolution 43/228 on UNDOF but, symbolically, Syria found itself alone in its rejection of 43/229 on UNIFIL, the last time a resolutions on UN peace-keeping forces has been put to a vote. The issues regarding the Middle East, therefore, have served to isolate other countries in the Assembly besides Israel and the United States.

Since 1976 there have been some double rejections that have resulted in some curious couples. Between 1982 and 1990, for example, Turkey and the United States cast the only votes against nine resolutions on the Law of the Sea. (From 1991 to 1996, Turkey found itself all alone when the United States opted first to abstain and then, in 1996, vote in favor of that resolution). China and France joined forces in 1978 against resolution 33/71 C on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. That same year Paraguay supported Nicaragua in its opposition to resolution 33/76 on the situation in that country. Chile and Guatemala rejected resolution 40/139 in 1985 on the human rights situation in El Salvador, which did not participate in the vote. And in 1989

the only State that accompanied Chile's rejection of resolution 44/166 on human rights in that country was Morocco.

The nations which have participated most frequently in triple rejections since 1976 are the United States (63 percent), Israel (37 percent), the United Kingdom (36 percent), and France (22 percent) which, taken together, have cast 53 percent of those votes. In addition to the trios of Albania, Syria and Libya or Iraq, there is one case that merits attention because it is indicative of how absurd it can become to support a Member State's openly stubborn position. It began with Pakistan's 1974 proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, i.e., the Indian Subcontinent. India opposed the proposal and has voted against the resolutions which, except in 1975, the Assembly has adopted year after year. But India has not been alone in its rejection since on five occasions it convinced Bhutan to join her and, on sixteen others, the negative votes came from Bhutan and Mauritius as well as India. How do those two countries justify their votes in support of India other than as ill-conceived solidarity? The same question might be addressed to the handful of countries that have occasionally joined the United States and Israel in rejecting resolutions on the Middle East situation.

Since 1976 Israel has obtained the sporadic support of a small group of Latin American and Caribbean countries (Antigua and Barbuda, Costa Rica, Dominica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua), as well as Australia, France, Gambia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, the United Kingdom and, with greater frequency, Canada. But, without a doubt, the greatest defender of Israel's juridically indefensible positions in the UN has been the United States, especially since 1981.

Since 1976 (and through September 1997) the United States joined Israel in rejecting 281 resolutions, almost all relating to some aspect of the Middle East question: UNRWA, the living conditions of Palestinians, the reports of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices in the occupied territories, etc. And 174 of those rejections in tandem occurred in the eighties.

For its part, Israel did not reciprocate the favor, since few are the times it has been the only one to support US opposition to resolutions on other matters. The case of the item on the trade embargo against Nicaragua between 1986 and 1989 is one of those rare examples in which Israel decided to accompany US opposition to the overwhelming majority. In 1985, when that item was first examined, five countries (Gambia, Grenada, Israel, Saint Kitts and Nevis and Sierra Leone) supported the United States. The following year, the United States found itself all alone with Israel. Israel also joined the US in rejecting the resolution calling for the "immediate and full" implementation of the International Court of Justice's sentence of 27 June 1986 in the case of the "Military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua".

On some issues in the eighties the United States was able to secure the support of the United Kingdom, a nation which often has had to choose between being the only one to accompany the US, with which it has a "special

relationship”, or adhering to the position taken by the European Economic Community. In general the UK managed to stay, if not within, at least very near, the EEC camp. Between 1976 and 1980, that is, just before the Reagan and Thatcher era, there was not one single US/UK tandem rejection. Between 1981 and 1990, however, there were 40 Assembly resolutions adopted with the negative votes of those two nations: 32 on items relating to decolonization and Southern Africa, including *apartheid*, one on the UN budget and seven on a comprehensive nuclear test ban and other disarmament items. On the latter, they were occasionally joined by France.

Since 1976, however, the United States has been left completely alone pressing the red button on 199 occasions, while Israel has voted by itself 108 times. Aside from South Africa, the only country that comes near to the US and Israel is France, which cast 24 of its 30 solitary votes during the 1976–1995 period.

Through September 1997, the Assembly had adopted 555 resolutions with only one vote against. Of these, 368 (or 66 percent) have been registered since 1976. The yearly average of resolutions approved over a solitary rejection grew from about five between 1946 and 1965 to over seven in the late sixties, to around ten in the seventies and to over 25 in the eighties. Since 1991 the yearly average has dropped to 10.

What pushes a country to separate itself so emphatically from the rest of the international community? Since 1976, 25 countries have cast solitary negative votes. But only ten have done so more than once: India and Russia (two), DPRK and Iran (three), Iraq (four), Turkey (seven), Albania (nine), France (24), Israel (100) and the United States (199). Among the fifteen with one solitary negative vote since 1976, five (Argentina, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Luxembourg and Sri Lanka) did so by mistake. But the rest did so intentionally: the United Kingdom on the Falkland or Malvinas Islands (resolution 31/49 of 1976); Singapore on the UN scale of assessments (32/39 of 1977); China on a comprehensive nuclear test ban (33/60 of 1978); Guatemala on Belize’s admission to the UN (36/3 of 1981); Togo on the problem of radioactive waste (43/75 Q of 1988); Chile on the human rights situation in that country (43/158 of 1988); Syria on the financing of UNIFIL (43/229 of 1988); Cuba on 45/188 of 1990 in which the Assembly encouraged “the promotion of entrepreneurship in all countries, including those attempting to develop or reactivate their economies in a system of free enterprise and the exploitation of market opportunities”; Yugoslavia on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (46/242 of August 1992) and the Ukraine on the UN pension system (51/217 of 1996).

Since 1976 single negative votes have been cast by India on a UN study regarding nuclear-weapon-free zones (37/99 F of 1982) and conventional arms control (51/45 Q of 1996), Russia on the human rights situation in the former Yugoslavia (50/193 of 1995 and 51/116 of 1996), the DPRK against resolutions regarding the IAEA (48/14, 49/65 and 50/9 of 1993, 1994 and

1995, respectively), Iran against resolutions 37/3 of 1982 on the Iran-Iraq war, 42/42 B of 1987 on the observers in the Conference on Disarmament and 49/190 on periodic and genuine elections; Turkey against one on Cyprus (31/12 of 1976) and six on the Law of the Sea (46/78, 47/65, 48/28, 49/28, 50/23 and 51/34 of 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995 and 1996, respectively); and Iraq against one on protection of diplomatic missions (45/39 of 1990), two on human rights in occupied Kuwait (45/170 of 1990 and 46/135 of 1991) and one on human rights in Iraq itself (46/134 of 1991).

Between 1976 and 1979 Albania cast the only vote against the Soviet initiative regarding the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction (31/74 and 32/84 A and B), another Soviet proposal on the principle of the non-use of force (33/96), a resolution on the Non-proliferation Treaty (33/57), another resolution on the bilateral START talks (33/91 C) and two other ones on nuclear security assurances (34/84 and 86). In 1986 Albania cast the only negative vote on the resolution on UNDOF (41/44 B).

Fifteen of France's 24 solitary negative votes since 1976 were on the "Question of the Comorian Island of Mayotte"; six on proposals aimed at banning the production of fissile material; two on timely notification of nuclear tests, and one on the complete cessation of such tests.

To almost all of the preceding cases one can find a more or less plausible explanation. They are the result of very diverse considerations: the inertia of colonialist habits; the political moment of a certain government; a genuine disagreement with some concrete proposal or an honest difference of opinion regarding a specific subject.

As for Israel, the answer is rather clear: it simply refused to recognize the validity of the international community's decisions regarding the situation in the Middle East. That attitude is all the more surprising if one bears in mind that the State of Israel itself was in fact created by a resolution of the General Assembly. Its isolation within the UN is the product of its efforts to defend a line of conduct which is altogether indefensible. This is confirmed by the results of the many votes on resolutions on which not even the United States dared to accompany Israel.

What is more difficult to comprehend is the attitude that lay behind the US's systematic rejection of dozens of resolutions during the eighties. It is a self-imposed isolation derived from the enormous disregard for the UN which many of its high officials and political leaders felt at the time. US opposition to the UN and especially to Assembly pronouncements over almost a decade had no coherent basis. Had there been one, other countries would have accompanied it in its negative votes.

Since 1976 (and through September 1997) the United States cast the solitary negative vote against 199 resolutions, beginning with seven in 1976 and ending with one in 1995. The annual average of those rejections went from three in 1976–1980 to 15 in 1981–1985 and 17 in 1986–1990, falling to four in 1991–1995.

The subject matter of the resolutions that gave rise to those 199 solitary rejections by the United States were varied but may be grouped under the following headings: 1) 73 resolutions on *disarmament and international security*, including the prohibition of chemical weapons and nuclear testing, the SALT Talks, naval armaments, new types of weapons of mass destruction, the strengthening of international security, the Brazilian proposal for the establishment of a “Zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic”, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, as well as institutional aspects of the UN role in the disarmament field (World Disarmament Campaign, the fellowship program to train young persons in disarmament matters); 2) 62 resolutions on *human rights and other social questions*, including *apartheid* and other items on racial discrimination, some aspects of the social situation in Southern Africa, the legal status of women, as well as the UN role in the human rights sphere; 3) 42 resolutions on *international economic relations*, including the New International Economic Order, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, the International Strategy for the Second Development Decade, multilateral trade negotiations, protectionism, the problems of developing countries in general (poverty, debt, industrialization, transfer of resources and technology, global negotiations on international economic cooperation, energy, landlocked countries) and African nations in particular, as well as institutional aspects of the UN in the economic field (UNIDO); 4) 13 resolutions on other aspects of *the role of the United Nations*, including the principles and purposes of its Charter, as well as questions relating to its personnel, budget and activities of its Department of Public Information; and 5) nine resolutions on *various issues*, including 31/21 of 1976 on the admission of Viet Nam (adopted by 124 votes to one with three abstentions), 37/7 of 1982 which approved the World Nature Charter (vote: 111–1–18), 37/137 and 39/229 on protection against products hazardous to health and the environment (146–1–0 and 147–1–0, respectively), 38/202 of 1983 on strengthening the UN system’s capacity to respond to situations of natural disasters and of other types (126–1–15), 39/161 B of 1984 on the observance (in 1985) of the UN’s fortieth anniversary (143–1–2) and 41/187 of 1986 in which the Assembly proclaimed the period 1988–1997 the World Decade for Cultural Development (146–1–2).

On many of those votes there were few or no abstentions and the United States found itself absolutely alone pressing the red button amidst a sea of green lights. In 1996, however, the United States did not cast a single solitary negative vote.

1991–1997: a new era?

The rapid changes registered in the world at the end of the eighties had an immediate impact on the work of the General Assembly. Those changes will

be examined in greater detail in the following chapter. Here it will suffice to mention that the proportion of resolutions adopted without objection (i.e., those adopted without a vote plus those with no negative votes) climbed from 65 percent in 1986–1987 to 69 percent in 1988, to 75 percent in 1989 and to over 80 percent since 1991. Moreover, at the Assembly's 1993–1996 sessions the average number of resolutions adopted with negative votes was about 50, the lowest yearly total since the seventies. This was due to the fact that the United States drastically reduced its solitary negative votes and that, for the first time, the resolutions relating to South Africa were adopted without a vote. Nevertheless, the Middle East items continued to be the main source of rejections by the United States and Israel and of the latter's continuing isolation within the General Assembly.

CHAPTER 4. COINCIDENCES AND DISCREPANCIES

United Nations General Assembly resolutions are a concrete expression of world opinion on a wide variety of multilateral issues. The analysis of the votes cast by States on those issues is one way of taking the pulse of the international situation at a given moment. A comparison of those votes can lead to a better understanding of the UN and of the attitude of individual countries towards the Organization. Therein lies the value of studying Assembly voting patterns. However, it is difficult to devise a method to measure objectively the degree to which countries agree or disagree at the UN.

This chapter examines the voting patterns of UN Members in the General Assembly. It begins with some methodological considerations, then it describes the overall trends for the 1946–1997 period, identifies some of the signposts that serve to explain the changes over time and concludes with a description of the five stages into which the half-century has been divided.

The tools of analysis

Over the past few decades much has been made of voting patterns at the UN General Assembly. Votes have been compared and the question asked is, Who votes with whom on a given issue? Statistics are compiled and conclusions drawn. Some analysts have approached the subject of voting at the UN as an academic exercise; others have more specific objectives in mind and certain governments have gone so far as to link votes to the level of their foreign aid to other countries. The message appears to be: “If you do not vote as we do, then we will take another look at how much aid we provide you with”. This tack has had an impact on certain recipient nations.

Some governments have identified the ten or so resolutions which most interest them and have then compared their own votes to those of others. But this tends to be a highly subjective exercise. A few non-governmental organizations have approached the problem with more objectivity. After identifying the most important resolutions adopted at a session, they analyze each nation’s vote according to a set of predetermined criteria, such as the World Federalists’ “World Order Values”.

It would, of course, be most useful to have a set of agreed criteria with which to analyze and evaluate each country’s votes. One could think in terms of the UN Charter’s purposes and principles. But even here there is the risk of some degree of subjectivity, since on any issue there can be conflicting interpretations of the Charter’s provisions. The fact is that year after year UN Members are called upon to define their position by voting on a variety

of resolutions. And deciding how to vote is not always easy. Voting is the culmination of the Assembly's debates. That is to be expected in any body whose decision-making process is based on democratic principles.

It is true that the General Assembly adopts over half of its resolutions without a vote. But resolutions on the most controversial issues are almost always put to a vote, and it is precisely those resolutions that allow us to study and compare the attitude of Member States towards certain crucial problems of international relations.

When a resolution is put to a vote, delegations may vote "Yes", "No" or "Abstention". They may also opt "to absent themselves" from the room. Finally, they may decide to remain in the room but announce that they are "not participating" in the vote. Here we shall examine the General Assembly voting records of UN Members and attempt to measure the extent of agreement among them. To do so, we shall rely on three analytical tools: the Coincidence Index devised for this study, the grouping of resolutions according to issues, and the median.

How often did country A vote the same as country B? When they voted differently, was it a case of "Yes/No" or did it involve abstentions? How does one take into account absences (genuine or self-imposed) or "announced non-participation" (which is really an absence)? The Coincidence Index (CI) is designed to answer those questions. If country A always votes "Yes" while country B always votes "No", their CI is zero; if they always vote the same, their CI is 1000. Between these two extremes one can find all UN Members.

To determine the CI, begin by eliminating those votes in which one (or both) of the countries being compared was absent. Then add all those times in which they voted the same: Yes/Yes, No/No or Abstention/Abstention. To each of those "coinciding" or identical votes assign a value of two; and, in order to differentiate between a Yes/No, on the one hand, and a Yes/Abstention or a No/Abstention, on the other, assign to the latter a value of one. The formula is quite simple:

$$CI = \frac{2 (\text{total identical votes}) + (\text{total Abstention/Yes} + \text{Abstention/No})}{2 (\text{total resolutions both voted})}$$

The CI is only a tool for comparing the votes of any two given States. It does not pretend to judge the content of the resolution being voted. That would be an exercise fraught with danger. It simply takes into account how often the votes were identical (Yes/Yes, No/No and Abs/Abs), different (Abstention/Yes or Abstention/No) or opposite (Yes/No).

The CI appears to produce less distortion than other methods. For example, in its annual "Report to Congress on Voting Practices in the United Nations", the US State Department seeks to ascertain the "percent coincidence

TABLE 4.1 *Coincidence of US votes with the UK and the USSR:
a comparison of the results using two different methods*

	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990
United States/United Kingdom					
US State Department	813	1000	1000	962	818
Coincidence Index	750	855	932	862	738
United States/Soviet Union					
US State Department	313	579	182	164	167
Coincidence Index	342	597	333	324	262

of a country's votes with the United States, calculated on the basis of Yes/No votes only and does not take into account abstentions or absences". This approach can skew the results since it tends to exaggerate the extremes: it magnifies the extent of agreement or disagreement and thus appears greater or smaller than the CI (Table 4.1). Abstentions do matter and should be included in the calculations.

A computer program was written following the CI method and a data base was created from the 3,262 recorded votes since 1946 (and through September 1997) on Assembly resolutions, indicating the votes cast by every UN Member State (Yes, No, Abstention or absent). A file was opened for each country that has participated in those votes and, by mid-1997, the data bank contained over half-a-million entries. The computer did the rest.

The mountain of the compiled data had to be distilled and its presentation had to be condensed. In order to focus the analysis and trace the evolution of the voting patterns, the study was divided into five-year periods and by subject. It was relatively easy to identify the most important items debated in the Assembly in order to examine how the CI varied from one issue to another. They have been grouped under the following twelve headings:

1. political
2. economic
3. social
4. codification of International Law
5. decolonization
6. nuclear disarmament
7. international security and other disarmament
8. Middle East
9. *apartheid*
10. Namibia
11. other matters regarding Southern Africa
12. UN budget

Appendix VII details the resolutions included under each of those headings.

TABLE 4.2 *The median of the Coincidence Index of UN Members and their regional groups 1946–1996^a*

Years	Total UN	Eastern Europe	Western Europe/ Others	European Union	Africa	Asia	Arab group	Latin America/ Caribbean	G-77 ^c
1946–1950	771	944	831	836	709 ^b	837	942	853	815
1951–1955	781	993	833	838	968 ^b	853	939	905	892
1956–1960	786	991	850	827	829	838	868	924	847
1961–1965	829	984	856	830	923	879	909	931	885
1966–1970	819	956	815	809	876	877	940	901	869
1971–1975	868	990	838	853	949	941	965	893	931
1976–1980	903	974	847	859	954	934	960	923	941
1981–1985	910	984	830	841	963	941	968	926	942
1986–1990	935	968	854	867	967	961	975	944	956
1991–1995	884	930	926	936	949	917	974	944	938
1996	870	930	941	955	949	892	973	955	932
Total	876	934	872	857	953	909	966	926	933

^a Through September 1997, 3,262 (recorded votes).


^b Very few countries.

^c Includes all developing countries in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as Yugoslavia and South Africa (since 1994), but not Malta, Mongolia or the republics of the former Soviet Union or Yugoslavia.

The basic tool employed in this study is the median, or the point at which UN Member States are divided into two equal parts. And countries have been grouped according to the UN's regional divisions. Our analysis, however, concentrates on two groups: first, the developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean, and second, the nations belonging to the group of Western Europe and Others. Eastern European countries are referred to only in passing since the degree of coincidence among them was consistently very high.


General trends, 1946–1996

Let us begin with the Coincidence Index in all 3,262 recorded votes in the General Assembly. The first thing that strikes us is the surprisingly high degree of coincidence among UN Members. In examining the CI for the 1946–1996 period, one finds that among the 188 different countries that have participated in Assembly votes only Palau has cast too few to warrant inclusion in our statistics. Each country's votes were compared to all others. Of the 17,391 possible combinations, 111 were discarded because they involved countries not members simultaneously of the UN. Among the remaining 17,280 matches, no less than 44 percent (7,537) had a CI of over 900; another 25 percent was between 800 and 899; and 20 percent was be-

FIGURE 4.1 *The median of the Coincidence Index among all UN Members, 1946–1996*

tween 700 and 799. In other words, 89 percent of the time UN Members had a CI of over 700. A mere one percent (208) of cases was below 500.

The highest CI were the 25 matches of 990 or over. The top seven involve the German Democratic Republic: three 998 (Belarus, Mongolia and USSR), one 997 (Bulgaria), and three 996 (Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Ukraine). This is proof of the monolithic nature of the Soviet bloc until 1989, the GDR's last year of existence. Then come two with 993 (Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, and Kuwait and UAE), five with 992 (Bahrain with Qatar and UAE; Belarus and Ukraine; Hungary and Czechoslovakia; and Qatar and UAE), six with 991 (Bulgaria and Hungary; Comoros and Djibouti; France and Monaco; Lao and Viet Nam; and Sao Tome and Principe with

FIGURE 4.2 *The yearly median of Coincidence Index among UN Members, 1946–1996^a*

^a No resolutions in 1964.

Guinea-Bissau and Vanuatu), and five with 990 (Andorra and Spain; Cape Verde with Guinea-Bissau and Sao Tome and Principe; Kuwait with Bahrain and Qatar; and Namibia and Somalia). There are also 134 matches between 980 and 989, 445 between 970 and 979, 931 between 960 and 969, and 1,166 between 950 and 959. This adds up to 2,676 matches with a CI of 950 or higher, or 15 percent of the total.

At the other end, there are ten matches under 300, all involving the United States: DPRK (220) is the lowest, followed by Seychelles, Viet Nam, Angola, Zimbabwe, Vanuatu, Brunei Darussalam, Sao Tome and Principe, Mozambique and Cape Verde, ranging from 250 to 299. Then there are 85 in the 300–399 range: 80 involve the United States, four Israel (DPRK, GDR, Seychelles and Viet Nam) and one South Africa (Czechoslovakia). The latter is due to the fact that they never voted together after 1974. With regard to

TABLE 4.3 *Impact of issues on coincidence among UN members, 1946–1996*

Issues	All UN Members	Developing countries	Western European and Other
Political	±	–	±
Economic	+	+	±
Social	–	–	+
Codification of International Law	+	+	±
Decolonization	±	±	–
Nuclear disarmament	±	±	±
International security/other disarmament	±	±	+
Middle East	±	±	+
Southern Africa			
<i>Apartheid</i>	+	+	–
Namibia	+	+	±
Other issues	+	+	–
UN budget	±	±	±

+ Served to raise coincidence index consistently.

– Served to lower coincidence index consistently.

± Varied from one five-year period to another.

the US' partners, 37 are from Africa, 23 from Asia and the Pacific, 12 from the Americas (Cuba and 11 English-speaking Caribbean nations) and 8 from the former Soviet-bloc in Eastern Europe.

How can one describe the voting patterns in the UN General Assembly? Or, to put it another way, what has been the evolution of the Coincidence Index in the General Assembly as a whole? Let us begin by examining the median of the CI in the Assembly. For the 1946–1996 period, the median is 876, a rather high level that confirms the extent of coincidence among UN Members. The median began at a low of 771 in 1946–1950, then rose almost steadily for forty years, peaking at 935 in 1986–1990, and declined in the nineties (Table 4.2 and Figure 4.1). The almost steady rise of the five-year median until 1990 was interrupted momentarily in 1966–1970. Moreover, it should be stressed that the yearly median of the Coincidence Index among all UN Members has varied, sometimes sharply, from year to year. As shown in Figure 4.2, it has gone from a low of 738 in 1946 to a high of 958 in 1990. To explain those trends one must look at the degree of coincidence within the different groups and their relative size, as well as the relative weight of the subjects of the resolutions adopted by a recorded vote.

Greater agreement among the larger groups quite obviously translates into higher coincidence within the General Assembly, and until the sixties the two largest groups were the Western European and Others and the Latin American and Caribbean. Since then, with the admission of countries from Africa and Asia, the developing nations have comprised the majority.

TABLE 4.4 *The median of the Coincidence Index among all UN Members by subjects, 1946–1996^a*

Issues	1946 1950	1951 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	1991 1995	1996
Political	808	909	768	719	625	812	789	839	820	773	—
Economic	— ^b	—	—	—	—	911	963	962	965	875	—
Social	773	833	—	—	786	855	840	862	910	767	700
Cod. International Law	—	—	—	—	867	875	935	944	952	917	—
Decolonization	820	769	810	875	875	927	866	897	923	861	—
Nuclear disarmament	—	—	—	833	889	882	881	890	931	875	833
Int. sec./other disarm.	—	—	—	—	—	940	908	902	950	939	929
Middle East	—	—	748	—	714	810	882	921	935	905	937
Southern Africa											
<i>Apartheid</i>	—	—	—	—	1000	977	948	969	949	900	—
Namibia	—	—	—	—	889	—	1000	1000	1000	—	—
Other issues	—	—	—	844	—	953	922	985	967	889	—
UN budget	682	—	786	778	—	939	941	935	957	—	—
Total	771	781	786	829	819	868	903	910	935	884	870

^a Through September 1997 (3,262 recorded votes).^b Less than ten resolutions on these issues.

Some issues have consistently brought together the group of developing countries: economic, codification of International Law and Southern Africa (*apartheid*, Namibia and Other). For the Western European and Others group, those issues have been social, international security and disarmament in general, and Middle East. Other issues have consistently divided those groups: political and social, especially human rights, in the case of the developing countries; decolonization and Southern Africa, except for Namibia, in the case of Western European and Others. Finally, some issues have, at different times, divided and joined certain groups (Table 4.3).

The drop in 1966–1970 was felt in all groups except for the Arab countries and it was due to a relatively low level of agreement regarding three issues: decolonization (which accounted for 36 percent of the recorded votes during that five-year period), political (10 percent) and the Middle East (9 percent). Decolonization issues included the right to self-determination in general, as well as specific situations regarding European colonies in Africa, Asia and the Pacific and other questions such as Gibraltar. During that period the Middle East resolutions began to change in light of the Six-Day War in 1967. And the political issues were dominated by the resolutions on the representation of China at the UN and the Korean question, and other matters, such as the need for Charter review and the proposed establishment of a UN high commissioner for human rights. The latter would have to wait almost thirty years while the promised Charter review has never taken place.


TABLE 4.5 *The median of the Coincidence Index of the G-77 by subjects, 1946–1996^a*

Issues	1946 1950	1951 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	1991 1995	1996
Political	833	937	786	769	667	818	867	904	886	846	—
Economic	— ^b	—	—	—	—	963	1000	980	984	964	—
Social	800	—	—	—	800	914	883	894	939	842	750
Cod. International Law	—	—	—	—	912	923	974	972	972	955	—
Decolonization	906	885	875	952	918	961	905	917	954	986	—
Nuclear disarmament	—	—	—	900	909	924	955	925	958	940	958
Int. sec./other disarm.	—	—	—	—	—	979	949	942	964	975	1000
Middle East	—	—	—	833	714	857	942	957	965	949	972
Southern Africa											
<i>Apartheid</i>	—	—	—	—	—	1000	981	990	977	1000	—
Namibia	—	—	—	—	1000	—	1000	1000	1000	—	—
Other issues	—	—	—	958	955	988	962	1000	1000	1000	—
UN budget	750	—	846	833	—	957	980	977	980	—	—
Total	815	892	847	885	869	931	941	942	956	938	934

^a Through September 1997, 3,262 recorded votes. **Thirty-six** countries until 1950: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Thailand, Pakistan, Yemen and Myanmar; **one** more since 1951–1955: Indonesia; **twelve** more since 1956–1960: Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Jordan, Lao, Libya, Nepal, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, Ghana, Malaysia, and Guinea; **thirty** more since 1961–1965: Cameroon, Central African Rep., Chad, Congo, Zaire, Côte D'Ivoire, Cyprus, Benin, Gabon, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Togo, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Algeria, Burundi, Jamaica, Rwanda, Trinidad/Tobago, Uganda, Kenya, Kuwait, Malawi, and Zambia; **eleven** more since 1966–1970: Gambia, Maldives, Singapore, Barbados, Botswana, Guyana, Lesotho, Dem. Yemen, Equatorial Guinea, Mauritius and Swaziland; **ten** more since 1971–1975: Fiji, Bahrain, Bhutan, Oman, Qatar, UA Emirates, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Grenada and Guinea-Bissau; **fourteen** more since 1976–1980: Cape Verde, Comoros, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, Sao Tome/Principe, Suriname, Angola, Samoa, Seychelles, Djibouti, Vietnam, Dominica, Solomon Islands and St. Lucia; **seven** more since 1981–1985: St. Vincent/Grenadines, Zimbabwe, Antigua/Barbuda, Belize, Vanuatu, St. Kitts-Nevis and Brunei Darussalam; **one** more since 1986–1990: Namibia; **seven** more since 1991–1995: DPRK, Rep. of Korea, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Eritrea, South Africa and Palau.

^b Less than ten resolutions on these subjects.

The Group of 77 grew numerically in the sixties and soon began to exhibit greater and greater coincidence in the votes, especially on economic and Southern African matters. Later, in the eighties, the Middle East and certain disarmament questions would also serve to increase the group's level of agreement. By the nineties, however, the coincidence among developing countries, with the exception of those from Latin America and the Caribbean, began to drop, precipitously in the case of Asia (Figure 4.3). The highly-cohesive issues, especially Southern Africa, disappeared from the Assembly's agenda and new, highly-divisive ones, such as human rights, began to occupy a larger proportion of the recorded votes.

FIGURE 4.3 *The median of the developing countries, 1961–1996*

In contrast, the level of agreement of the Western European and Others group varied very little (between 815 and 856) for over forty years. The most divisive issues for the group were Southern Africa, decolonization and, between 1966 and 1975, the Middle East. In the late eighties, however, the Western developed countries began to agree increasingly on a some items (social matters and many disarmament questions), including one (the Middle East) that had previously divided them. By the early nineties, they were also agreeing more on nuclear disarmament issues. This coincided with the disappearance of the Southern African resolutions and translated into greater agreement within the group. It could thus be said that the trend among Western European nations is, in a sense, the opposite to that of the developing countries—a constant and relatively low level of coincidence until the late eighties and then a rise in the nineties.

TABLE 4.6 *The median of the Coincidence Index of the group of Western European and Others by subjects, 1946–1996^a*

Issues	1946 1950	1951 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	1991 1995	1996
Political	886	939	900	885	846	854	882	944	800	857	—
Economic	— ^b	—	—	—	—	855	857	890	911	882	—
Social	833	—	—	—	964	851	870	879	890	953	1000
Cod. International Law	—	—	—	—	912	857	833	806	857	909	—
Decolonization	893	808	810	800	755	757	805	783	787	829	—
Nuclear disarmament	—	—	—	875	929	850	861	767	794	906	875
Int. sec./other disarm.	—	—	—	—	—	844	908	865	874	950	929
Middle East	—	—	1000	—	808	824	900	908	936	971	958
Southern Africa											
<i>Apartheid</i>	—	—	—	—	—	828	775	775	802	—	—
Namibia	—	—	—	—	850	—	879	839	875	—	—
Other issues	—	—	—	778	792	761	780	750	778	850	—
UN budget	750	—	857	955	—	942	917	828	846	—	—
Total	831	838	855	850	815	838	851	830	856	926	941


^a Through September 1997, 3,262 events. **Sixteen** countries until 1955: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States; **six** more since 1956–1960: Austria, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain; **one** more (Malta) since 1966–1970; **one** more (Germany) since 1971–1975; **one** more (Liechtenstein) since 1986–1990; and **three** more (San Marino, Andorra and Monaco) since 1991–1995.

^b Less than ten resolutions on these subjects.

Some signposts

There are a number of signposts that increase our understanding of the trends within the General Assembly: the relative weight of the different issues at different times; the relationship of some countries to their own regions, i.e., those that seemed to row upstream; the problem-riddled situation in Southern Africa; the changing position of the United States (the countries it was closest to and furthest from); Israel's increasing isolation as a result of its votes on Middle East items and their impact on the US; the United Kingdom's relationship to the US, on one hand, and to its European allies, on the other, and the ensuing tension; the behavior of EEC (now European Union) members; the relations among the Security Council's five permanent members; the four decades of USSR-US confrontation; and the emergence of a clear majority.

A first signpost is the list of issues of the resolutions adopted by a *recorded* vote. One must bear in mind that those 3,262 resolutions (through September 1997) represent two-thirds of all resolutions adopted by a vote (4,875). Until 1970, moreover, they comprised less than one-third. Since then, the vast majority of votes have been recorded.

FIGURE 4.4 *Resolutions adopted by a vote and by a recorded vote, 1946–1996*

Of the total resolutions adopted by a vote, 24 percent was on nuclear disarmament and matters relating to international security issues and disarmament in general; 20 percent on the Middle East; 17 percent on the situation in Southern Africa (*apartheid*, Namibia and other questions); 13 percent on decolonization; 10 percent on social matters and another 10 percent on the UN budget; 8 percent on political issues; 6 percent on economic questions and 5 percent on aspects of the codification of International Law. Since some resolutions refer to two or more items, the total is over 100 percent.

The relative weight of those items has varied from one period to the next. Between 1946 and 1969, resolutions on political questions made up 35 per-

TABLE 4.7 *Subjects of resolutions adopted by a recorded vote, 1946–1996^a*

		Quinquennium											
		1946	1951	1956	1961	1966	1971	1976	1981	1986	1991		
Subject	Total	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	1996	
Political	258	22	34	42	16	15	25	22	28	31	14	9	
Economic	201	1	4	6	2	6	31	35	50	45	18	3	
Social	327	15	6	3	3	16	38	50	67	68	51	10	
Cod. Int. Law	147	6	2	4	2	18	14	24	36	28	11	2	
Decolonization	427	28	13	21	35	56	70	59	46	55	38	6	
Nuclear disarm.	431	1	0	9	12	14	40	61	121	108	53	12	
Int. sec./other dis.	358	0	1	1	2	3	32	39	103	106	58	13	
Middle East	660	7	0	16	7	14	36	95	179	160	122	24	
Southern Africa													
<i>Apartheid</i>	234	3	7	7	5	5	32	68	52	45	10	0	
Namibia	111	5	6	5	2	10	7	32	28	16	0	0	
Other	224	0	0	2	18	27	51	32	38	45	11	0	
UN budget	321	11	3	14	12	8	49	104	90	27	2	1	
Total	3,262	90	75	114	92	155	363	555	748	640	352	78	

^a Through September 1997. The total is less than the sum because some resolutions were included under more than one heading. Total in percent is given in Table 2, Appendix VII.

cent of the total and those relating to decolonization 22 percent. The latter jumped to 36 percent in the sixties, when the situation in Southern Africa accounted for 26 percent, a level that continued into the seventies. In the 1971–1980 period budgetary matters also accounted for a significant part (17 percent) and there was a surge in disarmament and security issues (19 percent). These have accounted for over 30 percent since the eighties.

The study of the evolution of voting coincidences makes it possible to identify the emergence of groups of more or less like-minded countries, that is, with a CI above 900. That evolution—which was not necessarily gradual in all cases—has gone through five different stages: 1946–1960, 1961–1970, 1971–1980, 1981–1988 and 1989–1996. During the first stage (1946–1960) there were no clear trends in the voting patterns of the vast majority of countries; the second stage lasted until the late sixties, a decade that saw the consolidation of a bi-polar world and, consequently, of the group of countries that were non-aligned, *militarily and politically* speaking; the third covered the seventies when the Group of 77 developing countries was strengthened; the fourth stage included most of the eighties when, faced with an evermore ideologically bi-polar world (Reagan and Thatcher), there was a further consolidation of the groupings of countries with similar positions in the Assembly while, paradoxically, there appeared certain trends which soon undermined the viability of those same groupings as vehicles for political harmonization; and, finally, the fifth stage which burst upon the international scene (and multilateral fora) in 1989 as a consequence of both the dramatic chang-


TABLE 4.8 *Southern Africa: CI between South Africa and UN Members, 1946–1974*

Coincidence Index	Total countries					
	Apartheid		Namibia		Other items	
	1946–1966	1966–1974	1946–1966	1966–1974	1946–1966	1966–1974
1000	1		1	1	1	
900						1
800						
700		1			2	1
600			1		3	1
500	6		5		6	1
400	4	3	3	1	2	4
300	5	1	5	7	15	7
200	10	2	13	10	11	8
100	12	11	15	9	7	10
1–99	24	28	22	10	63	35
0	51	87	48	95	3	65
Total	113	133	113	133	113	133

es in Eastern Europe and the economic (and political) reforms in many developing countries. These five stages will be described at the end of this chapter. Now let us turn to the second of our signposts—those countries that voted differently from the other members of their regional group.

The evolution of regional coincidences reveals that in each of the groups there were some countries that, at one time or another, rowed upstream: in the African group, Malawi between 1961 and 1990, Gambia and Lesotho in the sixties, Swaziland in the sixties and seventies, Liberia and the Central African Republic in the seventies, and Côte d'Ivoire in the seventies and eighties; in the group of Arab countries, Morocco and Saudi Arabia before 1960 and Saudi Arabia, Syria and Democratic Yemen in the seventies; in Asia, Indonesia before 1960, Japan since 1960, Mongolia from the sixties until 1990, Kampuchea in the seventies, Afghanistan, Lao and Viet Nam in the eighties, and the Marshall Islands and Micronesia in the nineties; in the Latin American and Caribbean group, Cuba since 1960, Dominica since the eighties, Grenada, Nicaragua and Paraguay in the eighties, and Argentina in the nineties; in the group of Western European and Others, France since 1946, South Africa from 1946 until its suspension in 1974, Belgium and Sweden until 1960, Finland until the late sixties, Spain and Portugal until the seventies, the United States and the United Kingdom since the sixties, Greece between 1960 and 1980, Turkey between 1960 and 1990, Malta since the seventies and Germany in the eighties; in Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia since the late forties and Albania and Romania in the seventies.

The cases of South Africa, the United States and Israel warrant separate treatment and provide us with additional signposts. For over four decades, but especially after 1960, the debates on the situation in Southern Africa

FIGURE 4.5 *The yearly CI median of the United States and UN Members, 1946–1996^a*

^a No resolutions in 1964.

gave rise to resolutions that divided the General Assembly and dramatically isolated both South Africa and Portugal. In fact, South Africa's isolation has been unparalleled in the annals of the United Nations. The level of coincidence between South Africa and other UN Members suffered a marked drop between 1966 (the year its mandate over Southwest Africa, now Namibia, was terminated) and 1974 (the year of its suspension by the Assembly). The proportion of UN Members with a CI below 100 with South Africa on the issues of Southern Africa went from 66 to 86 percent in the resolutions on *apartheid*, from 62 to 79 percent regarding Namibia, and from 58 to 75 percent in the other items (Table 4.8).

TABLE 4.9 *The ten percent of UN Members closest to the United States, 1946–1996^a*

	<u>1946–1950</u>	<u>1951–1955</u>	<u>1956–1960</u>	<u>1961–1965</u>	<u>1966–1970</u>
1.	<i>Panama</i> 928	<i>Nicaragua</i> 868	<i>Italy</i> 947	<i>Malta</i> 950	<i>Australia</i> 925
2.	<i>Iceland</i> 916	<i>Turkey</i> 864	<i>Turkey</i> 946	<i>UK</i> 947	<i>UK</i> 910
3.	<i>Norway</i> 904	<i>Canada</i> 860	<i>Nicaragua</i> 932	<i>Australia</i> 940	<i>NZ</i> 894
4.	<i>Honduras</i> 900	<i>Iceland</i> 857	<i>Canada</i> 908	<i>Netherlands</i> 924	<i>Belgium</i> 885
5.	<i>Canada</i> 883	<i>China</i> 851	<i>Netherlands</i> 908	<i>NZ</i> 923	<i>Luxembg.</i> 883
6.	<i>Denmark</i> 883	<i>Netherlands</i> 851	<i>NZ</i> 908	<i>Luxembg.</i> 917	<i>Netherlands</i> 870
7.			<i>Thailand</i> 908	<i>Canada</i> 913	<i>Canada</i> 861
8.			<i>Peru</i> 907	<i>Italy</i> 891	<i>Italy</i> 847
9.			<i>Spain</i> 907	<i>Nicaragua</i> 875	<i>Iceland</i> 835
10.			<i>Colombia</i> 903	<i>Belgium</i> 870	<i>Malta</i> 833
11.				<i>El Salvador</i> 858	<i>Austria</i> 810
12.				<i>Greece</i> 850	<i>Norway</i> 797
13.					<i>Denmark</i> 792
	<u>1971–1975</u>	<u>1976–1980</u>	<u>1981–1985</u>	<u>1986–1990</u>	<u>1991–1996</u>
1.	<i>UK</i> 880	<i>UK</i> 879	<i>Israel</i> 777	<i>Israel</i> 777	<i>Israel</i> 831
2.	<i>Belgium</i> 829	<i>Germany</i> 859	<i>UK</i> 759	<i>UK</i> 759	<i>UK</i> 706
3.	<i>France</i> 823	<i>France</i> 834	<i>Germany</i> 711	<i>France</i> 680	<i>Monaco</i> 664
4.	<i>Luxembg.</i> 823	<i>Belgium</i> 825	<i>France</i> 680	<i>Germany</i> 711	<i>France</i> 643
5.	<i>Germany</i> 821	<i>Luxembg.</i> 824	<i>Belgium</i> 679	<i>Belgium</i> 679	<i>Andorra</i> 638
6.	<i>Italy</i> 807	<i>Canada</i> 815	<i>Luxembg.</i> 673	<i>Netherlands</i> 638	<i>Czech Rep.</i> 630
7.	<i>Netherlands</i> 796	<i>Israel</i> 804	<i>Canada</i> 663	<i>Luxembg.</i> 673	<i>Germany</i> 630
8.	<i>Canada</i> 780	<i>Italy</i> 787	<i>Italy</i> 656	<i>Italy</i> 656	<i>Netherlands</i> 630
9.	<i>Israel</i> 779	<i>Netherlands</i> 768	<i>Netherlands</i> 638	<i>Portugal</i> 584	<i>Luxembg.</i> 620
10.	<i>S. Africa</i> 771	<i>Australia</i> 744	<i>Japan</i> 618	<i>Canada</i> 663	<i>Slovakia</i> 620
11.	<i>Denmark</i> 760	<i>Denmark</i> 739	<i>NZ</i> 587	<i>Japan</i> 618	<i>Belgium</i> 619
12.	<i>Suriname</i> 750	<i>NZ</i> 732	<i>Portugal</i> 584	<i>Denmark</i> 557	<i>Croatia</i> 616
13.	<i>Ireland</i> 740	<i>Ireland</i> 725	<i>Australia</i> 583	<i>Iceland</i> 571	<i>Italy</i> 616
14.	<i>Norway</i> 729	<i>Japan</i> 713	<i>Iceland</i> 571	<i>Norway</i> 571	<i>Georgia</i> 614
15.		<i>Norway</i> 708	<i>Norway</i> 571	<i>Australia</i> 583	<i>Latvia</i> 613
16.			<i>Denmark</i> 557	<i>Spain</i> 587	<i>Hungary</i> 612
17.					<i>Canada</i> 606
18.					<i>Romania</i> 606
19.					<i>Slovenia</i> 606

^a Through September 1997. Italics indicates first appearance on list.

The case of the United States is our fourth signpost. Figure 4.5 traces the United States' yearly median with all UN Members and compares it to the overall median in the General Assembly. The downward trend, i.e., isolation, continued until 1989 and was interrupted by a few attempts to reverse it, usually during the first years of a new administration in Washington.

Tables 4.9 and 4.10 show the relative closeness of the United States to Western European countries and, until the early sixties, to some Latin Americans. They also reveal the gap between the United States and the Socialist bloc, at least until the late seventies. Nicaragua is noteworthy because it

TABLE 4.10 *The ten percent of UN Members furthest from the United States, 1946–1996^a*

	<u>1946–1950</u>	<u>1951–1955</u>	<u>1956–1960</u>	<u>1961–1965</u>	<u>1966–1970</u>
13.					<i>Mali</i> 456
12.					Poland 455
11.					Czechoslov. 448
10.			<i>Guinea</i> 590	Romania 424	<i>Mauritania</i> 448
9.			Poland 482	Czechoslov. 423	Belarus 445
8.			Belarus 478	Belarus 418	Bulgaria 445
7.			<i>Bulgaria</i> 478	Bulgaria 418	USSR 445
6.	<i>Yugoslavia</i> 472	<i>S. Africa</i> 655	USSR 478	Hungary 418	<i>Syria</i> 443
5.	<i>Czechoslov.</i> 444	Belarus 467	<i>Albania</i> 474	Poland 418	Ukraine 442
4.	<i>Poland</i> 393	Czechoslov. 467	Czechoslov. 474	USSR 418	Hungary 439
3.	<i>USSR</i> 393	Poland 460	Ukraine 473	Ukraine 418	<i>Guinea</i> 436
2.	<i>Belarus</i> 388	USSR 460	<i>Hungary</i> 471	<i>Mongolia</i> 411	<i>Eq. Guinea</i> 423
1.	<i>Ukraine</i> 388	Ukraine 460	<i>Romania</i> 469	<i>Albania</i> 364	<i>Albania</i> 278
	<u>1971–1975</u>	<u>1976–1980</u>	<u>1981–1985</u>	<u>1986–1990</u>	<u>1991–1996</u>
19.					Angola 308
18.				Benin 225	Zimbabwe 308
17.				Mongolia 224	<i>Tanzania</i> 300
16.			<i>Nicaragua</i> 236	<i>Yemen</i> 224	<i>Yemen</i> 290
15.	Bulgaria 533	Belarus 424	<i>Benin</i> 235	Nicaragua 223	Indonesia 288
14.	Czechoslov. 533	Czechoslov. 424	<i>Ethiopia</i> 229	Ethiopia 222	<i>Lebanon</i> 284
13.	Mongolia 533	Hungary 423	<i>S. Tome/P.</i> 229	Viet Nam 220	Iran 282
12.	Poland 532	Mongolia 422	<i>Algeria</i> 227	<i>Iran</i> 219	<i>Myanmar</i> 277
11.	USSR 532	USSR 422	Seychelles 227	Seychelles 219	China 276
10.	Belarus 530	Ukraine 421	Viet Nam 220	Afghanistan 216	<i>Sudan</i> 273
9.	Hungary 530	Grenada 419	Cuba 216	Lao 214	Libya 266
8.	<i>Grenada</i> 527	<i>Cuba</i> 412	<i>Syria</i> 216	<i>Algeria</i> 212	<i>India</i> 261
7.	<i>GDR</i> 520	<i>Saint Lucia</i> 411	<i>Afghanistan</i> 215	<i>Mozambiq.</i> 212	Lao 260
6.	<i>China</i> 504	<i>Angola</i> 404	<i>Angola</i> 215	<i>Angola</i> 211	<i>Syria</i> 250
5.	<i>Mozambiq.</i> 500	<i>Zimbabwe</i> 399	<i>Lao</i> 215	Libya 210	Viet Nam 247
4.	<i>Bangladesh</i> 483	<i>Cambodia</i> 398	<i>D. Yemen</i> 212	Cuba 207	<i>Iraq</i> 241
3.	<i>Albania</i> 471	<i>Viet Nam</i> 384	<i>Libya</i> 210	<i>Syria</i> 203	Cuba 235
2.	<i>Guinea Bis.</i> 468	<i>Seychelles</i> 310	<i>Mozambiq.</i> 209	<i>D. Yemen</i> 201	<i>DPRK</i> 220
1.	<i>Comoros</i> 458	<i>Albania</i> 301	<i>Albania</i> 182	<i>Albania</i> 199	<i>Yugoslavia</i> 222

^a Through September 1997. Italics indicates first appearance on list.

went from one extreme to the other between the fifties and eighties. The same happened to China between the early fifties and seventies. In the nineties the Eastern European countries appear to be replacing quite a few Westerners in their closeness to the US.

Since the early eighties Israel has been the country with the highest CI with the United States and, from the late seventies, the US has been so for Israel. That close relationship is not, however, derived from a shared vision of the problems which the Assembly examines year after year. It is rather the product of a US attempt to follow Israel as far as possible in its votes on

TABLE 4.11 *The United States and Israel, 1946–1996*

Quinquennium	Coincidence Index	Israel's rank on US's list	US's rank on Israel's list	Total countries
1946–1950	788	38	4	59
1951–1955	795	28	28	59
1956–1960	796	51	51	99
1961–1965	764	37	78	116
1966–1970	696	24	109	126
1971–1975	779	9	24	140
1976–1980	804	7	1	149
1981–1985	777	1	1	157
1986–1990	735	1	1	160
1991–1996 ^a	831	1	1	185

^a Six years, through September 1997.

resolutions regarding the situation in the Middle East, especially the so-called Israeli practices in the territories it occupied since 1967. It could be said, in fact, that Israel is the only UN Member whose position on certain issues has influenced in turn the votes cast by the United States in the General Assembly (as well as in the Security Council and other multilateral fora).

Since 1946 the CI between the United States and Israel has remained rather constant, between 696 and 804. The only time there was a more or less significant fluctuation was in the late sixties when it dropped by nine percent, and in the early seventies when it rose by 12 percent. As shown in Table 4.11, until the early seventies, Israel did not figure in a prominent place in the list of the US' closest partners. In contrast, the United States was important to Israel in the late forties and again since the late seventies. That closeness has been one of the most notable occurrences in the Assembly over the past twenty years.

Israel's growing isolation in the Assembly is, as already noted, the result of its votes against a great number of resolutions on the Middle East situation. That isolation began after the Six-Day War and increased until the late eighties and early nineties when, as shown in Table 4.12, Israel coincided in next to nothing on Middle East questions with 82 percent of the UN's Members and its CI with another 23 percent was only between 100 and 200.

The support which the United States lends Israel in the Assembly on Middle East items explains in part its own increased isolation which, in turn, has had an impact on the position of other US allies, especially the UK.

The relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom in the Assembly has been close and, at times, the closest among the permanent members of the Security Council. The UK clearly preferred France over the US in the early fifties and again since 1981. But even so, the UK has figured

TABLE 4.12 *The Middle East: CI between Israel and the other UN Members, 1946–1996^a*

	Total countries					
	1946–1966	1967–1980	1981–1988	1989–1992	1993–1995	1996
CI over 900	8	0	0	0	1	1
800	8	0	1	1	0	0
700	17	2	0	0	0	0
600	19	2	0	0	0	0
500	32	15	0	0	0	1
400	11	14	13	0	4	1
300	10	15	9	2	12	1
200	9	35	24	26	57	15
100	0	59	77	31	65	65
001–099	1	7	33	104	38	84
Total	115 ^b	149 ^c	157	164 ^d	177 ^e	172 ^f

^a Through September 1997.

^b Excludes (because of scant participation in votes) Barbados, Gambia, Maldives and Malta.

^c Excludes Dominica, St. Vincent/Grenadines, Seychelles and Solomon Islands.

^d Excludes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Democratic Yemen, Georgia, GDR, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, San Marino, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Yemen.

^e Excludes Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Palau, Sao Tome/Principe, Seychelles, Somalia and Yugoslavia.

^f Excludes Central African Rep., Comoros, DR of the Congo, Dominican Rep., Greece, Iraq, Rwanda, St. Vincent/Grenadines, Sao Tome/Principe, Somalia, Turkmenistan and Yugoslavia.

among the closest to the United States (Table 4.13). A careful look at the UK's relationship to the US and Canada, on one hand, and to some countries of Western Europe, on the other, reveals the existence of a kind of "trans-Atlantic tension" in London. What has been the source of that tension?

Since the early seventies France and Germany have disputed first place in the list of countries closest to the United Kingdom. The Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, Canada have been very near the UK. On the other hand, the UK has figured among the two closest countries to the United States since the early sixties.

The United Kingdom has always favored its European partners on social issues, the codification of International Law, the Middle East and the UN budget. In contrast it has been closer to the United States in the voting on political matters in the fifties and sixties, decolonization since 1960 (after the independence of most of Britain's colonies), *apartheid* from 1989 to 1992 and other issues relating to Southern Africa since 1946. As for nuclear disarmament questions, the UK was closer to the US until the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968 and again since 1989. Finally, until 1970 it coincided more with the US on economic matters. And it is precisely here

TABLE 4.13 *The United Kingdom's trans-Atlantic tension: five-year CI with Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United States, 1946–1996^a*

	1946	1951	1956	1961	1966	1971	1976	1981	1986	1991
	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1996
Canada	889	913	855	888	860	824	882	855	834	874
United States	817	813	868	947	910	880	879	759	711	706
France	817	937	886	726	757	895	929	908	898	936
Germany	— ^b	—	—	—	—	927	962	932	907	913
Netherlands	874	905	908	900	862	854	867	863	867	916

Period	Rank on the UK's list					UK's rank on the list of				
	CAN	US	FRA	GER	NL	CAN	US	FRA	GER	NL
1946–1950	1	14	14	—	3	3	26	9	—	5
1951–1955	5	12	4	—	6	5	17	2	—	5
1956–1960	14	11	8	—	2	38	34	2	—	3
1961–1965	4	1	45	—	3	19	1	5	—	14
1966–1970	7	1	16	—	6	13	2	14	—	15
1971–1975	8	4	2	1	7	16	1	1	5	14
1976–1980	6	7	2	1	8	8	1	1	1	14
1981–1985	7	14	2	1	6	13	2	5	4	14
1986–1990	8	18	2	1	5	19	2	4	7	12
1991–1996	20	58	2 ^c	4	3	41	2	2 ^c	33	32

^a Through September 1997.^b Indicates non-member.^c After Monaco.

that one finds the greatest coincidence among Western countries since the seventies.

When examining the evolution of the voting patterns in the General Assembly, one must bear in mind the attempt by the members of the European Economic Community (now European Union) to co-ordinate their positions. The relative success of those efforts is shown in Table 4.14.

The European Union is not, of course, the only grouping of countries that tries to co-ordinate positions (and the votes) of its members in the General Assembly. Developing countries have been doing so for decades through the Group of 77 and the Non-Aligned Movement. Those in NATO have also adopted a common position on certain military and disarmament items. And, in the environment field, for example, the OECD has been putting forward ever-more uniform positions. There are additional groups within the Assembly, including the Nordic countries, the Arab nations and some other, less formal ones.

But what distinguishes the EU is its communitarian will and its constant striving to bring together the positions of its members. In the Assembly the EU spokesman often delivers a general statement on various items. But some

TABLE 4.14 *The median of the Coincidence Index of European Union members by subjects, 1946–1996^a*

Issues	1946 1950	1951 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	1991 1995	1996
Political	889	924	878	875	733	875	886	946	806	893	—
Economic	— ^b	—	—	—	—	871	868	910	922	882	—
Social	833	—	—	—	937	865	890	888	919	971	1000
Cod. International Law	—	—	—	—	912	857	854	833	893	955	—
Decolonization	885	769	810	794	750	780	822	804	745	816	—
Nuclear disarmament	—	—	—	833	917	833	844	765	738	927	956
Int. sec./other disarm.	—	—	—	—	—	844	921	860	879	972	964
Middle East	—	—	850	—	929	886	916	927	947	983	1000
Southern Africa											
<i>Apartheid</i>	—	—	—	—	—	855	782	784	826	950	—
Namibia	—	—	—	—	800	—	879	929	969	—	—
Other	—	—	—	778	818	784	766	763	767	850	—
UN budget	773	—	864	750	—	946	909	826	870	—	—
Total	836	838	827	830	809	853	859	841	867	936	955


^a Through September 1997, 3,262 votes. **Eight** countries until 1955 (Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden United Kingdom); **six** more since 1956–1960 (Austria, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain); and **one** more (Germany) since 1971–1975.

^b Less than ten resolutions on these subjects.

of its members frequently feel the need to “complement” the agreed EU position, since it tends to reflect the lowest common denominator.

If the CI of those countries in all votes is calculated, the lowest common denominator among the six founding members of the EEC turned out to be 850 between 1946 and 1957 and 781 between 1958 and 1972 (the year of its first enlargement). Between 1973 and 1980 the then nine members had a lowest common denominator of 798, which from 1981 to 1985 was 613, from 1986 to 1990 it was 688 and rose to 802 in the nineties. The reason for those relatively low coincidences was, France’s relationship between 1946 and 1980 to Italy first, then the Netherlands and, finally, Denmark and Ireland, and, since 1981, the United Kingdom’s relationship with Greece.

Countries with a CI above 900 have been Belgium, Italy and Luxembourg between 1946 and 1957, joined by the Netherlands from 1958 to 1972. From 1973 to 1985 the group also included Germany (which entered the UN in 1973). They were joined by Portugal in the 1986–1990 period. Since 1991 the group includes Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Portugal, as well as Denmark, Ireland and Spain and the three new members (Austria, Finland and Sweden), as well as Norway. Greece, France and the United Kingdom have yet to join fully the European Union’s positions on a number of General Assembly resolutions.

FIGURE 4.6 *The median of Western European Group and European Union, 1946–1996*

On economic items the EU members have been even more united. Towards the late eighties their lowest common denominator in the votes regarding economic issues was 856 and the nucleus of countries with a CI above 900 included ten of the then twelve members. The exceptions were Denmark and Greece. In sum, the members of the European Union are not only coinciding more and more in the General Assembly, but their increasing agreement has been the primary reason for the rise in the median of the Western European and Others group (Figure 4.6).

Like it or not, the state of the relations among China, France, the Russian Federation (formerly the Soviet Union), the United Kingdom and the United States hold the key to the UN's functioning. Within the Organization the Charter favors the Security Council and, within the Council, it privileges the five permanent members. The Council's five permanent members offer a kind of microcosm that serves to illustrate the evolution of the coincidence in the General Assembly votes.

Over the years, the Council has witnessed many, and at times violent, disputes between its permanent members, and those disagreements have also been felt in the Assembly. Table 4.15 lists the CI of the permanent members


TABLE 4.15 *CI of the permanent members of the Security Council, 1946–1996*

	Total	1946 1950	1951 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	1991 1996 ^a
China											
France	614	789	750	772	619	666	624	553	601	585	621
USSR	772	472	520	504	577	723	829	812	789	923	688
UK	577	772	716	816	786	667	541	527	535	545	575
US	423	867	851	886	780	658	504	429	315	274	276
France											
China	614	789	750	772	619	666	624	553	601	585	621
USSR	544	427	514	382	526	583	595	498	499	544	764
UK	896	817	937	886	726	757	895	929	908	906	936
US	728	811	796	798	719	758	823	834	680	644	643
USSR											
China	772	472	520	504	577	723	829	812	789	923	688
France	544	427	514	382	526	583	595	498	499	544	764
UK	504	331	487	408	382	457	560	478	453	506	739
US	379	393	460	478	418	445	532	422	261	237	564
UK											
China	577	772	716	816	786	667	541	527	535	545	575
France	896	817	937	886	726	757	895	929	908	906	936
USSR	504	331	487	408	382	457	560	478	453	506	739
US	798	817	813	868	947	910	880	879	759	716	706
US											
China	423	867	851	886	780	658	504	429	315	274	276
France	728	811	796	798	719	758	823	834	680	644	643
USSR	379	393	460	478	418	445	532	422	261	237	564
UK	798	817	813	868	947	910	880	879	759	716	706

^a Six years, through September 1997.

in five-year periods from 1946 to 1996. The fifty-year totals go from a low of 379 (USSR and US) to a high of 896 (France and UK).

The most stable relationships, i.e., those that have fluctuated the least, are among France, the United Kingdom and the United States. The most noteworthy features of that evolution are that France distanced itself from both the UK and the US in the sixties and that the United States has been moving away from its two European partners since the seventies. The least stable relationships among the Council's five permanent members have been those of China with the Soviet Union and those of the United States with China and especially the Soviet Union. The CI between China and the Soviet Union registered an almost uninterrupted rise until the nineties when it dropped significantly. In contrast, China has gone from being the closest to the United States to the most distant. The CI between the Soviet Union and the United States began very low in the late forties (460), reached its nadir in the eighties, and increased significantly in the early nineties. In fact, everything changed radically in the nineties in the Security Council although those

FIGURE 4.7 *The Coincidence Index and median of the US and USSR, 1946–1996*

changes were not reflected immediately in the CI among its permanent members in their General Assembly votes. And the most significant change was the new relationship between East and West, between the United States and the former Soviet Union.

Much of what has happened in the General Assembly can be described in terms of the US-USSR rivalry. Their CI since 1946 with the rest of UN Members offers a good idea of the general voting pattern. Figure 4.7 compares the evolution of the five-year median of the US and USSR and also includes their CI. It shows how over fifteen years the US point of view prevailed in the UN and how its influence diminished after the sixties. The case of the USSR is almost the reverse. Moreover, their CI was always below

their respective medians until the nineties, when their coincidence increased and, for the first time, placed the USSR well above the US median.


In the sixties, the United States distanced itself from many UN Members and in the seventies and eighties from many more, including its European allies. This, in turn, produced a split which led some Western countries, such as Canada, to follow the US on certain issues. Many of the items that served to isolate the United States—economic, Southern Africa, Middle East and disarmament—were the same that led to greater affinity among a growing number of UN Members.

Until the early sixties there was no clear majority in the General Assembly. In the fifties, perhaps because of its own isolation, the USSR would often refer to the “Anglo-North American bloc”. Later, in the sixties and especially the seventies, a majority group made up of ever-more *like-minded countries* began to appear. It was not, of course, a monolithic group similar to the countries of Eastern Europe or, on certain issues, to the members of NATO or the EEC. But, in general, that majority—which some even qualified as an “automatic majority”—comprised most of the developing and/or non-aligned countries.

How did this majority group take shape within the General Assembly and what countries did it include? Let us begin by the end, in the decade of the eighties when that group consolidated.

Around 1985 the majority group was composed of 80 African, American, Asian and Pacific countries. Malta and Yugoslavia were the only Europeans. There were, however, 44 other developing and/or non-aligned States that were not part of that majority: 15 African nations, aside from South Africa (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Swaziland and Zaire—which were closer to the West—and Angola, Ethiopia, Libya, Mozambique and Seychelles—closer to the East); 20 from America, aside from Canada and the US (Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Paraguay, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent/Grenadines and Uruguay—closer to the West—and Cuba and Nicaragua—nearer to the East); and nine from Asia and the Pacific, aside from Australia, China, Israel, Japan, NZ and Turkey (Fiji, Samoa, Singapore and Solomon Islands—closer to the West—and Afghanistan, Democratic Yemen, Lao, Syria and Viet Nam—closer to the East). How can one classify those exceptions?

Imagine a series of eight overlapping squares, with the majority group of 80 developing/non-aligned countries placed in the central square, representing around 50 percent of the 159 UN Member States in 1985 (Figure 4.8). In a second and very close square place Albania, China and Romania and those twelve developing countries that on some issues tended to side with the posi-

FIGURE 4.8 *Coincidence among UN Member States in the voting towards the mid-eighties*

tions of the nine Soviet bloc countries. In the third square locate those nine Eastern European countries. In the fourth square, at the other end of the central square, place the 32 developing countries that on some issues tended to side with the positions of the group of Western nations. The fifth square would include the four neutral countries of the Western European and Others Group; in the sixth, another 16 members of that Group; in the seventh Israel and in the eighth the United States. South Africa was still suspended.

In the mid-eighties, especially between 1986 and 1988, there was very little difference among the first four squares which, taken together, represented 86 percent (136 of 159) of UN Members. After 1989 and, above all, since 1990, many of them have radically changed their positions on several fundamental issues.

The five stages

As already noted, the evolution of the groups of countries Members of the United Nations has gone through five different stages. Here we shall examine those stages, bearing in mind that each stage is not a closed cycle.

The early years: 1946–1960

During this period there emerged some of the groupings of countries that would last until the late eighties. Between 1946 and 1954 the number of Member States grew 17.6 percent (from 51 to 60), and 67 percent over the following six years (from 60 to 100 between 1955 and 1960). That increase, which continued in the sixties, transformed the political atmosphere in the General Assembly.

At the end of the Assembly's first regular session in December 1946, there were 55 Member States, 54 of which had taken part in the votes (Thailand was admitted on 16 December). The analysis of that session's voting pattern reveals some clear trends that would consolidate in the following years, while others indicate an absence of co-ordination among the majority of countries and of the political free-for-all that prevailed then (and at the following five or six sessions).

The votes in 1946 demonstrated the cohesion of two small groups of countries: Eastern European and Arabs. The remaining UN Member States apparently voted without trying to arrive at common positions. Perhaps the novelty of the items in those early years did not allow for greater co-ordination among countries with similar ideas, something which was to occur later. In fact, the annual repetition of some texts of draft resolutions has had the effect of pressuring nations to align themselves with one group or another. To vote differently from the groupings that emerged in the fifties and sixties was to become a target for bilateral pressure. How was it possible that a given member could vote differently from the rest of its group?

A Coincidence Index above 950 is undoubtedly proof of certain affinity in the votes. And what is surprising about 1946 is the degree of coincidence in the General Assembly, even between countries that now seem very different. Forty of the 54 countries that took part in the 1946 votes had a CI of 950 with at least one other nation. Moreover, aside from the Eastern Europeans and the Arab countries, there were four cases of a CI of 1000.

Some of the countries with a CI over 950 could be described as natural partners: Belgium with Luxembourg; Denmark with Norway or Iceland; China with Philippines; Netherlands and United Kingdom; the quartets of Cuba, Honduras, Paraguay and Uruguay or Canada, New Zealand, Nether-

lands and South Africa, in addition to the Eastern European and Arab countries. Other couples were rather odd: Bolivia and Sweden; Brazil and Turkey; Chile and Ethiopia; Guatemala and France or Iran; Mexico and Belgium or Iran; Panama and Denmark or Luxembourg; China and Norway; or the trio of Greece, Netherlands and Peru.

Among the remaining fourteen countries, nine had a CI between 900 and 949 with at least one other country: Afghanistan, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Haiti, India, Lebanon, Nicaragua and United States. However, at the end of the Assembly's first session there were five States—Australia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Liberia and Venezuela—that had not reached a CI of 900 with anyone.

It is obvious that in the early years of the UN there were few attempts to co-ordinate positions among its Member States. There was simply no vehicle to do so. This is reflected in the CI of nations of Western Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America. Within the group of Arab nations, there was, however, greater coincidence. Furthermore, from the first vote, there was a small group of countries that gave proof of a firm political co-ordination provided by the Soviet Union: Belarus and Ukraine, as well as Poland and Yugoslavia, whose delegations cast almost identical votes in 1946. Only Czechoslovakia kept its distance from that bloc. By the following year, however, it was incorporated completely. On the other hand, Yugoslavia's participation in the Soviet bloc was brief, since in 1949 it clearly distanced itself from the group.

The Soviet bloc, which others would join after 1955, was to remain united for over forty years. Its emergence already in 1946 is perhaps the outstanding aspect of that first stage. Moreover, among the various groupings of countries that have appeared in the Assembly, that of the Socialist countries of Eastern Europe remained united for the longest time.

Yugoslavia's break with its geographic or political group was not unique in the UN. Years later Albania also distanced itself from the Soviet bloc. South Africa moved away from the Western European group, as did Portugal for a short period and the United States in the eighties. Israel never belonged to a group. Yugoslavia, significantly, not only managed to join another group of countries (the non-aligned) but was in fact one of its founders and principal defenders.

Between 1946 and 1960 the General Assembly adopted 279 resolutions by a recorded vote. Of these, 98 (or 35 percent) dealt with political issues and another 24 (9 percent) with social questions. If we add the 62 (22 percent) resolutions on decolonization, a highly political matter, the prevalence (66 percent) of social and political issues during that period is clear. However, since decolonization issues dominated the Assembly's agenda in the sixties, they will not be examined here.

What were those political and social issues and to what interests did they respond? Many of the votes on political questions were on the admission of new members, including some on China's representation at the UN and the UN's relations with Spain. These questions were a product of Cold War tension, as were those on Greece, Korea, Berlin, Hungary, Tibet, the Congo and, in 1960, Cuba.

The marked political polarization in the General Assembly between 1946 and 1960 intensified in the sixties. Between 1946 and 1970 the United States had the support, in varying degrees, of countries such as China (Taipei), France (until 1960), United Kingdom, Brazil, Cuba (until 1959), Canada, Japan, Mexico, Portugal (until 1960), South Africa and Israel (from the late fifties). During that period Sweden was closer to the United States as was Egypt until the end of the fifties. India, however, leaned towards the USSR.

In political matters the United States and the United Kingdom were close, especially from 1956 to 1970. In the sixties, however, France distanced itself from both the US and UK (and from practically the whole world).

As for social issues, the situation within the General Assembly was somewhat different, since US influence was much less imposing. There was thus less polarization. But a large part of the social items on the agenda—refugees, minorities and human rights (in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and the USSR itself)—did not respond to the interests of the Socialist bloc. However, in the resolutions on the question of women's rights, many developing countries and even certain members of the Western group—Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Norway and Sweden—were closer to the USSR than to the United States.

Another aspect of the General Assembly's social agenda was the politicization and lack of objectivity in the treatment of human rights items. The Assembly has adopted by recorded vote relatively few resolutions on specific human rights situations. Until 1960, there were only four such resolutions: one on Bulgaria and Hungary, another on the USSR, a third on Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, and a fourth on Tibet. The next resolution was not until 1974 when the case of Chile was taken up. Between 1974 and 1989, there were no less than 19 resolutions on the human rights situation in Chile. Since 1980 there have been seven resolutions on El Salvador, five on Guatemala, five on Cuba and one on Bolivia. Outside the Latin American region there have been 33: nine on Iran, six on Iraq, five on the Sudan, three on Afghanistan, two on occupied Kuwait, three on Kosovo and three more on the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro), and two on Nigeria.

TABLE 4.16 *CI: human rights, 1946–1996^a*

Specific cases ^b :	Eastern Europe ^c	Chile	Cuba	El Salvador	Guatemala	Afghanistan	Iran	Iraq	Sudan
Bulgaria	— ^d	0	0	0	200	1000	333	0	0
Hungary	—	0	0	0	200	1000	0	0	0
Romania	—	0	0	375	500	1000	643	0	0
USSR		0	100	0	200	1000	0	0	0
Chile	0		0	1000	500	0	0	0	0
Cuba	0	0		0	200	1000	1000	500	1000
El Salvador	0	583	0		1000	0	0	0	0
Guatemala	0	735	500	1000		0	125	167	200
Afghanistan	500	0	400	0	250		1000	125	900
Iran	333	0	1000	0	0	0		0	1000
Iraq	250	125	1000	0	200	500	0		1000
Sudan	0	139	1000	500	600	0	1000	1000	
Brazil	0	861	500	900	700	0	222	0	0
Canada	0	28	0	200	200	0	0	0	0
China	107	500	1000	500	600	0	1000	500	1000
Egypt	0	417	500	400	500	0	389	0	333
France	0	56	0	100	200	0	0	0	0
India	500	56	900	0	400	1000	722	375	800
Israel	500	559	0	833	875	0	0	0	0
Japan	—	361	0	500	500	0	167	0	0
Mexico	0	0	500	0	200	0	0	0	0
Nigeria	—	312	700	125	300	500	611	375	700
Portugal	—	0	0	300	200	0	0	0	0
Senegal	—	28	500	0	200	0	500	0	500
S. Africa	250	—	1000	—	—	—	167	0	0
Sweden	0	0	0	0	200	0	0	0	0
UK	0	83	0	500	200	0	0	0	0
US	0	528	0	900	900	0	0	0	0

^a Through September 1997.^b Other specific cases not included are those with only one resolution (Bolivia and Tibet), as well “occupied Kuwait” (two), Nigeria (two), Kosovo (three), and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia and Montenegro (three).^c Eastern Europe is taken as one.^d Non-members or suspended when votes were taken.

What has been the voting pattern on those resolutions? Table 4.16 shows that the politicization of human rights issues began in the late forties with the resolutions on some Socialist-bloc countries and has continued to this day. In fact, in its resolutions 272 and 285 (III) and 294 (IV) of 1949, the General Assembly expressed its deep concern for the “suppression of human rights and fundamental freedoms” in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania and recommended that the USSR withdraw the measures that prevented Soviet women married to foreigners, including diplomats, from leaving their country. The first two were opposed by six countries—Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Po-

land, Ukraine, USSR and Yugoslavia—and five opposed the third resolution (Yugoslavia moved to abstention).

Some countries that took a position different from that of the United States abstained precisely because they thought that the item had been politicized, while others did so because they did not feel much enthusiasm for human rights items in general. Only Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen abstained on all three; Burma, Iran and Syria on the first two; Venezuela on the first; Iraq and South Africa on the second; and Israel (which had just been admitted) and Yugoslavia on the third. Those changes reflected the intensification of the Cold War in 1949.

The politicization of human rights issues can also be observed in other cases that have come before the Assembly. However, there is no clear trend in the voting patterns of countries, including those that have been the subject of resolutions. Nonetheless, there is a group of nations that have more or less coincided in the votes on the various human rights resolutions. That group includes Sweden, Canada, France, Portugal and United Kingdom, as well as Mexico and, to a lesser extent, Senegal. For its part, the United States opposed the resolutions on El Salvador and Guatemala and, in the eighties, those on Chile, supporting instead those on Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq.


The General Assembly has thus reviewed the human rights record of very few countries. After an initial attempt to examine the situation in the Soviet bloc, it waited almost two decades to raise another case, that of Chile. In fact, Latin America was the only region signaled out during the seventies and eighties. And it was done in a very selective manner. For example, not a single resolution addressed the human rights violations in Argentina. Since then it has continued to be selective and has ignored some of the most flagrant cases in Africa and Asia.

Between 1946 and 1960 the Assembly adopted by recorded vote 68 resolutions (22 percent of the total) on matters related to decolonization. Colonial Powers opposed those resolutions and thus began their isolation on those items in the Assembly. The debates and resolutions on decolonization were to have a profound effect on the Assembly during the following decades.

The emergence of a majority, 1961–1970

Between 1960 and 1970 the UN admitted 45 nations, mostly recently-independent African and Asian countries. The number of Member States went from 82 to 127 (a 55 percent increase) and the Assembly thus changed radically. It was precisely around the decolonization items that those and other countries began to coincide. Their position was based on the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

FIGURE 4.9 *Evolution of the majority group within the General Assembly between the seventies and eighties*



adopted, on 14 December 1960 in resolution 1514 (XV), by 89 votes, none against and nine abstentions (Australia, Belgium, Dominican Republic, France, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, United Kingdom and United States).

During that decade there also appeared two important groupings whose positions on political, military and economic issues gained ever-greater strength within the UN: the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and, as a result of the first UNCTAD in 1964, the Group of 77 economically developing countries. The first of those groups was dominated by the Afro-Asian countries (and Yugoslavia). They resisted taking sides in the Cold War's ideological struggle and therefore, over several decades, largely defined the

political agenda, including questions of disarmament and international security. For its part, the Group of 77 appeared with UNCTAD, established upon an initiative of Latin American countries. In the seventies the differences between those groups began to blur and in the eighties they constituted a clear majority.

The nucleus of that majority group appeared in the sixties and included 29 countries (or 23 percent of the UN's 127 in 1970): ten African (Burundi, Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia); ten Arab (Algeria, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Kuwait, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan and Tunisia); eight Asian (Afghanistan, Cyprus, India, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka), and Yugoslavia. There was no country from Latin America or the Caribbean. Some countries—Afghanistan, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia and Libya—were to move somewhat away from the majority group as they grew closer, in the seventies or eighties, to the Socialist camp. Figure 4.9 illustrates the growth of that majority group.

The issues that served to bring together that majority group were decolonization, Southern Africa and, to a lesser extent, the codification of International Law. The decolonization items figured prominently in the list of resolutions which the General Assembly adopted by a recorded vote from the fifties to the early seventies, but especially between 1961 and 1970, accounting for 37 percent of those resolutions (Table 4.7 and Figure 1, Appendix VII). Some referred to the decolonization process in general and others to specific cases.

Table 4.17 presents the CI of the colonial Powers in the votes regarding their own trust territories or colonies. Some other countries are also included in order to compare their votes to those of the colonial or administering Powers. Note the solidarity between Portugal and South Africa. France and the United Kingdom had a CI of 731 and 786, respectively. In other words, they gave each other comparable support. Spain, however, supported Belgium (917) much more than Belgium supported Spain (643).

Among the colonial or trust-administering Powers, Denmark and New Zealand had the easiest time in the decolonization debates, followed by Australia and the Netherlands. Then came Belgium, Spain and the United States. The United Kingdom preceded France and Portugal and South Africa closed the list. Among the non-colonial countries, it is curious to note Brazil's support of Portugal and the fact that African countries were less severe with the United Kingdom than they were with France.

The group of developing countries coalesced around decolonization resolutions. That cohesion, apparent in the sixties, intensified in the seventies and eighties. In the decolonization items, the Soviet bloc was, until the late

TABLE 4.17 *CI: The colonies, 1946–1996^a*

Specific cases ^b :	Colonial or Administering Power										S. Africa	
	Aus.	Bel.	Den.	Fra.	Net.	NZ	Por.	Spa.	UK	US	1946	1966
											1966	1974
Australia		857	500	550	833	900	391	690	688	719	542	267
Belgium	850		0	725	667	1000	531	643	792	875	542	300
Denmark	850	786		687	1000	1000	328	548	727	875	167	233
France	700	857	500		833	800	594	667	786	812	583	367
Italy	778	750	— ^c	708	1000	1000	484	619	699	900	167	300
Netherlands	850	857	500	725		1000	453	571	766	906	417	267
New Zealand	900	786	500	538	833		391	738	760	750	417	233
Portugal	889	900	—	653	1000			750	790	714	1000	1000
Spain	500	917	—	568	833	1000	687		410	571	500	0
UK	1000	857	500	725	833	900	703	667		844	667	400
United States	950	786	1000	712	1000	900	609	667	799		208	333
South Africa	929	857	500	773	643	750	1000	750	917	643		
Algeria	389	0	—	94	1000	875	267	571	297	367	0	0
Brazil	500	643	1000	287	833	1000	790	714	442	500	83	0
Canada	900	786	500	700	1000	1000	391	619	747	875	333	300
China	667	786	1000	295	1000	1000	323	400	405	500	125	0
Côte D'Ivoire	375	400	—	226	500	1000	194	474	316	400	0	67
Cuba	500	571	1000	269	1000	900	310	571	378	400	42	179
Egypt	450	500	1000	263	833	1000	65	650	385	367	42	0
Ghana	389	500	—	141	750	833	234	619	326	357	0	0
India	444	500	1000	237	833	900	31	595	383	344	42	0
Israel	667	583	1000	554	833	1000	167	548	507	719	250	36
Japan	611	750	—	622	1000	1000	141	500	507	867	167	0
Mexico	500	714	1000	287	1000	1000	355	619	390	344	83	0
Nigeria	389	400	—	150	1000	1000	183	650	341	429	0	0
Senegal	389	400	—	234	1000	875	241	579	354	423	0	0
Soviet Union	350	286	1000	187	667	700	266	595	305	344	292	100
Sweden	850	786	1000	500	1000	1000	375	667	675	844	333	200

^a Through September 1997.^b The votes on Italy's colonies took place before Italy joined the UN.^c Non-member when votes were taken.

eighties, very close to the developing countries. In contrast, the United States was more inclined towards the European colonial Powers.

At its very first session in 1946 the General Assembly began its consideration of the situation in Southern Africa. The relationship between South Africa and the trust territory of Southwest Africa (Namibia) was inscribed in UN efforts in the decolonization field. Later the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique were added, as was British Southern Rhodesia. But what received most the attention was the *apartheid* regime in South Africa.

South Africa's behavior within and beyond its borders led the Assembly to take the drastic measure of suspension in 1974. But, even afterwards,

South Africa's domestic and foreign policy and its relations with several Members of the Organization continued to be discussed and the debates on Southern Africa intensified in the UN. The Assembly lived with South Africa's ghost for almost two more decades.

Today, when issues regarding Southern Africa are hardly debated and are the object of unanimous agreement in Assembly, it is difficult to imagine the intensity of the passions aroused by these matters over four decades.

South Africa's isolation increased in the Assembly after 1966 when the UN decided to assume responsibility for the territory of Southwest Africa. Table 4.8 summarizes the data on South Africa's CI with other UN Members on resolutions on *apartheid*, Namibia and other items regarding Southern Africa from 1946 to 1966 and from 1966 until its suspension in 1974.

With few exceptions, South Africa's CI was never very high with the other UN Members when it came to Southern African issues. The most obvious exception was Portugal (1000 until 1966 and later between 778 and 1000). Then, in a distant second place, came the United Kingdom (400 to 723), followed by France, the United States, Spain (before 1966), Australia, Belgium, Canada, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and New Zealand.

In most cases there was a significant decline in their CI after 1966. The same happened to the United States and, to a lesser extent, to France, the United Kingdom and some other Western countries. However, after 1966, for the vast majority in the Assembly, the issues regarding Southern Africa had, like decolonization, a coalescing effect, especially among developing countries and, until the late eighties, between them and the Socialist bloc. What is more, in the eighties the developing countries spoke with a single voice on these issues. In 1993, however, with the disappearance of these items from the list of resolutions adopted by a vote, the developing world lost an important focus of its political cohesion in the Assembly.

Between 1946 and 1992 the General Assembly adopted by recorded vote 234 resolutions on *apartheid*, 111 on Namibia and 224 on other issues regarding Southern Africa. Taken together, those 569 resolutions represented about one-fifth of the total recorded votes.

The codification of International Law is the UN's *raison d'être*. The way in which its Member States have approached this question reveals some very deep differences. Since 1946 about five percent of General Assembly resolutions adopted by a recorded vote have dealt with some aspect of the codification of International Law. In this area there is a gap separating the United States from everyone else, except Israel and the United Kingdom. Aside from reflecting the polarization between the US and the USSR, the codification of International Law revealed a growing disagreement between France and the US. It also shows France coinciding more than the UK with the

countries of the Western group. And it confirms that the USSR's closeness to the developing countries in the eighties began to disappear in the nineties.

The consolidation of the Afro-Asian Group, 1971–1980

The principal characteristic of the seventies in the General Assembly was the consolidation of the group of countries from Africa and Asia. Not that this group was made up of all the nations in those regions. Nor did it exclude all of the Latin American and Caribbean countries, most of which it was to include in the eighties.

There were other important developments in the seventies. Among the permanent members of the Security Council, for example, the early part of the decade witnessed a halt in the downward trend of the CI of the United States and the USSR (Table 4.15). These were the years of *détente*. Moreover, with the arrival of the representatives of the People's Republic, China's position in the Assembly underwent a drastic change. It moved closer to the USSR and especially to the developing world. In contrast, there was a marked recovery of France's CI with the United States and the United Kingdom, due in part to the votes on resolutions regarding the Organization's budget, but even more to those relating to economic matters.

In the seventies, resolutions adopted by a recorded vote on the UN budget accounted for 17 percent of the total. Those on economic issues represented another 7 percent.

Who contributes and with how much to the UN budget and how that budget is spent are questions that were hotly debated in the General Assembly until 1988. Since then resolutions on those questions are rarely put to a vote. Until the eighties there were sharp differences which today are papered over by the search for consensus proposals.

There are 17 countries that at different times have appeared among the ten largest contributors to the budget: the five permanent members of the Security Council, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Ukraine (Table 1.10).

At times the UN budget seemed to give rise to an East/West confrontation. But the deepest differences were between the largest contributors from the North and many countries from the South. There were also some discrepancies within the Western camp, especially between the United States and several European countries. Western European countries, however, were rather close on budgetary matters, especially the United Kingdom and Germany, as well as France and Italy. Japan leaned towards Germany in the seventies and, to a lesser extent, the UK in the eighties. In the seventies,

Sweden, for example, moved closer to the developing countries' positions regarding the budget, as did China, especially in the eighties.

Between 1970 and 1980 the over-riding characteristic of the UN budget was its growth. During that decade it went from \$170 million a year to \$670 million, an increase of almost 300 percent. And it grew in those areas of greatest interest to the developing countries: decolonization, especially Namibia, disarmament and economic matters. With time that trend was reversed and for some years the Organization's regular budget has not registered any real increase despite its new and broader field of activities.

The seventies also witnessed a radical change in the General Assembly's approach to the problems of economic development. It simply changed its economic agenda (and it did so again in the nineties). Just as in the definition of the UN's political and social agenda in the fifties and sixties the influence of the United States and many other Western countries was preponderant, so in the economic field the developing countries played the largest role. In the sixties their influence was felt with the establishment of UNCTAD. But it was in the seventies that they defined their ideas on the New International Economic Order, including the transfer of technology, the role of transnational corporations and the drafting of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. North/South relations were at the center of the debates and many efforts were made to enhance South/South co-operation.

In the recorded votes on economic issues there was, therefore, a marked coincidence among developing countries, including China whose CI with those countries that presided over the Group of 77 in New York or the Non-Aligned Movement varied from 907 to 1000 in the seventies. And it would continue to rise in the eighties.

The highest levels of coincidence were attained among African and Asian countries in the seventies and among all developing countries in the eighties when many Latin American and Caribbean nations swelled the ranks of the majority within the Assembly. During that decade, the Soviet Union moved closer in economic matters to the developing countries in general and to the Africans and Asians in particular. It also moved closer, though to a much lesser extent, to countries such as Canada, France, Portugal and Sweden.

The voting patterns on economic issues reveal that there was no uniform policy among the principal players of the North—United States, France, United Kingdom, Germany and Japan, as well as Canada and Italy. In general terms, the United States began to distance itself more and more from the Third World in the seventies, a trend that intensified in the eighties. It also moved away from the Group of 7, except for France and Italy. Japan separated itself from the South, while France and the UK moved closer to it. For France, Germany, Japan and the UK the coincidence with the South re-

mained at around 600 since the seventies. Only the US distanced itself dramatically from the developing world in the eighties.

The Rise of the Third World, 1981–1988

One of the most curious developments in the General Assembly since 1946 is the force which the Third World majority acquired between 1981 and 1988 and the apparent speed with which that strength was lost as a result of the collapse of the Socialist bloc and the emergence of the market system as the world's sole economic model. That rise and fall have but one single explanation: the Assembly's agenda (which the developing countries began to define in the sixties and consolidated in the seventies and early eighties) changed precipitously in the late eighties.

The long road to decolonization was about to end, the items regarding Southern Africa—first, Namibia in 1988 and then *apartheid* and other Southern African questions—disappeared from the agenda, thus depriving the majority group of many issues that had given it cohesion. Add to that the transformation of the economic platform and the end of voting on the Organization's budget, and one has an explanation of what happened to the majority in the General Assembly, a majority which also included, in the eighties, the now defunct Socialist bloc.

What items continue to give cohesion and coherence to that majority group? The answer is the Middle East (at least until 1992) and most disarmament questions, two sets of issues that contributed greatly to the rise of the Third World in the Assembly.

Since 1946 the General Assembly has adopted by recorded vote 660 resolutions on the Middle East, that is, an annual average of over twelve. Until the Six-Day War that average had been about one per year; from 1967 to 1980 it was 10, then 35 from 1981 to 1988 and 25 since 1989. In turn, the proportion of resolutions dealing with the Middle East has grown constantly: 6 percent until 1960, 9 percent in the sixties, 14 percent in the seventies, 24 percent between 1981 and 1988, and 32 percent since 1989.

Middle East resolutions isolated Israel and the United States. They also divided the permanent members of the Security Council. In contrast, they served to cement solidarity among developing countries and moved them closer to many Western nations. Among developing countries there was, at least until the early nineties, no difference between their overall CI and their coincidence regarding Middle East resolutions.

Unlike the impact which the Middle East seems to be having after 1992 on the degree of coincidence within the majority group, disarmament items have continued to bring together its members in the nineties. This is particu-

larly evident with regard to nuclear disarmament, but it is also present in other disarmament matters in general and international security. There are, of course, exceptions (India, for example, especially in nuclear disarmament).

Among the permanent members of the Security Council, which are also the five recognized nuclear-weapon States, there is an uneven evolution between nuclear and non-nuclear disarmament items. In the case of the United States, its CI with the USSR bottomed out in the eighties and has begun to rise in the nineties. With China it has also increased in the nineties in the nuclear field while there has been a marked drop (34 percent) in non-nuclear matters.

Something similar has occurred between the United States and the United Kingdom and France. In general there appears to be greater coincidence among the five permanent members on nuclear issues in the nineties.

A transitional era, 1989–1996

In the mid-nineties it is not yet possible to detect a clear voting pattern in the General Assembly. There are many political adjustments still in the making, changes derived from the end of the Cold War and the economic policies very much in vogue throughout the world. Those political (and military) adjustments have had a dramatic impact on the UN, both in the Assembly and in the Security Council. The most obvious case is that of the members of the group of Eastern European countries and the erstwhile Warsaw Pact. But there are indications of change in other regions and in other subjects. Let us look at the Security Council, the USSR, Eastern Europe, Germany, the Nordic countries, economic groupings (the European Union, the OECD, NAFTA and ASEAN), Japan, the non-aligned countries, China and Argentina, and conclude with the impact of the Southern Africa and Middle East items on the voting patterns in the General Assembly.

Since 1990 the Security Council has been transformed. After decades of paralysis produced by East/West confrontation, it began to play a very active role in the search for solutions to threats to international peace and security. There are two facts that clearly reveal the ease and even speed with which agreements are reached within the Council: first, between January 1990 and September 1997, it adopted 485 resolutions, a monthly average of 5.2, compared to 646 resolutions, or a 1.2 average, from 1946 to 1989; second, its permanent members have resorted to the veto only six times since 1991.

Greater agreement in the Security Council has been reflected as well in the General Assembly. As shown in Table 4.18, the key is found in the 1990–1991 biennium when there is an initial rise in the United States' CI

TABLE 4.18 *The transition: Coincidence Index of the permanent members of the Security Council, 1986–1996^a*

	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
China											
France	574	629	577	573	548	609	634	575	608	623	662
USSR	862	928	956	955	940	769	662	623	697	629	740
UK	520	601	516	536	530	565	577	525	577	568	622
US	309	292	244	236	265	243	239	238	318	295	308
France											
China	574	629	577	573	548	609	634	575	608	623	662
USSR	480	568	551	571	560	679	795	795	720	776	822
UK	850	919	912	906	922	903	925	934	938	948	968
US	683	633	636	594	669	627	596	631	682	672	649
USSR											
China	862	928	956	955	940	769	662	623	697	629	740
France	480	568	551	571	560	679	795	795	720	776	822
UK	467	542	489	522	524	627	750	794	724	754	792
US	258	232	210	206	262	457	561	619	603	630	526
UK											
China	520	601	516	536	530	565	577	525	577	568	622
France	850	919	912	906	922	903	925	934	938	948	968
USSR	467	542	489	522	524	627	750	794	724	754	792
US	748	684	703	684	738	701	676	698	746	732	686
US											
China	309	292	244	236	265	243	239	238	318	295	308
France	683	633	636	594	669	627	596	631	682	672	649
USSR	258	232	210	206	262	457	561	619	603	630	526
UK	748	684	703	684	738	701	676	698	746	732	686

^a Through September 1997.

with the other four permanent members, followed by the marked change in 1991 of the USSR's voting pattern: it moved much closer to the United States and to a lesser degree to France and to the United Kingdom while it distanced itself from China.

In the eighties the five permanent members appeared as two separate duos (France and the United Kingdom; China and the USSR) and one loner (the United States). In the nineties they appear to be moving towards a quartet and one loner (China). That is due to the profound political changes in the now Russian Federation.

In a matter of a few years, the Soviet Union was transformed politically and economically and thereby lost its leadership role within the most monolithic bloc of countries in the world. Towards the late eighties it had a CI above 950 with all the countries of Eastern Europe and with a large number of countries from other regions (Appendix VIII, Table 2). Moreover, its median within the Assembly had increased almost constantly from 460 in 1946–1960 to 806 in 1981–1985 and to 941 in the late eighties. In the early

TABLE 4.19 *The transition in Eastern Europe: Coincidence Index of 1988 compared to 1989 and 1990*

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Decolo- nization</i>	<i>Nuclear disarmament</i>	<i>ISOD^a</i>	<i>Southern Africa</i>	<i>Middle East</i>
Bulgaria						
1989	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000
1990	772	500	786	833	550	804
Czechoslovakia						
1989	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000
1990	706	500	679	729	550	732
Hungary						
1989	968	929	1000	1000	929	982
1990	754	500	808	826	500	732
Poland						
1989	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000
1990	705	625	692	750	500	714
Romania						
1989	989	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000
1990	765	625	750	792	500	815

^a International security and other disarmament.

nineties its median had dropped to 735, a 22 percent decline in a just a few years. With the countries of Eastern Europe its CI fell by 14 to 17 percent but by as much as 30 percent with its other former allies.

To measure the extent of the changes registered around 1990 within the Eastern European group, a comparison was made between how they voted on various subjects in 1988 and their votes in 1989 and 1990 on those very same resolutions. The results are dramatic (Table 4.19). Taken together, the CI of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania remained the same from 1988 to 1989, although it dropped a little in the case of Hungary and Romania. By 1990, however, it had decreased by 71 to 77 percent below its 1988 level. And the changes were most apparent in the resolutions regarding Southern Africa and decolonization, precisely the issues in which Western countries had some of their greatest differences with the developing nations.

In fact, one of the outstanding features of the voting patterns in the General Assembly in the early nineties has been the movement of the former Soviet bloc to the positions of the countries from the western part of Europe. That U-turn or "Westernization" of Eastern Europe can be observed in all countries in the region, but above all in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. This trend is apparent in the evolution of Germany's CI with a group of European countries (Appendix VIII, Table 3). Although Germany's level of coincidence has increased with most European nations (except Yugoslavia), it is now greater with some Eastern Euro-

pean countries (such as Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania) than with certain Western nations (such as Austria, Greece, Ireland, and Sweden, and even France and the United Kingdom).

There are clear signs that the European countries are drawing closer in the General Assembly. This is true between East and West and within certain subregions as well. The Nordic countries—Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden—are more united in the nineties than at any other time in the last 50 years. Greece and Ireland have also moved closer to their European partners (Appendix VIII, Tables 4 and 5).

Within the group of Western Europe and Others (Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the United States and, in certain items, Turkey) there seem to be, however, some contradictory trends. There is the growing cohesion among Europeans themselves (including Turkey), but there are signs that point to a slight distancing (aside from the US) between the Europeans and Canada, Japan and, above all, Australia and New Zealand. This can be seen among the members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) which includes developed countries from many regions (Appendix VIII, Table 6). And this brings us to the question of the coincidence among nations within the various economic or trade groupings.

The nineties have witnessed increasing coincidence among the European Union countries, including its three new members. Something similar has happened in other economic groupings. Such is the case of the OECD, which Mexico joined in 1994, the Czech Republic in 1995 and Hungary, Poland and the Republic of Korea in 1996 and which will probably include other developing countries in the coming years.

On the other hand, the North American Free Trade Area entered into force in 1994. We have compared the evolution since 1946 of the CI of Canada, the United States and Mexico, as well as Mexico's CI with a group of Latin American and Caribbean nations (Appendix VIII, Table 7). It is apparent that, in spite of their cultural and economic closeness, in addition to their geographic proximity, Canada and the United States have coincided less and less in General Assembly votes. That was no obstacle to their signing a bilateral free-trade agreement which has now become trilateral.

Although the United States remains very distant from the rest of UN Members, especially developing countries, it has sought closer economic and commercial ties with Mexico and several nations from Latin America and Asia. For its part, Mexico has signed free-trade agreements with some countries in its region, including Chile with which it coincides more and more in the General Assembly. In other words, the European Union's example of growing closeness does not seem to be a model that will necessarily repeat itself in other instances where there is a growing commercial and economic

activity: neither between the United States and Canada nor between Canada and Mexico.

Nevertheless, one cannot deny that, as nations grow closer economically, they tend also towards greater political understanding or, at least, to feel greater political pressure. Moreover, as shown in several recent cases in Asia, opening up commercially and economically brings with it political and social consequences, as happened in Japan some decades ago with its Western trading partners (Appendix VIII, Table 8).

It would be impossible to measure precisely the effects that trade and economic groupings have had on the voting patterns of their members. The ASEAN nations have had, at least since the seventies, a very high level of coincidence in General Assembly votes (Appendix VIII, Table 9). And yet, except for some very specific economic issues, they do not appear to seek, as do the members of the European Union, common voting positions beyond the co-ordination offered to them as members of the Group of 77 or the Non-Aligned Movement. Moreover, since 1991, differences among them have appeared, especially regarding social issues in general and human rights in particular. This trend has also become evident within the Non-Aligned Movement and between its members and the Western countries.

Since the eighties, members of the Non-Aligned Movement have been abandoning, modifying or nuancing their positions on many agenda items. Some have changed their vote on a given resolution as a result of unilateral decisions or, more frequently, bilateral pressure. In fact, the policy of "bilateralizing multilateral issues", which the United States pursued vigorously in the eighties, had a strong impact on the behavior of many members of the Non-Aligned Movement. Pressure was applied with regard to items of special interest to the US State Department, including Central America (above all El Salvador and Nicaragua), Namibia and other South African issues, and some aspects of the Middle East situation.

Despite that pressure, which on occasion reached the highest political level, the Non-Aligned countries managed to maintain their unity in the eighties and even to increase their general coincidence level in the period 1989–1991 (Appendix VIII, Table 1). Since then, however, the Movement has begun to lose its cohesion. The trend is rather widespread and includes other developing countries as well as China (Appendix VIII, Table 10). It signals an important re-adjustment of positions within the Non-Aligned group.

The transformation of the Non-Aligned Movement in the nineties is the result of several factors. First, with the end of the Cold War the question arises, non-aligned to what? Its *raison d'être* is eroding. This is apparent in many political matters and some economic issues. They differ increasingly on social issues, especially human rights, and even on some disarmament

questions, although nuclear disarmament items seem to continue to keep the Movement together.

How can the Non-Aligned be characterized in the nineties? It is still early to tell which way the Movement will go. At the eleventh summit conference, held in Cartagena, Colombia, in October 1995, there was much soul-searching but no clear decision as to the future course of the Movement, except that there would be greater emphasis on economic development rather than the political issues which dominated its discussions in the past. The twelfth summit is scheduled in 1998 in South Africa.

The voting patterns in the General Assembly since 1991 point to the existence of two trends within the Non-Aligned Movement. The first includes those members that maintain a very specific political course, such as Cuba, DPRK and Viet Nam, to which one should add Iraq, Libya, Syria and Sudan, which are very close to the positions of China, for example, in the area of human rights. The second trend includes an ever-growing number of countries that, in addition to changing their economic course, have switched positions on many political and social issues including human rights. The most extreme example of this trend is Argentina which in 1991 completely modified its stance in multilateral fora and withdrew from the Non-Aligned Movement. Argentina's change has been such that its votes in 1993 were, with one exception, very similar to its voting pattern between 1946 and 1950. The exception is that today it is much further removed from its own Latin American and Caribbean group (Appendix VIII, Table 11). What is more, Argentina's conversion to Western European positions was almost as enthusiastic as that of the Eastern Europeans. Whereas in 1991 it coincided the most with Brazil (988), Zambia (981), Ethiopia and India (976), in 1995 it did so with Andorra (934), San Marino (929) and Portugal (924). In 1996, however, there were signs that Argentina was moving back towards the developing countries.

In sum, almost all members of the Non-Aligned Movement have been changing course. The difference among them is not one of direction but one of the pace of that change in the political as well as economic field.

The contours of a new agenda

The General Assembly's agenda has changed in the nineties. It is very different from the one around which the developing countries coalesced in the seventies and eighties. With the collapse of the Socialist bloc, East/West political polarization within the UN has disappeared and with it so have some areas that were once economic priorities. At the insistence of Western countries, a series of new items or, at least, a renewed emphasis in some

TABLE 4.20 *The divisive impact of General Assembly agenda items, 1946–1996*

	1946–1960	1961–1970	1971–1980	1981–1988	1989–1996
Political	E/W ^a	E/W	E/W N/S	E/W N/S	N/S
Economic	E/W N/S	E/W N/S	E/W N/S	E/W N/S	N/S
Social	E/W N/S	E/W N/S	E/W N/S	E/W N/S	N/S
Codification of International Law				N/S	N/S
Decolonization	E/W	E/W N/S	E/W N/S	E/W N/S	N/S
Nuclear disarmament	E/W			E/W N/S	N/S
International security/ other disarmament				E/W N/S	N/S
Middle East					
Southern Africa		E/W N/S	E/W N/S	E/W N/S	N/S
Budget					

^a E/W East/West division; N/S North/South division.

areas has emerged, such as peace-keeping operations, human rights and even so-called humanitarian intervention. The approach to several disarmament questions has also changed and new subjects have been introduced.

Until the late eighties, the General Assembly's agenda contained many items that produced both an East/West and North/South divide. Table 4.20 seeks to give an idea of how various items have affected the Assembly's work in terms of their impact on the relations between the two military blocs and between the developed and developing countries. Some questions, such as those relating to the Middle East or the Organization's budget, cannot be defined in those terms and so do not fit the pattern. In addition, by 1989 East/West polarization had disappeared from the Assembly. The differences between the South and the North (which now also includes the countries of the former Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe) continue in several areas, especially in the political, social and disarmament spheres.

East/West polarization was present, however, in the political, economic, social and decolonization items until the late eighties; with regard to Southern Africa, from the sixties to the eighties, and in the field of nuclear disarmament from 1946 to 1960 and again from 1981 to 1988. In contrast, the North/South divide appeared later but continues into the nineties.

The Southern Africa and Middle East items were among the most divisive in the Assembly and, at the same time, a uniting factor for many developing countries, especially those from Africa. Voting on Namibian questions ended with its independence in 1989. In 1993, for the first time in its history, the General Assembly adopted without a vote all its resolutions on *apartheid* and other Southern African issues. In contrast, voting on the Middle East resolutions has continued. With the initiation of the Middle East peace process and, above all, with the Accords signed in Washington in September of

1993, it was thought that the General Assembly would also manage to adopt its resolutions on the matter without a vote. But it has proved impossible.

The contours of the General Assembly's new agenda, therefore, are defined by the items it contains, as well as by those that no longer figure on it. The disappearance of the decolonization chapter and more recently of *apartheid*, Namibia and other Southern African issues, has deprived the majority group of one of the elements which held it together.

With rare exceptions, the votes on Southern Africa and, in particular, the Middle East had the effect of bringing UN Members together. After 1993, the absence of voting on Southern African items reduced the level of coincidence among the members of the majority group and between them and the Western countries. If, as many expect, the resolutions on the Middle East also disappear from the list of those put to a vote, another focus of cohesion will vanish from the UN. With that, and with the introduction of new items in the political and social fields, together with the renewed insistence on human rights, we could have the contours of the UN General Assembly's new agenda.

EPILOGUE: THE UNITED NATIONS AT FIFTY

The Great War signaled the collapse of Europe's nineteenth-century order. Its ashes gave life to the idea of creating a world organization. The League of Nations, however, was unable to preserve peace after 1919 and it became one of the first victims of the forces that led to the Second World War. During that conflagration the countries opposing the Axis Powers issued, on 1 January 1942, a Declaration signed by 26 United Nations. And it could be said that the UN Charter, signed at San Francisco on 24 October 1945, was a political pact that emanated from that military alliance.

In 1995 the United Nations celebrated its golden anniversary. It was an occasion for governments, non-governmental groups and individuals to assess the work of the Organization. On October 24th the General Assembly adopted a declaration on the occasion of the UN's fiftieth anniversary (resolution 50/6). In it the Organization's 185 Member States reaffirmed their commitment to the Purposes and Principles of the Charter. They also expressed their determination that "the United Nations of the future will work with renewed vigor and effectiveness in promoting peace, development, equality and justice and understanding among the peoples of the world". And to this end, the Member States "Will give the twenty-first century a United Nations equipped, financed and structured to serve effectively the peoples in whose name it was established".

The declaration itself was a triumph of collective efforts to render the UN a better, that is, more effective institution. Its solemn and unanimous adoption was proof of how much the world has changed in recent years. A short decade ago, such a declaration would have been impossible.

The lesson of 1985

In 1985 the UN General Assembly was in fact incapable of adopting a declaration on the occasion of its fortieth anniversary. The draft declaration was almost completely agreed upon and enjoyed the support of the overwhelming majority of Members. However, it was not approved because the United States opposed certain references to the problem of Palestine. Once again the Middle East had a negative impact on the General Assembly's work; once again a single delegation was able to paralyze the Assembly because its members had accepted beforehand that the approval of that declaration would be by consensus.

On the other hand, during that same session the Assembly adopted without a vote a resolution purportedly aimed at enhancing the efficiency of the

UN, but which in reality sought the introduction of various reforms in the Organization, including the acceptance of the consensus rule in the adoption of decisions regarding the UN budget. The resolution was submitted by Japan with the open support of the United States and the rest of the members of the Western Group, as well as with the tacit approval of the Soviet Union and its allies.

Those two events—the impossibility of adopting a declaration reaffirming the adherence of all Members to the purposes and principles of the Charter and the acceptance of the attempts of a few to transfer the veto to the General Assembly—were a clear indication that the Organization was at a crossroads. It was proof of the steady erosion of the commitment of all to the Organization's noble aims and the attempts to impose changes geared at neutralizing the strength of the majority. Therein lies the challenge faced today by many UN Members. The solution that is found to those problems will define, to a large extent, the kind of Organization that we will have in the next century. This task concerns all countries, but most especially those that, for decades, have been enthusiastic supporters of the Organization and active promoters of its ideas and ideals. They must create a greater awareness of the dangers involved in passively accepting the course which others are attempting to define for the Organization.

It now, therefore, behooves the countries that since 1945 have defended the United Nations' *raison d'être* to redouble their efforts to halt and reverse the current trend within the Organization. Several fronts must be attacked simultaneously. The first, and undoubtedly the most important, is to strengthen the spirit of internationalism that guided many negotiators at San Francisco in 1945. The second is a corollary of the first: the need to promote greater and better participation of the UN Secretariat in the Organization's substantive matters and also to combat the indifference which already permeates the Secretariat, as well as the permanent missions of the Member States themselves. Third, one must ensure that any action the Security Council decides to undertake, as well as any change in its structure, enjoys the open support of the rest of the Organization's Members. A fourth front is to seek greater efficiency and, above all, seriousness in the General Assembly's debates, conclusions and recommendations. In short, we must recognize that the UN has, unwittingly, embarked on a course which, if not corrected, will lead it inevitably into a dead end.

From the Cold War to the Gulf War

During four decades East/West rivalry reduced the United Nations' margin of action, especially in the Security Council. After 1990, however, the Coun-

cil has repeatedly shown renewed vigor. The role of the Secretary-General has also been transformed and significant changes have been introduced in the Secretariat's structure in order to deal with the new international challenges, real or imagined. There is talk of a new "agenda for peace" whose aim is to establish a system of preventive diplomacy and to provide the UN with a military force of its own. All of this has resulted in a growing interest in what happens at the UN on the part of governments and the media. In fact, as occurred just after World War II, the UN has once again become front-page news. And this is due much more to the activities of the Security Council than the General Assembly and, even less, ECOSOC.

The Security Council has entered a very active phase. During the nineties it has been meeting almost continuously. The beginning of this new phase was the Gulf War, considered as clear evidence that the UN had changed. Although that war was seen by some as a signal that the Security Council had finally awakened after three decades of inactivity, for others it was a harbinger of a new and less attractive world order. For many UN Members, the Gulf War was a source of conflicting sentiments. Proof is that, despite the so-called success of the military operation in Iraq, the Security Council has refrained from undertaking another similar action.

The UN Secretariat has been reorganized to adapt it to the new international realities and to the supposedly new multilateral priorities. Some changes, such as the elimination of the offices in charge of the follow-up of resolutions relating to *apartheid* and other South African issues, are understandable. But others are more difficult to justify. For example, the sector dealing with economic matters within the UN, to which the developing countries had managed to give a high profile, has been re-organized and drastically reduced. The same occurred to the disarmament affairs department, which had been strengthened as a result of the General Assembly's 1978 special session, but which later was reduced to a minimum.

In contrast, the areas devoted to peace-keeping operations and humanitarian affairs have been strengthened, at least on paper. The department for humanitarian affairs has been created to co-ordinate the Organization's many activities in this sphere and, after decades of discussion, the post of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights was established in 1993.

All of the above, however, has had to be done with budgetary resources which have not grown for years. The Secretariat's re-organization, therefore, has meant that increases in one department have been at the expense of another. The favorite phrase of many of the delegates who follow budgetary questions is that any reform undertaken should be carried out "within existing resources". Worse still, the gap between rhetoric and reality has widened.

In fact, whereas many proclaim the dawn of a new world and the rebirth of the UN, very few are ready to increase their financial contributions to the Organization and even fewer to provide troops to the multilateral military forces. Those who have most defended the thesis of so-called humanitarian intervention are the most reluctant to place the UN in a situation to do so quickly and effectively. They prefer instead to preserve their right to resort to the Security Council to achieve a kind of multilateral blessing for those actions which they wish to undertake unilaterally.

Today, when one speaks of the United Nations, the adjective most often used is “new”. But it is premature to refer to a “new” international order. Just as no one could have imagined the speed with which the Soviet Union fell apart, so no one has yet written the script for the events that are still to follow the end of the Cold War. What is more, the community of nations has yet to resolve an age-long dilemma.

Internationalism versus parochialism

The UN Charter embodies an enormous contradiction that reflects a fundamental tension between the individual human being and the Nation-State: on the one hand, it urges the peoples of the world to defend and promote a series of universal principles; on the other hand, it recognizes and even broadens many of the prerogatives which Nation-States have been arrogating to themselves for centuries.

For almost two hundred years the inhabitants of the world have based their professional careers and even their lives on the shared notion that, in one way or another nations are distinct and therefore different from the rest. Perhaps this trend would have overwhelmed us by now had it not been for the recurrence of military conflicts, especially the two tragic and sobering world wars in this century.

Caused by certain manifestations of exaggerated and threatening nationalisms, they gave rise, paradoxically, to a vigorous defense of universal human values and international solidarity. The UN was itself the product of this renewed internationalism, inspired by shared human goals which, for a moment, seemed to bury perceived national differences. The UN founders, however, were unable to take the international organization that one final leg of the way: a world authority. That is the step that we still have to take. The UN, it is ironic to note, was to fall victim to the very threats it was supposed to deter: the pursuit of parochial interests by the Nation-State.

The history of the UN is, in a sense, the history of the conflict between nationalism and internationalism. Its saddest chapters have been the work of nationalists; its best pages have been written when its Members have recog-

nized their common dreams and aspirations. And the Charter is an example of that inherent contradiction: humanity's high aims are proclaimed in its Preamble, while in one provision after another the rights and prerogatives of States are preserved intact. Critics of the Organization invoke those provisions; its defenders allude more often to the Preamble. The debates have frequently reflected that dichotomy which on occasion has resulted in tension and friction in the UN.

It is the undeniable duty of responsible UN Members to promote the causes of internationalism and to advance multilateralism. But their efforts will surely be in vain if they allow the will of the majority to be trampled repeatedly by the maneuverings of a small, well-organized and vociferous minority which, basing itself on the spurious argument that money talks, terrorizes the Secretariat and frightens many governments, whose viability at times depends on the sums of bilateral aid they receive. If the trend towards accepting the rule of consensus, i.e. the veto, in the work of the General Assembly and its subsidiary bodies is not stopped, it is probable that in the not too distant future we will end up accepting a system not unlike that of South Africa's former practice of *apartheid*: the submission of the majority, now gagged, to the orchestrated directives of a handful of countries. That day we will have buried internationalism and, as in the not too distant past, there will again prevail, but this time sanctioned by ourselves, the reign of the strong over the weak.

The UN's purse strings

The blackmail which a small group of determined countries has been exercising over the UN draws much of its strength from a very modest fact: their monopoly over the Organization's purse strings. In fact, in accordance with the present scale of assessments, a mere twelve countries, all of them members of the Western European and Others Group, account for over 72 percent of the regular budget. Three of the fifteen countries of the former Soviet Union (Belarus, Russia and the Ukraine) cover another 11 percent. Put in a different way, 170 of the 185 Members contribute a mere 17 percent. What is more, there are dozens of countries that pay the minimum contribution of 0.01 percent, that is, about \$130,000, an amount that barely covers the salary of a UN official with the rank of director.

Any discussion of the United Nations' budget must be based on one irrefutable fact: the sums that the Organization spends are ridiculously small. To the UN's regular annual budget in the eighties (\$800 million) one would have to add three zeros in order to equate it with what the world squandered yearly during that decade on military activities (\$800 billion). Moreover, the

annual cost of the UN was then equal to some eight hours of military outlays. One more comparison: in 1987 Mexico's monthly expense to cover its foreign debt service was equal to the UN's annual regular budget.

Since 1972 the maximum contribution has been 25 percent of the budget. In other words, the United States' assessment is \$300 million a year. But one tends to forget that one-third of that amount goes towards the payment of the salary and pension of US citizens that work in the UN Secretariat. The City of New York, moreover, receives a sum four or five times greater than those \$300 million from what is spent by the members of the Secretariat and the permanent missions. In short, while a minority holds the purse strings, the purse contains a very small sum. And yet the debates on the UN's budget have monopolized the attention of its Members in recent years, especially in light of the unilateral decision by the principal contributor to retain the payment of a good part of its assessed quota which, according to its treaty obligations, it must pay. That retention has been used to blackmail the Organization, forcing it to introduce certain reforms in exchange for promises of future payments.

The situation could not be more absurd: a single country applies disproportionate pressure on the UN by illegally suspending its payments, and the Organization responds by apologizing. A radical response to such blackmail would be the immediate firing of all US nationals working in the Secretariat in order to cut part of the budget's deficit caused by that government. Another, less radical but equally effective, response would be for a group of countries to set up a kind of "United Nations Solidarity Fund" with voluntary contributions that would ensure that the Secretary-General could count on the entire regular budget approved by the Organization, thus freeing him from the role of beggar to which he has been reduced.

It has been stressed repeatedly how absurd it is that the UN's daily operation should depend on the will or whim of a small group of nations. The UN is today being held hostage by the United States as it was some thirty years ago by the Soviet Union and its allies. It is thus necessary to modify the present scale of assessments to prevent one country or a small group of countries from obstructing the Organization's activities. This is an area that requires action. Several dozen countries could increase considerably their quotas. It does not fail to be ironic that those which attack the Organization the most are precisely those with the highest quotas.

Committed international civil servants and diplomats

The United Nations will not be able to advance the causes for which it was created if the Organization lacks funds, nor will there be significant progress

without a truly international and internationalist Secretariat or with delegates little committed to those causes. It is true that the important decisions are ultimately taken by governments, but the persons that represent them also influence how they are made.

In its early years the Organization recruited many individuals that had been part of the League of Nations. For them, the UN signified a second chance to undo the mistakes of exaggerated nationalisms and to set international solidarity on a new course. Imbued with wholesome idealism, they assumed an active role in the promotion of the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter.

With time, however, the enthusiasm of international civil servants has waned. The virulence of the Cold War also had a negative impact on the Organization, including its Secretariat. Initial activism gave way to disheartening passivity. This, together with the bureaucratic fiefs that invariably emerge in all government and inter-governmental institutions, produced an increasingly apathetic body of functionaries whose basic professional aim seems to be to hold on to their jobs while ensuring themselves greater benefits. Rarely do they express an opinion or demonstrate a willingness to take an initiative for fear of drawing attention to themselves. Thus the Secretariat in New York (and elsewhere) is often described as a colorless, odorless and mute body.

With time there have also been changes in the attitude of delegations and the permanent missions. New York still ranks among the top of the list of diplomatic priorities of almost all countries; statesmen and leaders from all over the world continue to make periodic appearances in the General Assembly Hall. There they address the great (and even small) challenges facing the international community. The gap has been widening, however, between the speeches in the General Assembly and its practical results. That has produced discouragement among the delegates who, in turn, have developed defensive attitudes that range from outright cynicism to brazen frivolity.

Delegates to the General Assembly seem to perform their tasks in a rather mechanical manner, devoting much of their time to peripheral questions and thus avoiding as much as they can taking a position on the substance of the questions they are supposedly there to discuss. Hours are wasted in Byzantine procedural debates and energies squandered in the drafting of documents—declarations, resolutions, action plans—which are repetitive and verbose and which, at the end of the day, only serve “to get it over with”, thus confirming the French adage which says that “La parole a été donnée à l’homme pour cacher sa pensée”.

Multilateral pantomime

The General Assembly's agenda in the nineties contains some 150 substantive items. As usual, the Assembly has three months to go through it. However, if one subtracts the almost four weeks devoted to the general debate and organizational meetings, that period is reduced to about sixty days which, setting aside week ends and holidays, leaves only some forty working days. In other words, the Assembly theoretically examines and takes action on an average of almost four items each day. That figure could be interpreted as a clear indication of a high degree of efficiency, but that is not the case.

Although the Assembly adopts each year a high number of resolutions (over 300 in 1996), the truth is that many of them are almost identical texts to the previous year's resolutions; others are procedural, while only a dozen are the result of prolonged consultations among delegations. Before adopting its resolutions, the General Assembly holds a series of debates on the different items. Those debates take place in one of its now six main committees or directly in Plenary.

Besides those main committees and the Plenary, there are countless parallel meetings and discussions during the General Assembly: regional groups, the Group of 77, the Non-Aligned Movement, the European Union, ASEAN, working or drafting groups or friends of the chair of the main committees themselves, *ad hoc* groups, etc. Delegations must therefore cover simultaneously a variety of meetings. Most countries, even those that reinforce their permanent missions during the Assembly, simply cannot cope with all of them. For their part, the larger delegations, which are in a position to send representatives to all such meetings, frequently suffer from too much compartmentalization which is often at odds with the adequate co-ordination of their work.

Towards effective action

The proliferation of resolutions and subsidiary organs within the General Assembly of the United Nations has proven detrimental to the Organization's own effectiveness. It is a vicious circle: the lack of tangible results in the solution of the most pressing international problems gives rise to frustration among UN Members and this, in turn, is translated into the multiplication of repetitive debates and resolutions. All of this merely serves to magnify the Assembly's impotence. It is therefore useless and even counterproductive to go on debating the same items in the same way and adopting, year in and year out, the same resolutions with the same appeals, appeals that rarely go beyond the paper they are printed on.

The first thing to do is to reduce drastically those subsidiary bodies that have long ceased to register any meaningful results and whose meetings are routine and pro forma. In the second place, a good number of the items presently on the General Assembly's agenda should be eliminated. Some have remained on the agenda because of bureaucratic inertia; others for some outdated political purpose. What is the point of continuing to adopt resolutions condemning, for example, an illegal and isolated act committed by some country? Condemning it once should suffice. Very different were those situations that persisted for decades and therefore had to be the object of repeated condemnations, such as South Africa's occupation of Namibia until 1990 or its régime of *apartheid* until 1993. A third goal would be to take greater care in the drafting and content of resolutions. What is to be gained by reviewing in detail every year the same antecedents of a given situation? Moreover, the defiant and at times presumptuous tone of some resolutions undermines the importance and seriousness of the matter in question.

At the same time, the system envisaged in the Charter for decision taking in the General Assembly must be vigorously defended. To deviate from the present rules of procedure by modifying the principle of "one Nation, one vote" would render impossible the adoption of many resolutions. To accept the "consensus rule" in the Assembly would undermine its reason for being.

In the late nineties the United Nations has come full circle. In many ways the nineties are a repetition of the forties when the strongest voice in the Organization was that of the United States. But the situation is now different in that there is no visible challenger on the horizon as there was in the forties with the Soviet Union. The US is thus in a position to set the course for the UN for the coming decades. Unfortunately, its initial enthusiasm for the UN soon faded and was replaced with decades of suspicion and neglect.

In recent years the United States has changed its rhetoric regarding the UN. But it still seems unwilling to offer any guidance, political or moral, to an Organization that is in a state of flux. The much-proclaimed new international order has yet to take shape and no one is prepared to approach the UN in a selfless and principled manner.

As a center for harmonizing the actions of nations, the United Nations' record over the past fifty years has been mixed. In some areas it has managed to set a number of agreed guidelines that have influenced the conduct of many countries, especially in the developing world. Decolonization, human rights and disarmament fall into this category. But in the field of international co-operation for economic development the results are very modest.

The question is how to go about establishing a truly universal organization that responds to the needs of the peoples of the world. And that is the question that the UN's present Secretary-General and the vast majority of Member States are trying to answer. The Nation-States that promoted the

UN in the forties moved us closer to that goal, but the UN has been limited and even hampered Nations-States themselves. And many of the UN's shortcomings, past and present, can be traced to the Nation-State.

After a promising beginning it became one of the first casualties of Cold-War confrontation and countries soon looked elsewhere for a solution to their problems. Now, once again, the Organization wants to tackle the major issues of our time and resolve the conflicts within and among States. But the UN continues to appear helpless and even impotent. Witness the failure of the Earth Summit in June 1997 or the situation in the former Yugoslavia. The UN is adrift and its role in the world cannot be reduced to one of lending its name to another's actions as occurred in Korea in the early fifties and as is happening now in Bosnia-Herzegovina with the so-called "NATO led UN force".

The UN thus continues to be a victim of a fundamental paradox: it is made up of Nation-States that refuse to allow their Organization to act above or independently of them. Countries are demanding more from the UN and, at the same time, are preventing it from acting decisively. Ironically, many governments are precluding the UN from being more responsive to the demands of the people that they are supposedly representing. The UN should certainly be more responsive and accountable. But responsive and accountable to whom? Nation-States, their governments, parliaments or congresses, or their citizens?

Much has changed at the United Nations in the nineties, but much remains the same.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX I. LIST OF UN MEMBER STATES

The first column lists current UN **MEMBER STATES**, those that have ceased to be members and those that have yet to join. The second column identifies with an asterisk (*) the 51 original Members and gives the date of admission for the rest. The third column gives the year of a nation's independence if it occurred after 1945 and its former colonial or administering Power: Australia (Au), Belgium (Be), France (Fr), Italy (It), Netherlands (Ne), New Zealand (NZ), Portugal (Po), South Africa (SA), Spain (Sp), United Kingdom (UK) and United States (US). Also given are the nations from which 23 Members have separated: Czechoslovakia (**Cze**), Ethiopia (**Et**), India (**In**), Malaysia (**Ma**), Pakistan (**Pk**), Soviet Union (**USSR**) and Yugoslavia (**Yu**).

Afghanistan	1946		Bulgaria	1955	
Albania	1955		Burkina Faso ⁴	1960	1960 (Fr)
Algeria	1962	1962 (Fr)	Burundi	1962	1962 (Be)
Andorra	1993		Cambodia	1955	1953 (Fr)
Angola	1976	1975 (Po)	Cameroon	1960	1960 (Fr/UK)
Antigua & Barbuda	1981	1981 (UK)	Canada	*	
Argentina	*		Cape Verde	1975	1975 (Po)
Armenia	1992	1991 (USSR)	Central African Rep.	1960	1960 (Fr)
Australia	*		Chad	1960	1960 (Fr)
Austria	1955		Chile	*	
Azerbaijan	1992	1991 (USSR)	China ⁵	*	
Bahamas	1973	1973 (UK)	Colombia	*	
Bahrain	1971	1971 (UK)	Comoros	1975	1975 (Fr)
Bangladesh ¹	1974	1971 (Pk)	Congo	1960	1960 (Fr)
Barbados	1966	1966 (UK)	Costa Rica	*	
Belarus ²	*	1991 (USSR)	Côte d'Ivoire ⁶	1960	1960 (Fr)
Belgium	*		Croatia	1992	1991 (Yu)
Belize	1981	1981 (UK)	Cuba	*	
Benin ³	1960	1960 (Fr)	Cyprus	1960	1960 (UK)
Bhutan	1971	1949 (UK)	Czechoslovakia ⁷	*	
Bolivia	*		Czech Republic ⁷	1993	1993 (Cze)
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1992	1992 (Yu)	DPR of Korea	1991	
Botswana	1966	1966 (UK)	DR of the Congo ⁸	1960	1960 (Be)
Brazil	*		Democratic Yemen ⁹	1967	1967 (UK)
Brunei Darussalam	1984	1984 (UK)	Denmark	*	

Appendix I—Continued

Djibouti	1977	1977 (Fr)	Israel	1949	1948 (UK)
Dominica	1978	1978 (UK)	Italy	1955	
Dominican Republic	*		Jamaica	1962	1962 (UK)
Ecuador	*		Japan	1956	
Egypt ¹⁰	*		Jordan	1955	1946 (UK)
El Salvador	*		Kazakhstan	1992	1991 (USSR)
Equatorial Guinea	1968	1968 (Sp)	Kenya	1963	1963 (UK)
Eritrea	1993	1993 (Et)	Kiribati		1979 (UK)
Estonia	1991	1991 (USSR)	Kuwait	1963	1961 (UK)
Ethiopia	*		Kyrgyzstan	1992	1991 (USSR)
Fiji	1970	1970 (UK)	Lao PDR	1955	1949 (Fr)
Finland	1955		Latvia	1991	1991 (USSR)
France	*		Lebanon	*	
Gabon	1960	1960 (Fr)	Lesotho	1966	1966 (UK)
Gambia	1965	1965 (UK)	Liberia	*	
Georgia	1992	1991 (USSR)	Libyan Arab Jama.	1955	1951 (Fr/UK)
German Dem. Rep. ¹¹	1973		Liechtenstein	1990	
Germany ¹¹	1973		Lithuania	1991	1991 (USSR)
Ghana	1957	1957 (UK)	Luxembourg	*	
Greece	*		Madagascar	1960	1960 (Fr)
Grenada	1974	1974 (UK)	Malawi	1964	1964 (UK)
Guatemala	*		Malaysia ¹⁴	1957	1957 (UK)
Guinea	1958	1958 (Fr)	Maldives	1965	1965 (UK)
Guinea-Bissau	1974	1974 (Po)	Mali	1960	1960 (Fr)
Guyana	1966	1966 (UK)	Malta	1964	1964 (UK)
Haiti	*		Marshall Islands	1991	1991 (US)
Holy See			Mauritania	1961	1960 (Fr)
Honduras	*		Mauritius	1968	1968 (UK)
Hungary	1955		Mexico	*	
Iceland	1946		Micronesia, FS of	1991	1991 (US)
India ¹²	*	1947 (UK)	Moldova	1992	1991 (USSR)
Indonesia ¹³	1950	1949 (Ne)	Monaco	1993	
Iran (Islamic Rep.)	*		Mongolia	1961	
Iraq	*		Morocco	1956	1956 (Fr)
Ireland	1955		Mozambique	1975	1975 (Po)

Appendix I—Continued

Myanmar ¹⁵	1948	1948 (UK)	Sierra Leone	1961	1961 (UK)
Namibia	1990	1990 (SA)	Singapore ¹⁴	1965	1965 (Ma)
Nauru		1968 (Au)	Slovakia ⁷	1993	1993 (Cze)
Nepal	1955		Slovenia	1992	1991 (Yu)
Netherlands	*		Solomon Islands	1978	1978 (UK)
New Zealand	*		Somalia	1960	1960 (It/UK)
Nicaragua	*		South Africa ¹⁷	*	
Niger	1960	1960 (Fr)	Spain	1955	
Nigeria	1960	1960 (UK)	Sri Lanka ¹⁸	1955	1948 (UK)
Norway	*		Sudan	1956	1956 (UK)
Oman	1971	1970 (UK)	Suriname	1975	1975 (Ne)
Pakistan ¹⁶	1947	1947 (In)	Swaziland	1968	1968 (UK)
Palau	1994	1994 (US)	Sweden	1946	
Panama	*		Switzerland		
Papua New Guinea	1975	1975 (Au)	Syria ¹⁰	*	
Paraguay	*		Tajikistan	1992	1991 (USSR)
Peru	*		Tanganyika	1961	1961 (UK)
Philippines	*		Thailand	1946	
Poland	*		Togo	1960	1960 (Fr)
Portugal	1955		Tonga		1970 (UK)
Qatar	1971	1971 (UK)	Trinidad & Tobago	1962	1962 (UK)
Republic of Korea	1991		Tunisia	1956	1956 (Fr)
Romania	1955		Turkey	*	
Russian Federation	*	1991 (USSR)	Turkmenistan	1992	1991 (USSR)
Rwanda	1962	1962 (Be)	Tuvalu		1978 (UK)
Saharawi Arab DR		1976 (Sp)	Uganda	1962	1962 (UK)
Saint Kitts-Nevis	1983	1983 (UK)	Ukraine ¹⁹	*	1991 (USSR)
Saint Lucia	1979	1979 (UK)	USSR	*	
St. Vincent/ Grena.	1980	1979 (UK)	UA Emirates	1971	1971 (UK)
Samoa	1976	1962 (NZ)	United Kingdom	*	
San Marino	1992		UR of Tanzania ²⁰	1961	1961 (UK)
Sao Tome & Principe	1975	1975 (Po)	United States	*	
Saudi Arabia	*		Uruguay	*	
Senegal	1960	1960 (Fr)	Uzbekistan	1992	1991 (USSR)
Seychelles	1976	1976 (UK)	Vanuatu	1981	1980 (Fr/UK)

Appendix I—Concluded

Venezuela	*
Viet Nam	1977 1954 (Fr)
Yemen ⁹	1947
Yugoslavia ²¹	*
Zambia	1964 1964 (UK)
Zanzibar ²⁰	1963 1963 (UK)
Zimbabwe	1980 1980 (UK)

¹ Separated from Pakistan in 1971.

² Formerly Byelorussia, a non-independent State that entered the UN in 1945 as an original Member as a result of the agreements among Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin. It became independent in 1991.

³ Formerly Dahomey.

⁴ Formerly Upper Volta.

⁵ In 1971 the People's Republic of China occupied the seat of the representatives of the Republic of China (Taiwan).

⁶ Côte d'Ivoire has decided to retain the French spelling of its name in all of the UN's working languages.

⁷ Czechoslovakia was an original Member. In 1990 it changed its name to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. It dissolved in 1993 and the Czech Republic and Slovakia were admitted separately.

⁸ Since 1997. Formerly Congo-Kinshasa and later Zaire.

⁹ On 22 June 1990 the Arab Republic of Yemen (which entered the UN in 1947) and Democratic Yemen (in 1967) united into a single State, the Republic of Yemen.

¹⁰ In 1958 Syria withdrew from the UN when it merged with Egypt into the UAR. In 1961 it resumed its separate participation.

¹¹ With the reunification of Germany on 3 October 1990, the GDR was absorbed by the Federal Republic of Germany, which changed its name to Germany.

¹² Following an arrangement of the League of Nations, India entered the UN *before* it was independent. For the purpose of this study, however, it is considered as an independent country already in 1945.

¹³ Withdrew from the UN in 1965 and renewed its participation in 1966.

¹⁴ The Federation of Malaya entered the UN in 1957 and changed its name to Malaysia in 1963 when it formed a new federation that included the former Federation of Malaya, as well as Singapore, Sabah (formerly North Borneo) and Sarawak. In 1965 Singapore became independent and entered the UN.

¹⁵ Formerly Burma.

¹⁶ With the partition of India in 1947, Pakistan entered the UN as an independent State.

¹⁷ Suspended by the General Assembly from 1974 to 1994.

¹⁸ Formerly Ceylon.

¹⁹ A non-independent State that entered the UN in 1945 as an original Member as a result of the agreements among Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin. It became independent in 1991.

²⁰ Tanganyika joined the UN in 1961 and Zanzibar in 1963. Upon uniting in 1964, those two States became the UR of Tanzania.

²¹ In September 1992 the General Assembly decided that Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) could not participate in its work.

APPENDIX II. NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES ENU- MERATED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

This is a list of territories which the General Assembly identified as “non-self-governing.” The administering States of those territories that were Members of the United Nations had to transmit information regarding them to the UN Secretary-General in accordance with the Charter’s Article 73, paragraph e). The first list, drawn up in 1946, included the non-self-governing territories administered by Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States. From 1960 the list also included the territories of Portugal and Spain, as well as the special case of Southern Rhodesia. The name of the territory is given, together with the year of its independence or other change in its legal status, and its present name.

A. In 1946		
AUSTRALIA		
1. Cocos (Keeling) Islands	1984	Part of Australia
2. Papua	1975	Papua New Guinea
BELGIUM		
3. Belgian Congo	1960	Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly the Congo Republic and Zaire)
DENMARK		
4. Greenland	1953	Autonomous province of Denmark
FRANCE		
<u>French Equatorial Africa</u>		
5. Chad	1960	Chad
6. Gabon	1960	Gabon
7. Middle Congo	1960	Congo
8. Ubangi Shari	1960	Central African Republic
<u>French West Africa</u>		
9. Dahomey	1960	Benin
10. French Guinea	1958	Guinea
11. French Sudan	1960	Mali
12. Ivory Coast	1960	Côte d’Ivoire
13. Mauritania	1960	Mauritania
14. Niger Colony	1960	Niger
15. Senegal	1960	Senegal
16. Upper Volta	1960	Burkina Faso
17. Guadeloupe and dependencies	1946	French overseas Department
<u>Indo-China</u>		
18. Cambodia	1953	Cambodia
19. Laos	1949	Laos
20. Viet Nam	1954	Viet Nam

Appendix II—Continued

A. In 1946 (continued)		
<u>Madagascar and dependencies</u>		
21. Madagascar	1960	Madagascar
22. Comoros Archipelago	1975	Comoros
23. Martinique	1946	French overseas Department
24. Morocco	1956	Morocco
25. New Caledonia and dependencies	1946	French overseas Department
26. New Hebrides under Anglo-French Condominium	1980	Vanuatu
27. Réunion	1946	French overseas Department
28. St. Pierre and Miquelon	1946	French overseas Department
29. Tunisia	1956	Tunisia
NETHERLANDS		
30. Netherlands Antilles	1954	Autonomy under new constitution
31. Netherlands Indies	1949	Indonesia
32. Netherlands New Guinea	1963	Incorporated into Indonesia
33. Surinam	1975	Suriname
NEW ZEALAND		
34. Cook Islands	1965	Autonomy in free association with NZ
35. Niue Island	1974	
36. Tokelau Islands		
UNITED KINGDOM		
37. Aden Colony and Protectorate	1967	Democratic Yemen
38. Bahamas	1973	Bahamas
39. Barbados	1966	Barbados
40. Basutoland	1966	Lesotho
41. Bechaunaland	1966	Botswana
42. Bermuda		
43. British Guiana	1966	Guyana
44. British Honduras	1981	Belize
45. British Somaliland	1960	Somalia (includes Italian Somalia)
46. Brunei	1984	Brunei Darussalam
47. Cayman Islands		
48. Cyprus	1960	Cyprus
49. Falkland Islands		
50. Fiji	1970	Fiji
51. Gambia	1965	Gambia
52. Gibraltar		
53. Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony	1979	Kiribati
	1978	Tuvalu
54. Gold Coast Colony and Protectorate	1957	Ghana
55. Hong Kong		In 1997 it reverted to China.
56. Jamaica	1962	Jamaica
57. Kenya	1963	Kenya

Appendix II—Continued

A. In 1946 (concluded)		
<u>Leeward Islands</u>		
58. Antigua	1981	Antigua and Barbuda
59. British Virgin Islands		
60. Montserrat		
61. St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla	1983	Saint Kitts-Nevis, Anguilla
62. Malayan Union	1957	Malaysia (1963 union of Malayan Federation, Sabah and Sarawak)
63. Malta	1964	Malta
64. Mauritius	1968	Mauritius
65. Nigeria	1960	Nigeria
66. North Borneo (Sabah)	1963	Union with Malaysia
67. Northern Rhodesia	1964	Zambia
68. Nyasaland	1964	Malawi
69. Pitcairn Islands		
70. St. Helena and dependencies		
71. Sarawak	1963	Union with Malaysia
72. Seychelles	1976	Seychelles
73. Sierra Leone	1961	Sierra Leone
74. Singapore	1965	Singapore (separation from Malaysia)
75. Solomon Islands Protectorate	1978	Solomon Islands
76. Swaziland	1968	Swaziland
77. Trinidad and Tobago	1962	Trinidad and Tobago
78. Turks and Caicos Islands		
79. Uganda	1962	Uganda
<u>Windward Islands</u>		
80. Dominica	1978	Dominica
81. Grenada	1974	Grenada
82. St. Lucia	1979	Saint Lucia
83. St. Vincent	1979	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
84. Zanzibar	1963	United Republic of Tanzania (union with Tanganyika in 1964)
UNITED STATES		
85. Alaska	1959	State of the USA
86. American Samoa		
87. Guam		
88. Hawaii	1959	State of the USA
89. Panama Canal Zone		In 2000 will revert to Panama.
90. Puerto Rico	1952	Associate State of the USA
91. Virgin Islands of the USA		
B. Since 1960		
PORTUGAL (1960)		
92. Angola including the enclave of Cabinda	1976	Angola
93. Cape Verde Archipelago	1975	Cape Verde
94. Goa and dependencies	1961	Union with India

Appendix II—Concluded

B. Since 1960 (concluded)		
95. Portuguese Guinea	1974	Guinea-Bissau
96. Macau and dependencies		In 1999 will revert to China.
97. Mozambique	1975	Mozambique
98. Sao Joao Batista de Ajuda	1961	Union with Benin
99. Sao Tome and Principe	1975	Sao Tome and Principe
100. Timor and dependencies	1975–76	East Timor (incorporated into Indonesia)
SPAIN (1960)		
101. Fernando Póo	1968	Equatorial Guinea (union with Rio Muni)
102. Ifni	1969	Ceded to Morocco
103. Rio Muni	1968	Equatorial Guinea (Union with Fernando Póo)
104. Spanish Sahara	1976	Saharaui Arab Democratic Republic
UNITED KINGDOM (1962)		
105. Southern Rhodesia	1980	Zimbabwe

APPENDIX III. TOTAL GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS BY SESSION: REGULAR, SPECIAL (S) AND EMERGENCY (E)

This is a list of the total number of resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at each one of its regular, special (S) and emergency (E) sessions (through September 1997). The number and year (or years) of the session are indicated, as are the number of resolutions approved without a vote, those put to a vote and, if the vote was recorded, those that were adopted without negative votes, and the total number of resolutions approved “without objection” (the sum of those not put to a vote and those that were put to a vote but received no negative votes).

<i>Session</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Without a vote</i>	<i>By a vote</i>	<i>Recorded vote</i>	<i>With no negative votes</i>	<i>Without objection</i>
1	1946	119	81	38	25	12	93
1 S	1947	4	1	3	2	0	1
2	1947	93	53	40	12	14	67
2 S	1948	5	1	4	1	3	4
3	1948–1949	129	52	77	20	27	79
4	1949	108	23	85	9	29	52
5	1950–1951	136	30	106	21	45	75
6	1951–1952	122	19	103	13	52	71
7	1952–1953	123	28	95	18	31	59
8	1953	106	29	77	10	36	65
9	1954	109	26	83	12	39	65
10	1955	111	36	75	22	42	78
1 E	1956	8	0	8	6	5	5
2 E	1956	5	0	5	4	1	1
11	1956–1957	131	32	99	23	57	89
12	1957	108	40	68	17	36	76
3 E	1958	2	0	2	0	1	1
13	1958	125	53	72	16	38	91
14	1959	128	43	85	16	57	100
4 E	1960	2	0	2	1	1	1
15	1960–1961	148	67	81	31	52	119
3 S	1961	2	1	1	1	1	2
16	1961–1962	133	71	62	27	34	105
17	1962	133	69	64	13	38	107

Appendix III—Continued

<i>Session</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Without a vote</i>	<i>By a vote</i>	<i>Recorded vote</i>	<i>With no negative votes</i>	<i>Without objection</i>
4 S	1963	9	1	8	3	1	2
18	1963	124	70	54	20	22	92
19	1964	14	14	0	0	0	14
20	1965	143	66	77	28	39	105
21	1966	141	65	76	29	38	103
5 S	1967	4	1	3	1	1	2
5 E	1967	6	0	6	4	5	5
22	1967–1968	133	57	76	24	40	97
23	1968	142	72	70	25	30	102
24	1969	158	69	89	33	41	110
25	1970	161	58	103	39	50	108
26	1971	180	53	127	80	50	103
27	1972	180	59	121	82	66	125
28	1973	178	71	107	74	51	122
6 S	1974	3	2	1	1	0	2
29	1974	187	97	90	55	46	143
7 S	1975	2	2	0	0	0	2
30	1975	217	116	101	71	49	165
31	1976	253	155	98	90	37	192
32	1977	264	158	106	95	54	212
8 S	1978	2	1	1	1	0	1
9 S	1978	2	1	1	1	1	2
10 S	1978	2	2	0	0	0	2
33	1978–1979	283	154	129	128	61	215
34	1979–1980	305	182	123	121	42	223
6 E	1980	2	1	1	1	0	1
7 E	1980	3	1	2	2	0	1
11 S	1980	4	4	0	0	0	0
35	1980–1981	321	187	134	116	45	238
8 E	1981	3	1	2	2	1	2
36	1981–1982	338	193	145	133	45	238
9 E	1982	2	1	1	1	0	1

Appendix III—Concluded

<i>Session</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Without a vote</i>	<i>By a vote</i>	<i>Recorded vote</i>	<i>With no negative votes</i>	<i>Without objection</i>
7 E ^a	1982	4	0	4	4	0	0
12 S	1982	1	1	0	0	0	1
37	1982–1983	348	188	160	157	39	227
38	1983–1984	332	184	148	148	32	216
39	1984–1985	343	194	149	147	36	230
40	1985–1986	356	199	157	156	37	236
13 S	1986	2	2	0	0	0	2
14 S	1986	1	0	1	1	1	1
41	1986–1987	320	165	155	155	39	204
42	1987–1988	322	176	146	146	37	213
15 S	1988	2	2	0	0	0	2
43	1988–1989	326	190	136	136	34	224
16 S	1989	1	1	0	0	0	1
44	1989–1990	336	220	116	116	31	251
17 S	1990	1	1	0	0	0	1
18 S	1990	3	3	0	0	0	3
45	1990	342	256	86	86	19	275
46	1991–1992	315	240	75	75	15	255
47	1992–1993	303	228	75	75	17	245
48	1993–1994	333	268	65	65	17	285
49	1994–1995	328	260	68	68	20	280
50	1995–1996	325	256	69	69	17	272
51	1996–1997	310	234	76	76	21	255
10 E	1997	3	1	2	2	0	1
19 S	1997	2	2	0	0	0	2
Total		10,815	5,940	4,875	3,262	1,878	7,818

^a Continuation of 1980 session.

APPENDIX IV. LIST OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY A RECORDED VOTE

The following is a list of United Nations General Assembly resolutions adopted since 1946 (and through September 1997) by a recorded vote. Those 3,262 votes were used to determine the Coincidence Index of Member States. Each session (regular, special or emergency) is listed separately and the five-year totals are given in parenthesis. From 1946 to 1975 resolution were numbered consecutively.

1946–1950 (90)

- I: 4, 9, 10, 17 (A and B), 32, 39, 40, 44, 49 (B and C), 62, 63 (1 to 8), 65, 67, 83 and 100 (A and B);
S I: 104 and 106;
II: 109, 113 (C to H), 114, 141, 180, 181 (A) and 184;
S II: 186;
III: 194 (A), 195, 197 (I), 200, 217 (A), 218 to 221, 247, 250, 252 (A), 255, 260 (A), 263, 265, 272, 273, 277 (C), and 285;
IV: 289 (A), 294, 303, 313, 317, 323, 325, 334 and 337;
V: 377, 383 (A), 384, 386, 390 (A), 395, 432 to 436, 440, 446, 447, 449 (A and B) and 496 to 500;

1951–1955 (75)

- VI: 503 (A and B), 505, 507, 510, 511, 520 (A), 532 (A and B), 550, 558 and 570 (A and B);
VII: 609 (A), 610, 612, 615, 616 (A and B), 620 (A and B), 623, 624, 626, 637 (A), 640, 648, 652, 656, 697 and 706;
VIII: 719, 721, 729, 731, 740, 748, 749 (A and B), 785 (A) and 804;
IX: 811, 812, 815, 820, 844, 849, 854, 878, 895, 903, 904 and 906;
X: 918, 945, 946, 957, 990, 992 and 995 (I to XVI);

1956–1960 (114)

- E I: 997 to 1002;
E II: 1004 to 1007;
XI: 1038, 1040, 1044, 1046, 1064, 1108, 1110 to 1113, 1118, 1120, 1122, 1123 to 1125 and 1127 to 1133;
XII: 1134, 1135, 1143, 1148 to 1151, 1155, 1178 to 1182, 1192, 1211, 1226 and 1236;
XIII: 1239, 1248, 1252 (A), 1263, 1264, 1300, 1302, 1307, 1312, 1317, 1318, 1324, 1337 and 1348 to 1350;
XIV: 1351, 1353, 1375, 1379, 1380, 1396, 1402 (B), 1404, 1410, 1424, 1426, 1441, 1454, 1455, 1460 and 1467;
E IV: 1474;
XV: 1493, 1495, 1498, 1514, 1536, 1541, 1542, 1565, 1568, 1573, 1576, 1577 to 1580, 1590, 1593, 1596, 1598 to 1605, 1607, 1608, 1616, 1619 and 1620;

1961–1965 (92)

- S III: 1622;
XVI: 1627, 1631, 1632, 1648 to 1650, 1652 to 1654, 1663, 1668, 1669, 1700, 1719, 1723 to 1725, 1731 to 1733, 1739 to 1742 and 1745 to 1747;
-

Appendix IV—Continued

1961–1965 (continued)

- XVII: 1752, 1755, 1760, 1761, 1762 (B), 1764, 1784, 1803, 1807, 1810, 1819, 1854 (A) and 1857;
 S IV: 1875 to 1877;
 XVIII: 1881, 1883, 1885, 1889, 1909, 1911, 1913, 1948, 1956, 1957, 1964, 1967, 1978 (B), 1979, 1983, 1990, 1991 (A and B) and 1992;
 XX: 2022 to 2025, 2028, 2030 to 2033, 2052, 2054 (A), 2064, 2065, 2070 to 2073, 2077, 2079, 2105, 2106 (A), 2107, 2111, 2112, 2113 (B), 2115, 2131 and 2132;

1966–1970 (155)

- XXI: 2138, 2145, 2153 (B), 2159, 2160, 2181, 2184, 2189, 2194 (A and B), 2200 (A), 2200 (A.1), 2200 (A.2), 2200 (A.3), 2200 (B), 2200 (C), 2202 (A and B), 2220, 2224, 2226 to 2232, 2238 and 2241 (B);
 S V: 2248;
 E V: 2252, 2253, 2254 and 2256;
 XXII: 2262, 2269 to 2271, 2286, 2288, 2289, 2298, 2311, 2321, 2324, 2325, 2327, 2328, 2339, 2346 (B), 2348, 2350, 2353, 2356, 2357, 2359 (B), 2372 and 2373;
 XXIII: 2383, 2389, 2391, 2395, 2403, 2422, 2424 to 2431, 2443, 2456 (A, B, C and D), 2466, 2467 (A and C), 2474 (A), 2479 and 2480 (B);
 XXIV: 2498, 2499 (B), 2500, 2504, 2505, 2507, 2508, 2511, 2516, 2517, 2521, 2535 (B and C), 2546, 2554, 2555, 2558, 2559, 2574 (D), 2578, 2587, 2588 (A and B) 2590 to 2593, 2595, 2602 (E), 2603 (A), 2605 (A and B) and 2617;
 XXV: 2621, 2624, 2628, 2642, 2647, 2652, 2660, 2661 (A and C), 2666, 2668, 2669, 2671 (C and F), 2672 (C and D), 2673, 2674, 2676, 2678, 2679, 2697, 2698, 2700 to 2704, 2706 to 2711, 2714, 2725 to 2727 and 2750 (C);

1971–1975 (363)

- XXVI: 2752 to 2754, 2758, 2764, 2765, 2769 to 2771, 2774, 2775 (A to H), 2777, 2784 to 2787, 2792 (C to E), 2793 to 2796, 2799, 2800, 2813, 2816, 2825 (B and C), 2826, 2827 (A and B), 2828 (A to C), 2832, 2841, 2847, 2849 to 2851, 2857 2858, 2862, 2865, 2867 to 2869, 2871 to 2875, 2877 to 2881, 2889, 2890 (A and B), 2891 to 2897, 2899 (A to C), 2900 and 2901;
 XXVII: 2908, 2916, 2918, 2923 (A to F), 2926, 2930, 2931, 2932 (A and B), 2933, 2934 (A to C), 2935, 2936, 2945, 2946, 2948, 2949, 2955, 2959, 2961 (A to D), 2963 (C to E), 2978 to 2981, 2983 to 2987, 2991 to 2993, 2996, 3005, 3009, 3011 to 3014, 3016 to 3019, 3022, 3027, 3028, 3029 (B and C), 3030 to 3032, 3034 to 3041, 3043, 3044 (A to C), 3045, 3046, 3048 and 3049 (A to C);
 XXVIII: 3055, 3061, 3063, 3074, 3076, 3077, 3078 (A and B), 3079 to 3081, 3083, 3089 (C and D), 3092 (A and B), 3093 (A and B), 3101 to 3103, 3110 to 3119, 3122, 3129, 3130, 3136, 3148 to 3150, 3151 (A to G), 3154 (A to C), 3155 to 3165, 3167, 3169, 3171, 3172, 3175, 3184 (A to C), 3187, 3195 (A and C) and 3196 to 3199;
 S VI: 3200;
 XXIX: 3206, 3207, 3210, 3212, 3213, 3215, 3219, 3228, 3236 to 3238, 3240 (A to C), 3246, 3254, 3255 (A and B), 3257, 3258, 3259 (A), 3261 (C to E), 3262 to 3264, 3265 (A and B), 3273, 3281, 3283, 3289, 3290, 3292, 3293, 3295, 3297 to 3299, 3324 (B to E), 3327 to 3329, 3331 (A and D), 3332, 3333, 3336, 3349 and 3358 (A and B);
-

Appendix IV—Continued

1971–1975 (continued)

XXX: 3374 (B), 3375 to 3379, 3383, 3389, 3390 (A and B), 3395, 3397, 3398, 3411 (C, D, F and G), 3414, 3419 (B and C), 3420, 3421, 3424, 3429, 3432, 3433, 3448, 3450, 3451, 3458 (A and B), 3463, 3466 to 3468, 3471, 3472 (A and B), 3473, 3474, 3477 to 3482, 3484 (A to E), 3485, 3486, 3516, 3519 to 3521, 3525 (A to D), 3532, 3533, 3535, 3537 (A and B), 3538, 3539 (A and C), 3540 and 3541;

1976–1980 (555)

31: 4, 5 (B to D), 6 (A and D to K), 7, 9, 12, 14, 15 (D and E), 20, 21, 29, 30, 33, 34, 44, 49, 50, 53, 56, 58, 59, 61, 62, 66, 67, 70 to 78, 80, 84, 87 to 89, 91, 92, 95 (A), 106 (A to D), 110, 124, 128, 141 (A and B), 143, 144, 146 to 150, 152, 154 (B), 157, 158, 163, 174, 177, 178, 186, 189 (A, C and D), 195, 197, 204, 206, 207 (A to C) and 208 (I and III);

32: 4 (B and C), 5, 7, 9 (C to H), 12 to 15, 20, 27, 32 to 36, 39, 40 (A and B), 42, 76, 78 to 83, 84 (A and B), 85, 86, 87 (B, D, F and G), 90 (A, C and E), 91 (A to C), 105 (B to D and F to O), 113, 115, 116 (B), 118, 122, 124 to 126, 129, 130, 142, 147, 150, 152 to 154, 158, 161, 162, 171, 191, 193, 196 (B), 198, 200, 202 (A), 204, 205, 208, 210, 212 (I and IV), 213 (A and C), 214 and 215;

S 8: 2;

S 9: 2;

33: 9 (B), 13 (B to F), 14, 15, 17, 23, 24, 28 (A to C), 29, 31 (A and B), 36, 37, 38 (A and B), 39 to 41, 44, 45, 48, 50, 53, 57, 60, 63 to 65, 66 (A and B), 67, 68, 71 (A to C, H and J), 72 (A and B), 73 to 76, 85, 89, 91 (B to H), 96 to 100, 103, 106, 110, 112 (A, C, E and F), 113 (A to C), 114, 116 (A:I, IV and VI; B:VIII and IX; C:III, VI, VII and X), 118 to 120, 121 (A), 136 to 138, 143, 147, 150, 151, 155, 159, 163, 172, 174 to 176, 180 (A and C), 181, 182 (A to C), 183 (B to E and G to O), 184, 196, 199, 204, 205 (A to C) and 206;

34: 2 (A), 6 (A), 7 (A to D), 9 (B to E), 13, 22, 24, 27, 29, 30, 33, 37 to 42, 44, 46 to 48, 52 (A, C, E and F), 55, 65 (A to D), 69, 70, 73, 76 (A), 77 to 79, 80 (A and B), 83 (B, E, G and J), 84 to 86, 87 (C to E), 88, 89, 90 (A to C), 91, 92 (A to C, F and G), 93 (A, C to F, I, J, L, N and P to R), 94, 95, 100, 101, 103, 113, 133, 136, 145, 147, 150, 158, 160, 166, 172, 176, 179, 180, 184, 192, 197 to 199, 209, 211, 216, 219 (I), 220, 221, 222 (A and C), 223 (A and B), 227, 229, 230 (A and C), 231, 232 and 233 (I, IV, IX, XI and XIII);

E 6: 2;

E 7: 2 and 3;

35: 6, 8, 10 (B), 13 (A, B, E and F), 20, 26 to 29, 37, 39, 43, 44, 45 (A and B), 50, 57, 58, 60, 75, 113, 115 (A and B), 118 to 120, 122 (A to F), 123, 124, 130 (A and B), 136, 142 (B), 143, 144 (C), 145 (A and B), 146 (A and B), 148, 149, 152 (B to D, G, I and J), 154, 155, 156 (A, C, F, H and I), 157 to 159, 164, 166, 167, 169 (A to E), 174, 185, 188, 190, 192, 198, 200, 206 (A to J and M to Q), 207, 213, 214 (A), 217 (XV), 218, 220 (A and B), 222, 225, 226 (A and C) and 227 (A to J);

1981–1985 (748)

E 8: 1 (A) and 2;

36: 3, 5, 7, 8, 12, 13, 15, 18, 19, 21, 25, 27, 29, 31, 34, 39, 46, 49, 50 to 52, 56 (A), 66 (A and B), 68, 69, 73, 84, 86 (A and B), 87 (B), 88, 89, 92 (C to F and H to

Appendix IV—Continued

1981–1985 (continued)

- K), 94, 95, 96 (A to C), 97 (A, C, E, G, J and K), 98 to 100, 102 to 107, 112, 116 (A and B), 120 (A to F), 121 (A to F), 122, 133, 138 (C), 145, 146 (A to C and F to H), 147 (A to G), 149 (B), 150, 151, 155, 157, 171, 172 (A to I and K to O), 173, 175, 188, 225, 226 (A and B), 231 (A), 232, 234 (A and B), 235 (IV, VI, IX, XIII and XVII), 237, 240 (A and C), 241 and 242;
- E 9: 1;
- E 7: 6 to 9;
- 37: 1 to 3, 6, 7, 9, 11, 13, 18, 19, 28 to 32, 35 to 37, 38 (A and B), 39, 40, 43, 46, 47, 51, 65, 66, 68, 69 (A to H and J), 71 to 73, 74 (A and B), 76, 77 (A and B), 78 (A to C, E to G and I to K), 80 to 85, 86 (A to E), 88 (A to G), 92, 94 (B), 95 (B), 98 (A and C to E), 99 (A, D to G, I and J), 100 (A to C, E and H), 102 to 105, 114, 118, 120 (C to K), 122, 123 (A to F), 124 (A), 126, 127 (A and B), 130, 131, 134, 135, 137, 138, 140, 142, 144, 167, 183 to 185, 189 (A and B), 199, 200, 204, 207, 212, 215, 222, 230, 233 (A to E), 236 (B), 237 (II, XI and XII), 238, 243 (A and C), 244 and 250 to 252;
- 38: 3, 7, 9, 11 to 13, 17, 19, 25, 29, 34, 35 (A and B), 36 (A to E), 38 (A and B), 39 (A to G and I to K), 49 to 51, 54, 55, 58 (A to E), 59 (A), 61 to 63, 65, 67 to 70, 71 (A), 72, 73 (B and E to H), 74 to 76, 79 (A to H), 80, 81, 82 (B), 83 (A and D to K), 85, 100 to 102, 107, 108, 112, 113, 124, 128, 132, 133, 144, 145, 150, 154, 162, 166, 174, 177, 180 (A to E), 181 (A and B), 182, 183 (A to D), F to J, L to N and P), 184 (B), 187 (A and C), 188 (A, C and E to J), 190, 191, 196, 197, 202, 226 (A and B), 228 (A), 232, 233, 234 (XIII), 235, 236 (A and C) and 237 to 239;
- 39: 2, 5, 6, 9, 11, 13 to 15, 17, 19, 21, 40 to 43, 48, 49 (A to D), 50 (A to E), 51 to 53, 55, 57 to 60, 61 (A and B), 62, 63 (A, C, D, G, H and K), 64 (B), 65 (A, B and E), 70, 71, 72 (A to E and G), 73, 75, 76, 80, 81, 90 to 93, 95 (A to H), 98 (A and B), 99 (A and D to K), 101, 119 to 121, 127, 130, 133, 134, 137, 145, 146 (A to C), 147, 148 (A to H and J to P), 151 (A, B, D to F, H and I), 155, 157 to 159, 161 (B), 163, 167, 169, 177, 210, 211, 218, 221, 223, 224, 226, 229, 230, 232, 233, 236 (II, III, XI and XIV), 237 (A to C), 240 and 243;
- 40: 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 18, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 28, 50 to 53, 56 to 58, 59 (A and B), 62, 63, 64 (A to G and I), 67, 69, 70, 79, 80 (A and B), 81, 83, 85 to 88, 89 (A and B), 90, 91 (B), 92 (A and C), 93, 94 (A, F to I and K to N), 96 (A to D), 97 (A to F), 100, 111, 112, 114, 124, 137, 139 to 141, 145, 148, 150, 151 (A to F and H), 152 (A to E, G to J, M, N, P and Q), 156 (A to C), 158, 159, 161 (A to G), 164 (A and B), 165 (A and D to K), 167, 168 (A to C), 169, 170, 173, 182, 183, 185, 188, 191, 197, 200, 201, 207, 239 (A and B), 241 (B), 243 (I), 246 (A and B), 247, 248, 252 (IV), 253 (A to C), 254, 255 and 257 (A to C);

1986–1990 (640)

- S 14: 1;
- 41: 4, 6, 10 to 16, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35 (A to F and H), 38, 39 (A to E), 40, 41 (A and B), 42, 43 (A to D), 44 (A and B), 45, 46 (A and B), 47, 49, 51 to 54, 55 (A and B), 56, 58 (B and C), 59 (B, D, E, G to I and K to N), 60 (A to C, E, F, H and I), 63 (A to G), 68 (A, B and E), 69 (A and D to K), 71, 73, 75, 86 (A, B, D, F to K and M to P), 88 (A to C), 90 to 93, 95, 101 to 103, 113, 115, 117, 123, 128, 131, 132, 133, 141, 143, 146, 151, 155 to 159, 161, 162 (A to C), 164, 165, 179 (A and B), 180, 181, 184, 187, 195, 197, 199, 200, 209 (Sections III, V, VI, VIII

Appendix IV—Continued

1986–1990 (continued)

- and IX), 211 (A to C) and 212 (B);
- 42: 3, 5, 7, 14 (A to E), 15 to 20, 23 (A to G), 25, 26 (A and B), 27, 29, 31 to 33, 34 (A and B), 35, 38 (A, C and D, F, I to L and N), 39 (A to C and G to I), 42 (A to E, H and K to N), 44, 46 (A and B), 50, 52, 56, 66 (A to D), 69 (A and D to K), 70 (A and B), 71 to 75, 78, 79, 91 to 93, 95, 96, 99 to 102, 115, 119, 134 to 136, 139, 140, 145 to 147, 149 to 151, 153, 158, 159, 160 (A to G), 162 (A and B), 165, 166, 173, 174, 176, 184, 190, 198 to 205, 209 (A to D), 210 (B), 223, 224, 226 (A), 229 (A and B), 230 and 232;
- 43: 3, 11 to 14, 18, 19, 21 to 23, 25, 26 (A to E), 28 to 30, 33, 45 to 49, 50 (A to F, H, J and K), 54 (A to C), 57 (A and D to J), 58 (A to G), 60 (A and B), 62, 63 (A and B), 64, 66, 68 to 70, 71 (A and B), 72, 75 (A, G to L, N, O, Q, S and T), 76 (A to C and E), 77 (A and B), 78 (B to F, I, J and M), 80, 81 (B), 82, 83 (A and B), 86 to 89, 92, 97, 106, 107, 110, 113, 124 to 126, 137, 146, 156, 158, 160 (A and B), 162 to 164, 171 (A and B), 175 (A to C), 176 to 178, 182, 185, 187, 195, 197, 198, 209, 222 (B), 228 and 229;
- 44: 1, 2, 7, 9, 18, 22, 24, 26, 27 (A, C to I, K and L), 30 to 32, 40 (A to C), 41 (A to C), 42, 43, 47 (A, D to K), 48 (A to G), 50, 56, 63, 69, 79, 81, 83 to 85, 100 to 102, 104 to 107, 109 to 112, 113 (A and B), 114 (A and B), 116 (A, B, E, G, H, J, K, M, N, P, R and S), 117 (A, C, D and F), 118 (A and B), 119 (A, B and D to F), 120, 121, 123, 124 (A and B), 126, 128, 130, 147, 166 to 168, 170, 174, 181, 205, 214, 215, 217, 218, 232, 235 and 240;
- 45: 11, 16 to 18, 32 to 37, 39, 44, 45, 48 to 51, 53, 54, 55 (A and B), 56 (A and B), 58 (B, H, J to L and N to P), 59 (B and D), 60, 62 (C to E), 63, 67 (A to C), 68, 69, 73 (A and D to K), 74 (A to G), 77, 78 (A and B), 80, 82, 83 (A to C), 84, 87, 90, 96, 130, 132, 145, 150, 151, 164, 170, 176 (B to G), 183 and 188;

1991–1995 (352)

- 46: 9, 10, 16, 19, 24, 28, 29, 31 to 33, 34 (A), 36 (D, I, J and L), 37 (C, D and F), 38 (B and C), 39, 41 (A and B), 46 (A and D to K), 47 (A to G), 49, 52, 63 to 65, 71, 72, 74 (A to C), 75, 76, 78, 79 (B to E), 82 (A and B), 84, 86, 87, 89, 95, 117, 130, 134, 135, 137, 153, 162, 199, 201, 210 and 216;
- 47: 1, 8, 9, 12, 14 to 16, 19, 23, 24, 29, 43, 46, 47, 49 to 51, 52 (A, C and J), 53 (C, E and F), 54 (F), 55, 57, 59, 60 (A and B), 63 (A and B), 64 (A to E), 65, 69 (A and D to K), 70 (A to G), 74, 81, 82, 84, 89, 116 (D to G), 121, 130, 137 to 139, 142, 145, 146, 151, 170, 172, 198 and 229;
- 48: 14 to 16, 23, 28, 40 (A and D to J), 41 (A to D), 46, 47, 52, 53, 56, 58, 59 (A and B), 66 to 69, 72, 73, 74 (A), 75 (C and H to J), 76 (A and B), 78 to 80, 82, 83, 84 (A), 88, 89, 92, 94, 101, 123, 124, 131, 142, 144, 145, 147, 158 (A to D), 168, 182, 214 and 263;
- 49: 9, 10, 18, 26, 28, 33, 35 (A and C to G), 36 (A to D), 39 to 41, 43, 52, 58, 62 (A to D), 65, 67 to 69, 72 to 74, 75 (B, C, E to H, K, and N to P), 76 (E), 77 (D), 78, 82, 84, 87 (A and B), 88 to 90, 132, 149 to 151, 180, 182, 186, 190, 196, 198, 200, 202 to 204, and 243;
- 50: 9 to 11, 18, 21, 22 (A to C), 23, 28 (A, C to G), 29 (A to D), 32 to 34, 38 (A and B), 39, 40, 52, 56, 61 to 64, 67 to 69, 70 (A to D, F, I, K to N, P and Q), 71 (E), 73, 76, 84 (A to D), 89 (B), 96, 129, 138, 140, 172, 175, 185, 188, 190, 191, 193, 197 to 199, 245;
-

Appendix IV—Concluded

1996^a—(78)

51: 10, 17, 19, 22 to 29, 30 (I), 34, 39, 40, 42 to 44, 45 (A to C, E, G to I, K, M and O to S), 46 (D), 47 (A), 48, 51, 55, 57, 82, 83, 89, 100, 106, 107, 109, 111 to 113, 116, 124, 126 to 136, 138 (B), 139 to 141, 146, 147, 190, 193, 203, 205, 217, 223, 229, and 233;

E 10: 2 and 3.

^a Through September 1997. In sessions not listed there were no recorded votes.

**APPENDIX V. GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED
WITH NEGATIVE VOTES**

	<i>1946</i>	<i>1951</i>	<i>1956</i>	<i>1961</i>	<i>1966</i>	<i>1971</i>	<i>1976</i>	<i>1981</i>	<i>1986</i>	<i>1991</i>		
	<i>1950</i>	<i>1955</i>	<i>1960</i>	<i>1965</i>	<i>1970</i>	<i>1975</i>	<i>1980</i>	<i>1985</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>1996^a</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>By a vote</i>	353	433	422	266	423	547	595	766	640	352	78	4,875
<i>Votes</i>												
<i>against:</i>												
0	130	200	248	135	205	262	240	190	161	86	21	1,878
1	24	24	26	25	37	51	55	118	134	54	7	555
2	11	19	10	20	59	61	48	126	137	94	18	603
3	2	9	6	4	5	17	21	33	49	30	14	190
4	3	3	4	1	8	21	17	13	16	16	4	106
5	60	96	10	1	9	18	7	4	11	6		222
6	62	16	2	2	7	11	15	10	1	4		130
7	15	15	3	1	13	11	12	4	1			75
8	9	10	22	1	8	14	9	7	7	2		89
9	7	6	42	3	9	18	33	21	6	1		146
10	7	9	9	11	11	18	23	20	16	1		125
11	4	7	4	30	7	12	16	18	10	1		109
12	2	4	2	8	4	1	11	13	10			55
13	4	3	6	5	3	4	7	14	7	2		55
14	1	1	1	3	1		10	17	3	2		39
15	2	3	7	1	1	4	7	19	4	1		49
16	1	3	6	1	2	1	8	20	4	2	1	49
17	5	2	2	2	4	3	6	20	14		1	59
18	2		1	2	5	2	14	14	6	4		50
19		1	1		4	1	10	35	8	2	1	63
20	1	1		2	1	2	6	8	7	2		30
21			1	1		3	2	12	4	2		25
22	1	1		1	4		4	11	4	3	1	30
23			1	1	2	2	2	5	6	3		22
24			4					1	4	3		12
25					1			4	1	2	1	9
26				2	2	1	2	2	1	1		11
27			1					1		3		5
28			1		2	1			2	1		7

Appendix V—Concluded

	1946	1951	1956	1961	1966	1971	1976	1981	1986	1991		
	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	1996 ^a	Total
<i>Votes</i>												
<i>against:</i>												
29			1				1		5			7
30					2		2	1		3	1	9
31							2	1		1	1	5
32								1	1	1		3
33					1		2					3
34			1	1						3	1	6
35						3	2			2		7
36					1							1
37										1	1	2
38								1				1
39							1			2	2	5
40										2		2
42				1		1		1			1	4
43						2				2		4
44										1		1
45										2	1	3
46								1				1
47					1							1
48					3							3
49				1							1	2
51						1				2		3
52					1							1
54						1						1
57										2		2
Total	1,389	1,372	1,497	1,167	1,753	1,914	3,080	4,901	2,772	2,137	546	22,528
<i>Average</i>												
<i>votes</i>												
<i>against:</i>	3.9	3.2	3.5	4.4	4.1	3.5	5.2	6.4	4.3	6.1	7.0	4.6

^a Through September 1997.

APPENDIX VI. NEGATIVE VOTES CAST BY UN MEMBERS AGAINST GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS, 1946–1996

Through September 1997, the United Nations General Assembly adopted 4,875 resolutions by a vote: 1,878 of them were adopted with no negative votes, while 2,997 received at least one negative vote. Column two of this appendix gives the total negative votes cast by each UN Member State on those 2,997 resolutions. The next four columns give the total negative votes cast on resolutions adopted, respectively, with four to ten, three, two and one vote against.

	Total	<u>Total cast on resolutions receiving these votes against:</u>			
		Four to ten	Three	Two	One
Afghanistan	120	6			
Albania	315	104	19	31	18
Algeria	38				
Andorra	20				
Angola	40	2			
Antigua and Barbuda	11	1	1		
Argentina	53	13			3 ^a
Armenia	14				
Australia	425	84	7	2	1
Austria	119				
Azerbaijan	9				
Bahamas	3				
Bahrain	11	1			
Bangladesh	31	5			
Barbados	26	8		1	
Belarus	749	467	1		
Belgium	610	149	8	5	14
Belize	10	6			
Benin	29	1		1	1
Bhutan	27	1	17	5	
Bolivia	41	19			
Bosnia-Herzegovina	3				
Botswana	9				
Brazil	61	23	2	1	3
Brunei Darussalam	10				
Bulgaria	511	213			
Burkina Faso	13	1			
Burundi	17		1		

Appendix VI—Continued

	Total	<u>Total cast on resolutions receiving these votes against:</u>			
		Four to ten	Three	Two	One
Cambodia	21				
Cameroon	11	3			
Canada	504	86	18	2	
Cape Verde	5				
Central African Rep.	14	4			
Chad	16	1			
Chile	69	16		2	1
China	85	12	5	26	2
Colombia	21	5			1
Comoros	9	1	1		
Congo	49	1			
Costa Rica	87	26	5	5	1
Côte d'Ivoire	14	1			
Croatia	14				
Cuba	239	32	1	6	4
Cyprus	7				
Czechoslovakia	745^b	456			
Czech Republic	30				
DPR of Korea	17	1		1	3
DR of the Congo	23	5	1		
Democratic Yemen	69^b		1	1	3
Denmark	346	12			1
Djibouti	7	1			1 ^c
Dominica	12	3	4		
Dominican Republic	55	15	1		
Ecuador	17	4			
Egypt	57	6		1	
El Salvador	74	16	4	3	
Equatorial Guinea	19	3			
Eritrea	1				
Estonia	29				
Ethiopia	67	8			3 ^a
Fiji	9				
Finland	169	1			
France	715	214	41	21	30
Gabon	24	8			

Appendix VI—Continued

	Total	<u>Total cast on resolutions receiving these votes against:</u>			
		Four to ten	Three	Two	One
Gambia	22	4	1		
Georgia	13	1			
German Dem. Rep.	241^b	87			
Germany, Fed. Rep.	464	102	5		
Ghana	28				1
Greece	90	9	1		1
Grenada	39	7			
Guatemala	89	23	3	1	3
Guinea	36	1			
Guinea-Bissau	8				
Guyana	13				
Haiti	42	5	1		
Honduras	61	12	1		
Hungary	514	201		1	7
Iceland	286	8			
India	110	13	18	9	3
Indonesia	67	7			
Iran	52	11	4		3
Iraq	98	12	8	2	4
Ireland	186	1			
Israel	925	136	71	310	108
Italy	433	57			
Jamaica	9	1			
Japan	262	36	1		
Jordan	23				
Kazakhstan	6				
Kenya	16	3			1
Kuwait	22	2			
Kyrgyzstan	0				
Lao PDR	73	1			
Latvia	34	1		1	
Lebanon	37	12	2	1	
Lesotho	15				
Liberia	42	16		1	
Libyan A. Jamahariya	91	6	11	1	1
Liechtenstein	31				

Appendix VI—Continued

	Total	<u>Total cast on resolutions receiving these votes against:</u>			
		Four to ten	Three	Two	One
Lithuania	33				
Luxembourg	516	100	2		1 ^c
Madagascar	31			1	
Malawi	36	9		2	
Malaysia	27	3			
Maldives	16				
Mali	28				
Malta	29	1			
Marshall Islands	18	4	1		
Mauritania	26	2			
Mauritius	19		16		
Mexico	14	4			
Micronesia, FS of	17	3	9		
Monaco	35	4		2	
Mongolia	347	118			
Morocco	53	8		1	
Mozambique	30				
Myanmar	44	8			
Namibia	7	1			
Nepal	19	1			
Netherlands	515	104		2	2
New Zealand	351	45	1		
Nicaragua	104	33	6	2	
Niger	20	1		1	
Nigeria	24		1		
Norway	347	13			
Oman	26	7			
Pakistan	60	10		1	
Palau	3		2		
Panama	24	4	1		
Papua New Guinea	9				
Paraguay	60	16		2	
Peru	26	5		2	1
Philippines	33	6		1	
Poland	779	464			
Portugal	533	115	11	98	10

Appendix VI—Continued

	Total	Total cast on resolutions receiving these votes against:			
		Four to ten	Three	Two	One
Qatar	22	2			
Republic of Korea	9				
Republic of Moldova	25				
Romania	302	120	3	1	
Russian Federation	28	6		3	2
Rwanda	8				
Saint Kitts-Nevis	6	2			
Saint Lucia	11	1			
St. Vincent & the Gren.	7	1			
Samoa	6				
San Marino	9				
Sao Tome and Principe	11				
Saudi Arabia	55	12	1		1
Senegal	21	4			
Seychelles	11				
Sierra Leone	16	1			
Singapore	19	1			1
Slovakia	28				
Slovenia	25				
Solomon Islands	13	3			
Somalia	22	1			
South Africa	332 ^d	93	13	106	47
Spain	182	16	2	5	1
Sri Lanka	35	5			1 ^c
Sudan	64	3	3	2	
Suriname	9				
Swaziland	14	1	1		
Sweden	209	10			
Syria	180	17	20	11	1
Tajikistan	4				
Thailand	16	2			
TFYR of Macedonia	15				
Togo	13	2		1	1
Trinidad and Tobago	5	1			
Tunisia	16				
Turkey	210	14	1	9	8

Appendix VI—Concluded

	Total	<u>Total cast on resolutions receiving these votes against:</u>			
		Four to ten	Three	Two	One
Turkmenistan	5		1		
Uganda	17	1			1
Ukraine	767	470	1		1
USSR	748^b	472	1		
United Arab Emirates	11	1			
United Kingdom	871	274	69	71	10
UR of Tanzania	34	2			
United States	1,487	291	119	384	212
Uruguay	75	21			
Uzbekistan	6	1	2		
Vanuatu	3		2		
Venezuela	15	1			
Viet Nam	84	2			
Yemen	44^b	1			
Yemen, Republic of	2				
Yugoslavia	140^c	76			1
Zambia	26	3			
Zimbabwe	8	1			
Not identified	515	271	17	57	31
Total	22,528	6,115	570	1,206	555
Percent identified	97.7	95.6	97.0	95.3	94.4

^a One by mistake.^b Ceased membership.^c By mistake.^d South Africa was suspended from 1974 to 1994.^e In September 1992 the General Assembly decided that Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) could not participate in its work.

APPENDIX VII. SUBJECTS OF RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY A RECORDED VOTE

In order to examine how the Coincidence Index varied from one issue to another, the subjects of General Assembly resolutions adopted by a recorded vote have been grouped under the following twelve headings: i) political; ii) economic; iii) social; iv) codification of International Law; v) decolonization; vi) nuclear disarmament; vii) international security and other disarmament; viii) Middle East; ix) *apartheid*; x) Namibia; xi) other matters regarding Southern Africa; and xii) the UN budget.

Tables 1 and 2 list the total and five-year percentage of resolutions under each of the twelve headings. As shown, until the early sixties political issues accounted for 23 to 45 percent; until the sixties, decolonization questions, between 17 and 30 percent; from 1961 to 1980, Southern Africa went from 12 to 21 percent; since the sixties nuclear disarmament and international security and other disarmament, from 12 to 30 percent; and, since the late seventies, the Middle East has gone from 15 to 35 percent.

What are the specific items included under the different headings?

The **political issues** are varied. They include UN relations with non-member States, the admission of new members, the credentials of delegations to the General Assembly and China's representation at the UN; the Organization's functioning, the Assembly's Rules of Procedure, the veto in the Security Council, the UN role in the maintenance of peace and the strengthening of the Charter, the enlargement of the composition of the Security Council and ECOSOC, equitable representation in certain bodies of limited composition, the different aspects of peace-keeping operations, and a number of international items of a strictly political nature: UN fact-finding methods, international terrorism, the draft convention on crimes against peace and humanity, mercenaries, the security of the missions accredited to the UN, the rationalization of the work of the Assembly itself, and the privileges and immunities of diplomats in New York and UN Secretariat staff members. They cover, as well, specific cases such as the Korean question, the Berlin crisis, the tension between Burma and China, the situation in Hungary, Tibet, the Congo, the Indo-Pakistani conflict, the situation in Cambodia, Cyprus, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and US intervention in Cuba, Grenada, Libya and Panama, the suspension of Yugoslavia, the blockade against Cuba, and the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Economic issues are just as varied. They include the institutional aspects of how and who should consider them (that is, the perennial struggle for bureaucratic turf): UNCTAD, UNIDO, DIESA, Habitat, the Common Fund on Commodities, UNDRO, the Economic Commission for Africa, the UN Fund for capital development, UNDP, the Fund for population activities, etc.; resolutions on multilateral instruments, such as the Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States, and the negotiation (truncated or inconclusive) of the codes of conduct of transnational corporations and the transfer of technology; aid to individual countries, the right to development, international economic security, trade and development, *entrepreneurship*, coercive economic measures, the trade embargo against Nicaragua, protectionism, inflation, natural disasters, money and finance, the new international economic order, interna-

TABLE 1 *Subjects of resolutions adopted by a recorded vote, total by period, 1946-1996^a*

	Total	1946 1960	1961 1970	1971 1980	1981 1988	1989 1996
Political	258	98	31	47	49	33
Economic	201	11	8	66	82	34
Social	327	24	19	88	120	76
Codification of International Law	147	12	20	38	55	22
Decolonization	427	62	91	129	81	64
Nuclear disarmament	431	10	26	101	192	102
International security/other disarmament	358	2	5	71	174	106
Middle East	660	23	21	131	283	202
<i>Apartheid</i>	234	17	10	100	78	29
Namibia	111	16	12	39	44	—
Other Southern Africa items	224	2	45	83	65	29
UN budget	321	28	20	153	116	4
Total	3,262	279	247	918	1,186	632

^a Through September 1997. The total is less than the sum because some resolutions were included under more than one heading.

tional co-operation for development, the North/South dialogue, multilateral trade negotiations, the problem of water, shared natural resources, permanent sovereignty over natural resources, agricultural questions and agrarian reform, commodities, migration, and development and the environment; and many specific items of special interest to developing countries: technical assistance, development co-operation, population and development, industrial development, transfer of technological know-how, development and environment, brain drain, reverse transfer of technology and resources, poverty and unemployment, least developed countries, debt and debt service, housing and human settlements, transfer of resources, land-locked countries, science and technology for development, desertification, eradication of poverty, and the UN development decades.

Social issues include the human rights situation in various countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Soviet Union, Romania, Tibet, Chile, Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Afghanistan, Iran, occupied Kuwait, Iraq, Cuba, Sudan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo); questions relating to human rights in general and specific matters such as the world's social situation, social development, minorities, war crimes, racism, neo-Nazism, religious intolerance, cultural values, restitution of works of art, the legal status of women, torture, aging, children, youth, migrant workers, indigenous peoples, Zionism, political processes, the right to self-determination, the right to development, human rights and scientific and technological advances, human settlements, the right to private property, forced labor, capital punishment, and illicit drug use and trafficking; institutional aspects such as the representation of NGOs in

TABLE 2 *Subjects of Resolutions Adopted by a Recorded Vote, 1946-1996^a*
(five-year percentage)

Subject	1946	1951	1956	1961	1966	1971	1976	1981	1986	1991		
Total	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	1996	
Political	8	24	45	37	17	10	7	4	4	5	4	12
Economic	6	1	5	5	2	4	9	6	7	7	5	4
Social	10	17	8	3	3	10	10	9	9	11	14	13
Cod. Int. Law	5	7	3	4	2	12	4	4	5	4	3	3
Decolonization	13	31	17	18	38	36	19	11	6	9	11	8
Nuclear disarm.	13	1	—	8	13	9	11	11	16	17	15	15
Int. security/ other disarm.	11	—	1	1	2	2	9	7	14	17	16	17
Middle East	20	8	—	14	8	9	10	17	24	25	35	31
Southern Africa												
<i>Apartheid</i>	7	3	9	6	5	3	9	12	7	7	3	—
Namibia	3	6	8	4	2	6	2	6	4	3	—	
Other	7	—	—	2	20	17	14	6	5	7	3	—
UN budget	10	12	4	12	13	5	13	19	12	4	1	1


^a Through December 1996. The total is over 100 percent because some resolutions were included under more than one heading. See Table 4.7.

ECOSOC, the establishment of the Office for Refugees, the creation of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and UNDRO; international legal instruments such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the Declaration on the right of peoples to live in peace, the 1966 human rights Covenants, and various conventions on freedom of information, genocide, corporal punishment in the trust territories, women, racial discrimination in non self-governing territories, prostitution, protection of reporters in armed conflicts, etc.

Included under the heading of the **Codification of International Law** are Assembly pronouncements on treaties, conventions and international codes, the principles enshrined in the UN Charter—non-intervention, the non-use of force, peaceful solution of controversies—and other aspects of the UN's work in this sphere, such as the reports of the International Law Commission, the cases before the International Court of Justice, the Law of the Sea, the definition of aggression, international economic Law, and the principles of friendly relations and good neighborliness.

The questions relating to **decolonization** include non-self-governing territories, the implementation of the right to self-determination and the 1960 Declaration, information regarding paragraph e) of Article 73, mercenaries in the non-self-governing territories, colonialism in general, the reports of the Trusteeship Council and the specific cases of the colonies and/or trust territories of Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom and United States. The case of Namibia is examined separately.

FIGURE 1 *Subjects of General Assembly Resolutions Adopted by a Recorded Vote (Yearly Average), 1946–1996*



Nuclear disarmament covers the questions relating to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the complete cessation of nuclear testing, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the IAEA, the effects of atomic radiation, fissile material, the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons (nuclear winter and climate change) and radioactive waste; the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, Assembly pronouncements on the SALT and START treaties and the specific cases of radiological weapons, the neutron bomb, a nuclear-arms freeze, as well as questions such as Israel's nuclear arms, South Africa's nuclear capacity and Israel's attack on Iraq's nuclear installations; the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, including the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and the Treaty of Rarotonga.

International security and other disarmament includes questions of international security and related matters, as well as all items regarding the non-nuclear aspects of disarmament, beginning with other weapons of mass destruction (biological and chemical) and new systems and types of weapons of mass destruction; the item regarding general and complete disarmament; the comprehensive disarmament program; certain weapons such as napalm, incendiary weapons, naval disarmament, regional disarmament, unilateral measures, transparency in conventional armaments, the UN conventional arms register, verification of disarmament agreements, confidence building measures, economic and social consequences of the arms race, disarmament and development, the establishment of zones of peace (Indian Ocean, South Atlantic and Antarctica), the implementation of the 1970 Declaration on International Security, disarmament and environment, science and technology for disarmament, the various UN disarmament decades, the world disarmament campaign, implementation of General Assembly resolutions on disarmament, and the rationalization of the work of its First Committee; the UN role in disarmament and the various fora and subsidiary bodies dealing with these questions, such as the Conference on Disarmament, the Disarmament Commission, the special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the World Disarmament Conference (which was never held), the UN disarmament fellowship program, disarmament week, regional disarmament centers and the UN Disarmament Research Institute (UNIDIR); specific treaties relating to questions, such as the sea-bed, environmental modification techniques, the 1925 Protocol, and biological and chemical weapons; the uses of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes and the UN Commission on these matters.

Under the **Middle East** are resolutions relating to the Jewish Agency for Palestine, the Special Commission on Palestine, UNRWA, the admission of Israel, the status of Jerusalem, the Suez crisis, human rights and Israeli practices in the occupied territories, the UN's relationship with the PLO and the Arab League, the different Middle East peace-keeping or observation forces (UNEF, UNDOF, UNIFIL and UNSOF), sovereignty over natural resources in the occupied territories, establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East, Israel's nuclear armaments and its attack against the Iraqi nuclear station, Israel's military collaboration with South Africa, the canal to the Dead Sea, human settlements and economic development in the occupied territories, Intifadah, assistance to Lebanon, the Peace Confer-

ence and the International Conference on the Middle East, and the Palestine section within the UN Secretariat.

The questions relating to the situation in **Southern Africa** are grouped under three different headings: *apartheid*, Namibia and other matters. The latter include the question of Southern Rhodesia, the implementation of resolution 1514, economic interests in Southern Africa, the UN education program in Southern Africa, human rights in the region's armed conflicts, racial discrimination, the Portuguese territories, and the UN program for Southern Africa.

Finally, the heading **UN budget** covers matters relating to the Organization's regular budget, including administrative questions and the financing of peace-keeping operations; as well as resolutions relating to the funding of specific activities, the Organization's financial situation and the salaries and pensions of its personnel.

APPENDIX VIII. COINCIDENCE INDEX SINCE 1989

The eleven tables given in this appendix list the Coincidence Index for the Non-Aligned nations, the Soviet Union (Russia), Germany, the European Union, the Nordic countries, Russia, the OECD members, North America, Japan, China, ASEAN, and Argentina. They refer to the discussion at the end of Chapter 4 and illustrate the changes in the UN General Assembly voting patterns since 1989. The data includes votes through September 1997. An asterisk (*) indicates non-member (or suspended member) and a long dash (—) that participation in the votes was scant.

TABLE 1 *Countries of the Non-Aligned Movement*^a

	1946 1980	1981 1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Algeria										
Colombia	881	921	956	976	958	953	944	955	956	954
Cuba	900	961	987	952	973	925	937	921	910	925
Egypt	946	945	961	988	973	986	975	969	955	967
Ghana										
India	933	932	942	965	944	937	897	869	862	903
Indonesia	945	960	987	988	962	939	908	918	925	947
Iran	928	978	986	994	975	955	912	888	892	930
Jamaica										
Madagascar	947	924	957	967	962	952	922	973	925	991
Malaysia	946	934	970	977	927	932	914	937	903	936
Nigeria	944	936	960	977	958	950	895	915	879	908
Pakistan										
Peru	911	963	974	971	965	939	913	904	870	910
Senegal	944	960	974	982	993	993	966	976	945	945
Sri Lanka	944	965	974	982	1000	980	977	970	942	961
Tunisia										
Yugoslavia	909	975	969	994	979	*	*	*	*	*
Zambia	953	974	977	994	1000	970	922	923	931	944
Zimbabwe	939	980	962	994	993	958	960	948	939	967

^a Included are countries that have chaired the NAM or hosted one of its ministerial meetings.

Appendix VIII—Continued

TABLE 2 *The USSR and its allies*

	1946 1980	1981 1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
European										
Albania	904	967	995	975	821	782	855	842	802	804
Belarus	998	1000	1000	1000	937	833	803	868	833	868
Bulgaria	998	998	1000	819	761	849	849	821	841	812
Czechoslovakia	993	995	1000	765	771	856	*	*	*	*
Czech Rep.	*	*	*	*	*	*	859	813	831	812
GDR	997	998	1000	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Hungary	996	999	968	793	791	847	849	801	836	816
Poland	986	989	991	747	768	849	867	809	843	829
Romania	886	915	991	793	750	842	869	813	853	829
Slovakia	*	*	*	*	*	*	841	811	841	822
Ukraine	999	997	1000	1000	880	831	773	836	819	816
Yugoslavia	804	881	987	976	786	*	*	*	*	*
Other										
Cuba	831	931	969	929	732	651	595	635	590	715
DPR Korea	*	*	*	*	754	659	602	610	566	714
Lao	787	985	1000	976	750	662	619	670	642	758
Mongolia	994	999	1000	982	813	727	683	731	700	795
Seychelles	978	977	1000	982	798	726	737	806	—	944
Viet Nam	955	974	996	962	761	664	603	656	620	754
Former USSR										
Armenia	*	*	*	*	*	833	825	815	843	861
Azerbaijan	*	*	*	*	*	792	755	746	754	828
Estonia	*	*	*	*	793	829	847	836	836	780
Georgia	*	*	*	*	*	—	867	869	840	848
Kazakhstan	*	*	*	*	*	867	811	788	797	862
Kyrgyzstan	*	*	*	*	*	*	803	702	725	833
Latvia	*	*	*	*	763	831	864	836	830	817
Lithuania	*	*	*	*	793	838	871	819	838	783
Moldova	*	*	*	*	*	831	833	808	833	797
Tajikistan	*	*	*	*	*	841	857	881	875	857
Turkmenistan	*	*	*	*	*	900	833	778	885	—
Uzbekistan	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	787	761	732

Appendix VIII—Continued

TABLE 3 *Germany*

	1973 1980	1981 1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
P-5										
China	572	588	605	620	616	634	613	682	644	662
France	900	906	920	880	910	945	903	886	910	921
USSR	515	515	610	643	711	831	844	801	826	816
UK	952	924	904	881	918	919	914	896	899	929
US	849	690	588	619	618	595	633	640	645	649
Western Europe										
Austria	816	754	772	798	877	932	921	949	957	935
Belgium	948	952	974	982	979	993	984	985	978	961
Denmark	877	844	873	893	925	959	953	971	971	961
Finland	767	741	789	827	918	959	953	978	971	968
Greece	744	699	794	839	856	905	898	956	935	—
Ireland	865	794	816	833	890	932	937	949	942	922
Italy	918	937	969	982	959	993	992	993	985	961
Luxembourg	951	948	961	982	966	993	992	985	978	968
Netherlands	902	845	974	982	979	986	984	993	978	974
Norway	837	845	860	887	918	946	952	963	944	961
Portugal	777	884	947	952	925	959	969	985	964	967
Spain	741	797	846	857	870	912	921	956	957	954
Sweden	800	771	785	815	897	939	922	949	957	935
Eastern Europe										
Albania	470	550	615	623	889	910	868	939	944	942
Belarus	517	516	610	643	763	819	787	831	848	822
Bosnia-Herze.	*	*	*	*	*	738	786	875	906	855
Bulgaria	517	516	606	825	938	979	976	970	971	942
Croatia	*	*	*	*	*	868	902	902	937	930
Czech Rep.	*	*	*	*	*	*	969	985	978	968
Czechoslovakia	517	519	610	880	944	973	*	*	*	*
GDR	517	515	610	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Hungary	517	517	661	854	906	965	960	985	992	974
Poland	531	518	625	901	918	966	961	978	993	961
Romania	598	551	614	860	924	945	975	985	971	961
Slovakia	*	*	*	*	*	*	944	992	986	954
Slovenia	*	*	*	*	*	*	934	962	970	953
Ukraine	515	516	610	645	726	811	773	873	848	855
Yugoslavia	627	554	611	619	618	*	*	*	*	*

Appendix VIII—Continued

TABLE 4 *The European Union*

	1946 1980	1981 1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Austria										
Belgium	847	785	798	804	884	939	937	949	964	948
Denmark	923	885	890	905	938	973	937	963	986	962
Finland	916	925	947	958	932	959	921	941	957	955
France										
Germany	900	906	920	880	910	945	903	886	910	921
Greece	719	695	746	741	806	863	863	871	888	— ^a
Ireland	768	776	768	735	854	889	869	848	896	909
Italy										
Luxembourg	944	958	974	988	993	1000	1000	978	993	981
Netherlands	929	944	969	988	979	993	992	985	978	974
Norway ^b	881	889	882	905	932	953	960	956	960	955
Portugal										
Spain	796	887	882	905	918	939	944	971	978	987
Sweden	765	833	811	851	932	966	937	963	978	955
UK	775	827	877	833	856	878	883	881	862	935

^a Participated in very few votes in 1996.^b Decided not to join.TABLE 5 *The Nordic Countries*

	1946 1980	1981 1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Denmark										
Finland	893	884	908	923	938	973	937	978	971	981
Iceland	932	974	973	970	979	1000	969	978	986	987
Norway	965	972	987	994	993	986	968	978	976	968
Sweden	939	906	912	923	973	980	937	963	986	962
Finland										
Iceland	894	878	915	929	959	973	953	955	986	980
Norway	911	878	912	929	945	959	952	956	976	962
Sweden	934	928	987	988	966	980	953	956	957	955
Iceland										
Norway	948	977	978	976	986	986	984	978	992	967
Sweden	922	900	911	929	966	980	937	963	971	960
Norway										
Sweden	951	905	908	929	966	980	952	971	960	955

Appendix VIII—Continued

TABLE 6 *The OECD members*

	1946 1980	1981 1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Australia										
Austria	887	859	917	940	938	973	937	956	935	949
Belgium	859	876	846	839	904	939	875	919	899	896
Canada	888	895	886	893	932	939	891	934	913	910
Czechoslovakia	562	620	789	904	917	945	*	*	*	*
Czech Rep. ^a	*	*	*	*	*	*	875	918	897	917
Denmark	869	917	921	929	945	973	875	934	920	910
Finland										
France	731	725	741	729	868	918	871	894	896	942
Germany	767	741	789	827	918	959	953	978	971	968
Greece	825	864	882	881	911	932	898	949	935	— ^d
Hungary ^a	658	705	872	927	935	965	960	978	969	981
Iceland	894	878	915	929	959	973	953	955	986	980
Ireland										
Italy	901	836	846	851	918	938	944	941	956	949
Japan	888	837	851	875	904	973	960	934	912	923
Korea, Rep. of ^b	*	*	*	*	849	890	879	886	883	878
Luxembourg	878	830	841	835	911	938	944	934	949	942
Mexico ^c	817	758	804	779	740	757	734	787	804	814
Netherlands										
New Zealand	901	878	816	831	884	919	852	903	884	890
Norway	895	898	886	892	925	959	952	955	952	955
Poland ^b	539	552	652	906	938	966	961	985	970	974
Portugal	781	903	958	958	945	959	969	978	957	981
Spain	811	850	864	861	877	912	913	948	935	967
Sweden										
Turkey	814	745	781	792	829	858	869	873	875	812
UK	774	704	697	696	815	858	836	843	855	904
United States	729	463	382	435	514	534	570	588	601	590

^a Joined in 1995.^b Joined in 1996.^c Joined in 1994.^d Participated in very few votes in 1996.

Appendix VIII—Continued

TABLE 7 *North America*

	1971 1980	1981 1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Canada										
United States	831	637	522	560	583	574	602	625	623	628
Mexico	744	614	699	679	671	709	727	750	768	763
United States										
Canada	831	637	522	560	583	574	602	625	623	628
Mexico	620	265	217	238	250	284	328	375	391	391
Mexico										
Canada	744	614	699	679	671	709	727	750	768	763
United States	620	265	217	238	250	284	328	375	391	391
Belize	*	920	827	977	977	937	925	920	932	957
Guatemala	873	884	986	988	984	958	955	875	922	906
Argentina	915	949	965	952	781	792	797	765	801	853
Brazil	904	933	961	964	980	980	984	949	971	955
Chile	914	902	910	982	979	959	968	912	955	949
Colombia	923	941	978	988	993	966	968	955	956	948
Cuba	824	924	956	953	946	932	905	905	866	884
Peru	934	968	982	988	979	953	968	912	957	949
Venezuela	941	970	983	977	980	966	953	963	971	962

TABLE 8 *Japan*

	1957 1980	1981 1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
P-5										
China	781	698	695	699	717	718	653	689	662	705
France	749	829	848	801	840	890	863	811	841	870
Soviet Union	630	613	671	720	739	831	883	831	779	792
UK	780	807	807	792	822	838	859	836	838	878
United States	741	594	535	542	521	514	578	625	610	603
Other G-7										
Canada	851	875	890	899	870	926	914	926	926	923
Germany	815	869	886	899	877	919	945	912	897	922
Italy	866	880	899	893	890	926	953	904	896	923
Asian/Pacific										
Australia	856	872	846	863	884	946	914	949	926	910
India	780	630	659	661	714	716	659	647	640	679
Korea, DPR	*	*	*	*	685	720	636	627	623	680
Korea, Rep.	*	*	*	*	822	892	841	864	913	891
Mongolia	639	617	667	699	754	773	725	777	820	831
New Zealand	883	870	825	857	877	932	891	926	941	917
Pakistan	793	671	684	690	719	730	680	728	721	750
Philippines	823	697	702	702	732	764	687	750	772	779
Viet Nam	683	615	681	681	704	719	659	680	680	729

Appendix VIII—Continued

TABLE 9 *The ASEAN Countries*

	1946 1980	1981 1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Brunei Dar.										
Cambodia ^a	*	992	990	—	946	—	977	935	884	940
Indonesia	*	969	973	988	993	980	969	962	955	961
Lao ^b	*	915	968	988	972	964	967	955	950	963
Indonesia										
Lao ^b	911	917	982	988	979	979	983	973	948	970
Malaysia	954	973	991	994	993	987	977	962	948	961
Myanmar ^b	940	946	987	971	979	958	975	962	947	973
Malaysia										
Myanmar ^b	926	944	987	965	965	958	950	923	912	934
Philippines	956	966	978	1000	973	973	962	977	957	974
Singapore	943	975	977	983	960	933	915	939	957	968
Philippines										
Singapore	947	970	982	983	986	933	923	949	942	968
Thailand	961	973	995	988	993	966	962	985	964	987
Thailand										
Viet Nam ^b	897	896	968	970	973	939	914	926	919	940

^a Its admission was postponed.^b Joined in 1997.TABLE 10 *China and its Neighbors*

	1946 1980	1981 1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Bangladesh	912	944	970	958	971	936	933	929	906	933
Bhutan	899	939	964	946	937	889	910	875	800	889
Cambodia	871	981	981	—	963	—	953	898	830	880
India	838	923	945	952	948	923	943	886	871	885
Indonesia	850	937	968	952	971	937	968	938	898	914
Japan	781	698	695	699	717	718	653	689	662	705
Korea, DPR	*	*	*	*	966	984	982	939	920	953
Korea, Rep. of	*	*	*	*	855	803	803	805	754	776
Lao	875	890	963	963	957	956	965	973	965	940
Malaysia	894	951	968	958	971	951	960	930	909	917
Mongolia	783	849	954	970	932	929	940	906	839	858
Myanmar	841	928	981	958	956	971	974	953	938	941
Nepal	851	933	959	952	964	900	895	915	873	897
Pakistan	874	945	964	946	971	944	960	939	924	942
Philippines	896	945	955	958	971	923	952	917	894	916
Singapore	863	942	954	952	957	880	887	879	879	897
Thailand	884	943	967	957	964	921	927	915	886	901
Viet Nam	941	887	959	964	971	971	984	983	967	957

Appendix VIII—ConcludedTABLE 11 *Argentina*

	1946 1980	1981 1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
P-5										
China	866	934	959	939	761	750	734	727	685	769
France	654	578	590	555	819	843	798	795	848	851
Soviet Union	684	853	960	940	831	859	883	875	846	805
UK	659	515	531	506	760	803	797	806	801	814
United States	625	286	230	241	458	479	516	596	588	526
Latin America										
Bolivia	913	955	974	952	806	869	820	816	821	885
Brazil	920	956	987	988	801	810	794	787	813	870
Chile	913	906	892	958	793	829	810	824	828	891
Cuba	805	907	947	952	740	750	714	690	659	753
Jamaica	913	924	943	946	829	817	825	800	813	878
Mexico	915	949	965	952	781	792	797	765	801	853
Paraguay	898	882	944	952	809	857	888	811	861	884
Peru	930	955	974	952	779	824	778	809	816	878
Uruguay	900	935	951	934	821	862	855	809	831	864
Venezuela	925	957	965	940	788	800	794	772	799	853
Non-Aligned										
Algeria	885	938	952	963	771	778	773	765	757	818
Egypt	872	946	939	964	792	790	775	769	750	842
India	864	939	942	976	771	768	722	676	647	731
Indonesia	891	946	969	964	764	771	734	731	705	796
Malaysia	912	939	969	958	753	771	742	765	765	840
Nigeria	899	943	964	958	786	775	766	772	683	789
Senegal	896	936	955	951	786	799	784	810	770	863
Developed										
Canada	742	618	668	651	863	887	883	897	904	872
Germany	622	559	602	590	842	880	883	897	890	857
Italy	744	613	633	608	870	887	891	890	903	872
Japan	810	662	673	669	870	923	922	897	875	872
Sweden	803	780	801	777	918	944	914	919	919	897

INDEX

INDEX

- Addis Abeba, UN office in, 20
- Aden Colony and Protectorate, 180
- Administrative and budgetary Committee. *See* General Assembly, Fifth Committee of
- Afghanistan, 40, 42, 78, 111, 125, 130, 133, 141–149 *passim*
 human rights in, 145–147, 202
 membership in UN, 7, 175
 negative votes cast by, 195
 Soviet invasion of, 201
- African group. *See under* Regional groups
- Agenda of General Assembly. *See under* General Assembly
- Aggression, 97
 definition of, 28–29, 74, 203
- Alaska, 181
- Albania, 17, 27, 42, 103, 107–114
 passim, 130, 133, 141–142, 144
 membership in UN, 7, 175
 negative votes cast by, 195
- Algeria, 42, 44, 52, 125, 133, 148, 150
 CI with other non-aligned, 207
 membership in UN, 7, 175
 negative votes cast by, 195
- American Revolution, 59
- American Samoa, 181
- Amman, UN office in, 20
- Andorra, 121, 127, 132, 160
 membership in UN, 8, 175
 negative votes cast by, 195
- Angola, 45, 50, 111, 122, 125, 133, 141, 149
 and Cabinda enclave, 181
 membership in UN, 7, 175
 negative votes cast by, 195
- Anguilla, 175
- Annan, Kofi, 76, 77. *See also* Secretary-General
- Antarctica, 67, 115
- Antigua and Barbuda, 37, 112, 125, 141, 181
 membership in UN, 8, 175
 negative votes cast by, 195
- Apartheid*, 6, 31, 42, 43–45, 59, 84, 107, 108, 113, 115, 165, 167, 171, 206
 impact of issues on CI, 123–127, 161
 inscription of item on General Assembly agenda, 43
- Arab group. *See under* Regional groups
- Arabic. *See under* General Assembly, working languages of
- Argentina, 6, 34, 35, 40, 54, 79, 80, 102, 114, 125, 130, 147, 152, 155, 160
 CI with other countries, 214
 membership in UN, 7, 175
 negative votes cast by, 195
 and UN budget, 20
- Armenia, 12, 135
 dissolution of USSR and UN, 8
 membership in UN, 8, 175
 negative votes cast by, 195
- Asian group. *See under* Regional groups
- Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), 17, 155, 159, 170
 CI of members, 213
- Atomic Energy Commission, 64
- Australia, 6, 40, 43, 44, 45, 46, 49, 53, 54, 84, 101, 102, 108, 112, 127, 132, 141–152 *passim*, 158
 and dependencies, 13, 14, 149–151, 175, 179, 203
 membership in UN, 7, 175
 negative votes cast by, 195
 and regional groups, 16
 and UN budget, 20
- Austria, 27, 37, 38, 45, 75, 127, 132, 137, 157
 membership in UN, 7, 175
 negative votes cast by, 195
- Axis Powers, 39, 65, 69, 135, 163
- Azerbaijan, 12, 36, 135
 dissolution of USSR and UN, 8

- membership in UN, 8, 175
- negative votes cast by, 195
- Bahamas, 125, 141, 180
 - membership in UN, 7, 175
 - negative votes cast by, 195
- Bahrain, 36, 41, 121, 122, 125
 - membership in UN, 7, 175
 - negative votes cast by, 195
- Baker, James, 84
- Banda, Hastings Kamuzu, 44
- Bangkok
 - Treaty, 67
 - UN office in, 20
- Bangladesh, 12, 42, 125, 133
 - membership in UN, 7, 175, 178n.1
 - negative votes cast by, 195
 - partition of Pakistan and UN, 8
- Barbados, 125, 135, 180
 - membership in UN, 7, 175
 - negative votes cast by, 195
- Barbuda. *See* Antigua and Barbuda
- Baroody, Jamil, 55–56
- Basutoland, 180
- Bechaunaland, 180
- Belarus (formerly Byelorussia), 12, 13, 17, 27, 28, 40, 42, 45, 79, 102, 108, 111, 121, 133, 144, 167
 - membership in UN, 7, 175, 178n.2
 - negative votes cast by, 195
- Belgian Congo (now DR of the Congo), 52, 179
- Belgium, 6, 37, 40, 43, 49–56 *passim*, 75, 84, 101–110, 127–137 *passim*, 143–151 *passim*
 - and dependencies, 14, 52–53, 84, 149–151, 175, 179, 203
 - membership in UN, 7, 175
 - negative votes cast by, 195
 - and right to self-determination, 55
- Belize (formerly British Honduras), 114, 125, 141, 185
 - membership in UN, 8, 175
 - negative votes cast by, 195
- Benin (formerly Dahomey), 37, 42, 125, 133, 179, 182
 - membership in UN, 7, 175
 - negative votes cast by, 195
- Berlin, 144
- Berlin Wall, 84
- Bermuda, 180
- Bhutan, 110, 112, 125
 - membership in UN, 7, 175
 - negative votes cast by, 195
- Big Five. *See under* Security Council, permanent members of
- Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), 66
- Bi-polar world. *See* Cold War
- Bolivia, 6, 36, 40, 102, 125, 143
 - human rights in, 145–146, 202
 - membership in UN, 7, 175
 - negative votes cast by, 195
- Bosnia and Herzegovina, 12, 36, 59, 87, 114, 135, 172
 - dissolution of Yugoslavia, 8
 - human rights in, 145–146, 202
 - membership in UN, 8, 175
 - negative votes cast by, 195
 - situation in, 114, 201
- Botha, Pik, 44
- Botswana, 17, 125, 180
 - membership in UN, 7, 175
 - negative votes cast by, 195
- Bouteflika, Abdelaziz, 44
- Boutros Ghali, Boutros, 62, 76, 77, 104. *See also* Secretary-General
- Brazil, 40, 42, 54, 102, 108, 115, 125, 143–152 *passim*, 160
 - membership in UN, 7, 175
 - negative votes cast by, 195
 - and UN budget, 20
- British Cameroon, 52
- British Commonwealth, 18
- British Guiana, 180
- British Honduras, 180. *See also* Belize
- British Somaliland, 42, 180
- British Virgin Islands, 181
- Brunei Darussalam, 122, 125, 180
 - membership in UN, 8, 175
 - negative votes cast by, 195
- Budget of UN, 19–22, 31, 94, 101, 113, 116, 164, 167–168, 206
 - impact of issues on CI, 123–127, 161
 - list of issues of General Assembly resolutions on, 206
- Commission on Contributions, 21

- largest contributors to, 20
 - maximum contribution to, 20, 21
 - minimum contribution to, 20, 21
 - scale of assessments, 20, 31
- Bulgaria, 27, 42, 103, 111, 121, 133, 157
 - human rights in, 145–146, 202
 - membership in UN, 7, 175
 - negative votes cast by, 195
- Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta), 36, 125
 - membership in UN, 7, 175
 - negative votes cast by, 195
- Burma, 38. *See also* Myanmar
- Burundi, 125, 148
 - membership in UN, 7, 175
 - negative votes cast by, 195
- Bush, George, 77, 84
- Byelorussia. *See* Belarus
- Cabinda, 181
- Cambodia, 37, 42, 99, 111, 125, 130, 133, 179
 - membership in UN, 7, 175
 - negative votes cast by, 196
 - situation in, 201
- Cameroon, 37, 42, 45, 49, 52, 125, 141
 - membership in UN, 7, 175
 - negative votes cast by, 196
- Camp David Accords, 47
- Canada, 40, 43, 44, 46, 54, 64, 102, 110, 112, 127, 132, 134, 135, 136, 140–147 *passim*, 150, 151, 152, 153, 158
 - membership in UN, 7, 175
 - negative votes cast by, 196
 - and regional groups, 16
 - and UN budget, 20
- Cape Verde, 36, 42, 122, 125
 - Archipelago, 181
 - membership in UN, 7, 175
 - negative votes cast
- Caroline Islands, 49
- Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, 62
- Castañeda, Jorge, xi
- Castro, Fidel, 82
- Cayman Islands, 180
- Central African Republic, 14, 36, 125, 130, 135, 141, 179
 - membership in UN, 7, 175
 - negative votes cast by, 196
- Ceuta, 84
- Ceylon. *See* Sri Lanka
- Chad, 37, 38, 41, 125, 179
 - membership in UN, 7, 175
 - negative votes cast by, 196
 - and UN budget, 21
- Charter of UN, 28–29, 44, 47, 53, 77, 80, 86, 117, 163, 166–167
 - and codification of International Law, 74
 - and composition of principal organs of UN, 16, 18–19, 23, 78–79, 80
 - and disarmament, 63–65
 - and economic development, 54, 60
 - and new UN members, 39
 - Preamble of, 60, 167
 - principles and purposes of, xii, 64, 116, 163, 164, 169
 - and review of, 74, 77–80, 124
 - veto provision of, 6, 22, 29
 - and voting, xii, 23, 82, 95
- Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States, 108, 109, 115, 153, 201
- Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), 66
- Chiang Kai-shek, 74, 80, 82
- Chidzero, Bernard, 77
- Children, protection of, 74, 202
- Chile, 6, 17, 40, 54, 102, 112, 114, 125, 141, 143, 158
 - human rights in, 112, 114, 145–147, 202
 - membership in UN, 7, 175
 - negative votes cast by, 196
- China, 10, 17, 22–23, 27, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41, 45, 54, 59, 68, 71, 73, 74, 76, 80–82, 83, 100–114 *passim*, 124, 132, 133, 138–139, 141–146 *passim*, 150–156 *passim*, 159, 160
 - CI with other countries, 213
 - and GATT, 9
 - membership in UN, 7, 175, 178n.5
 - negative votes cast by, 196

- and nuclear testing, 35, 36, 68
- representation at the UN, 1, 6, 74–75, 80–82, 83, 99, 124, 144, 201
- and UN budget, 20, 21
- veto cast by, 104
- Chinese. *See under* General Assembly,
- Chinese (*continued*)
 - working languages of
- Cocos (Keeling) Islands, 179
- Codes of conduct, 73–74
- Codification of International Law, 1, 94. *See also* International Law
- impact of issues on CI, 123–127, 161
- list of issues of General Assembly resolutions on, 203
- Coincidence Index (CI). *See under* Tools of analysis; Voting patterns
- Cold War, 35, 40, 45, 48, 65, 66, 67, 69, 72, 73, 75, 77–78, 82–86, 129, 144, 147, 148, 155, 160–161, 164, 166, 169
- Colombia, 6, 40, 54, 62, 102, 125, 132, 143, 159
 - CI with other non-aligned, 207
 - membership in UN, 7, 175
 - negative votes cast by, 196
- Colonialism in general, 34, 97, 124, 147, 149, 203
- Colonies and/or dependencies, overseas territories or provinces, associate states, protectorates. *See* Decolonization
- Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). *See under* Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
- Comoros, 36, 41, 121, 125, 133, 135, 180
 - Archipelago, 180
 - membership in UN, 7, 175
 - negative votes cast by, 196
- Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), 29, 35, 36, 66
- Concepts of Security*, UN study on, 57
- Conference on Disarmament (CD), 66, 68, 70, 72–73, 114, 205
- Congo, 37, 42, 125, 148, 179
 - membership in UN, 7, 175
 - negative votes cast by, 196
- Connally, Tom, 6
- Consensus, 29, 66
- Conventional Armaments Commission, 64
- Cook Islands, 180
- Costa Rica, 40, 45, 54, 102, 108, 112, 125, 141
 - membership in UN, 7, 175
 - negative votes cast by, 196
- Côte d'Ivoire, 36, 125, 130, 141, 150, 179
 - membership in UN, 7, 175, 178n.6
 - negative votes cast by, 196
- Countries. *See* Member States of UN
- Croatia, 12, 85, 132, 135
 - dissolution of Yugoslavia, 8
 - human rights in, 145–146
 - membership in UN, 8, 175
 - negative votes cast by, 196
- Cuba, 6, 40, 42, 102, 103, 107, 111, 114, 123, 125, 130, 141, 143, 144, 150, 160, 201
 - CI with other non-aligned, 207
 - human rights in, 145–146, 202
 - membership in UN, 7, 175
 - negative votes cast by, 196
- Cuban Revolution, 103
- Cyprus, 33–35, 42, 114, 125, 149, 180
 - membership in UN, 7, 175
 - negative votes cast by, 196
 - question of, 33–35
 - and regional groups, 16
- Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, 178n.7
- Czech Republic, 12, 102, 132, 157, 158
 - dissolution of Czechoslovakia, 8–9
 - membership in UN, 8, 175, 178n.7
 - negative votes cast by, 196
- Czechoslovakia, 27, 28, 40, 42, 46, 78, 79, 102, 111, 121, 122, 133, 143–144, 157
 - dissolution of, 8–9
 - membership in UN, 7, 175, 178n.7
 - negative votes cast by, 196

- Dahomey. *See* Benin
- Debt and debt service, 116, 202
- Declaration
- on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960), 1, 52, 82–83, 108, 147
 - on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 1, 74
 - on strengthening of International Security, 74
- Decolonization, 1, 12, 13, 31, 47, 48–53, 74, 82–83, 94, 100, 105–109, 113, 171
- Article 73 (e) of Charter, 48–53, 179, 203
 - colonies and/or trust territories of Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands, NZ, Portugal, Spain, UK and US, 13, 14, 203
 - Committee. *See* General Assembly, Fourth Committee of
 - Declaration of 1960, 82–83, 203
 - and foreign economic interests, 100
 - impact of issues on CI, 123–127, 161
 - list of issues of General Assembly resolutions on, 203
- Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), 6, 37–38, 42, 114, 122, 125, 133, 160
- membership in UN, 8, 175
 - negative votes cast by, 196
- Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly the Congo Republic and Zaire), 75–76, 125, 135, 141, 144, 178n.8, 179
- membership in UN, 7, 175
 - negative votes cast by, 196
 - situation in, 107, 144, 201
- Democratic Yemen, 13, 42, 111, 125, 130, 133, 135, 141, 148, 149, 180
- membership in UN, 7, 175, 178n.9
 - negative votes cast by, 196
 - union with Yemen, 9
- Denmark, 37, 40, 49, 54, 102, 127, 132, 137, 143, 145, 157
- and Greenland, 149, 150, 179, 203
 - membership in UN, 7, 175
 - negative votes cast by, 196
- Dependencies and/or colonies. *See* Decolonization
- Developing countries. *See* Group of 77
- Development, 17, 26, 47, 61–62, 74, 108, 148, 153, 202
- decades of UN, 115, 202
 - and the environment, 61, 109, 202
 - international co-operation for, 116, 201–202
 - and peace, 60
 - and population, 61–62
- Disarmament, 47, 62–73, 94, 101, 105–116, 160, 165, 171. *See also*
- Nuclear disarmament
 - agenda, struggle for, 66–73
 - arms race, 63–66
 - Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), 66
 - biological and chemical weapons, 108, 115
 - and Charter, 63–65
 - Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), 66
 - Conference on, 66, 68, 70, 72–73, 114, 205
 - Conventional Armaments Commission, 64
 - conventional weapons, 114
 - Declaration of 1978, 63
 - economic and social consequences of the arms race, 109, 205
 - Environmental Modification Convention (ENMOD), 66
 - and General Assembly, 63–65
 - impact of issues on CI, 123–127, 161
 - military expenses, 20
 - naval armaments, 115
 - outer space, 24–26, 74, 115
 - and security Committee. *See* General Assembly, First Committee of
 - and Security Council, 63–65

- and UN, 63–66, 115
- World Campaign, 115
- Djibouti, 36, 41, 114, 121, 125
 - membership in UN, 8, 176
 - negative votes cast by, 196
- Dominica, 14, 36, 112, 125, 130, 135, 141, 181
 - membership in UN, 8, 176
 - negative votes cast by, 196
- Dominican Republic, 36, 40, 43, 102, 125, 135, 141, 144, 147
 - membership in UN, 7, 176
- Dominican Republic (*continued*)
 - negative votes cast by, 196
- Drug trafficking, 74
- Earth Summit (1997), 172
- East Timor (incorporated into Indonesia), 100, 101, 182
- East/West rivalry. *See* Cold War
- Eastern European group. *See under* Regional groups
- Economic (questions), 62, 63, 74, 101, 105, 106, 108–109, 115–116.
 - See also* Development
- Committee. *See* General Assembly, Second Committee of
- Commission for Africa, 201
- development, 1, 31–47, 60–62, 74, 94, 171
- and foreign interests and decolonization, 100
- impact of issues on CI, 123–127, 161
- inequalities and UN, 60–63
- international relations, 47, 115
- list of issues of General Assembly
 - resolutions on, 201–202
- monetary questions, 108
- poverty and unemployment, 116
- protectionism, 115–116, 201
- and UNCTAD, 61–62
- Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 106, 165
 - composition of, 1, 5, 16, 18–19, 22, 23, 61, 80, 201
 - functions of, 60–62
 - principal organ of UN, 5
 - voting procedure of, 5
- Ecuador, 6, 38, 40, 102, 125, 144
 - membership in UN, 7, 176
 - negative votes cast by, 196
- Egypt, 6, 17, 36, 40, 41, 46–47, 75, 77, 102, 125, 145, 146, 148, 150
 - CI with other non-aligned, 207
 - membership in UN, 7, 176
 - negative votes cast by, 196
 - and UAR, 9
- Eisenhower, Dwight D., 82
- El Salvador, 6, 40, 102, 106, 112, 125, 132, 141, 144, 159
 - human rights in, 112, 145–147, 202
 - membership in UN, 7, 176
 - negative votes cast by, 196
- English. *See under* General Assembly, working languages of
- Enosis*, 35
- Entrepreneurship*, 114, 201
- Environment, 74, 116
- Environmental Modification Convention (ENMOD), 66
- Equatorial Guinea, 37, 41, 44, 125, 133, 135, 141
 - membership in UN, 7, 176
 - negative votes cast by, 196
 - union of Fernando Póo and Rio Muni, 182
- Eritrea, 12, 125
 - membership in UN, 8, 176
 - negative votes cast by, 196
 - separation from Ethiopia, 8
- Estonia, 12
 - membership in UN, 8, 176
 - negative votes cast by, 196
- Ethiopia, 40, 102, 114, 125, 133, 141, 143, 148, 149, 160
 - membership in UN, 7, 176
 - negative votes cast by, 196
- European Economic Community (EEC), 113, 127, 136, 141. *See also* EU
- European Union (EU, formerly EEC), 9, 17, 37, 120, 127, 135–138
 - passim*, 155, 158, 170
 - CI of members, 136–138, 210
- Fabela, Isidro, xi
- Falkland Islands (Malvinas), 114, 180

- Fernando P6o, 182
 Fiji, 125, 141, 180
 membership in UN, 7, 176
 negative votes cast by, 196
 Finland, 27, 37, 127, 130, 137, 145, 157
 membership in UN, 7, 176
 negative votes cast by, 196
 France, 17, 19, 22–23, 27, 28, 35–55
 passim, 68, 73, 77, 84, 85, 101–114
 passim, 121, 127, 132–139
 passim, 143–157
 passim
 and dependencies, 13, 14, 52–52, 84, 149–151, 175, 179–180, 203
 membership in UN, 7, 176
 negative votes cast by, 196
 and nuclear testing, 35–37, 68, 73
 and UN budget, 20, 21
 vetoes cast by, 104
 Franco, Francisco, 39–40, 44
 French Cameroon, 52
 French Equatorial Africa, 179
 French Guinea, 179
 French Revolution, 59
 French Sudan, 179
 French West Africa, 179
 French. *See under* General Assembly, working languages of

 Gabon, 36, 125, 179
 membership in UN, 7, 176
 negative votes cast by, 196
 Gambia, 36, 37, 42, 112, 113, 125, 130, 135, 180
 membership in UN, 7, 176
 negative votes cast by, 197
 Garc3a Robles, Alfonso, xi
 Gaza, 47
 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). *See also* WTO
 and China, 9, 82
 Uruguay Round, 61–62,
 General Assembly. *See also* Apartheid; Budget; Codification of International Law; Decolonization; Disarmament; Economic issues; International security and other disarmament; Majorities and minorities; Middle East; Namibia; Non-self-governing territories; Nuclear disarmament; Political issues; Regional groups in; Resolutions of; Social issues; Southern Africa, other issues of; Tools of analysis; Voting patterns in;
 agenda of, 13, 31–33, 42, 62, 94, 171
 composition of, 5, 18–19, 23, 25
 and consensus, 29
 convening of, 1
 Credentials Committee of, 44, 81
 credentials of delegations to, 44, 81, 101, 105, 106, 201
 decisions of, 5, 92
 delegations to, 14, 169
 and difficult questions, 42–47
 and disarmament, 47, 63–65
 and dissolution of USSR, 8
 and economic relations, 47
 elections in, 5
 Fifth Committee of, 32, 94
 and fiftieth anniversary of UN, 163
 First Committee of, 24, 32, 36–37, 94
 and fortieth anniversary of UN, 163
 Fourth Committee of, 32, 50–53, 94
 functioning of, 2, 5, 13–19, 31, 33, 47, 78–79, 163–164
 and functioning of UN, 26–28, 31, 74–87, 169–171
 and fundamental issues, 47–74
 General Committee of, 23
 general debate in, 13–14
 and Korean question, 37–38
 and lesson of 1985, 163–164
 “Little Assembly” of, 79
 Main Committees of, 32–33, 94, 95
 master of its own procedure, 13
 and media, 94–95
 and Middle East, 46–47
 as multilateral pantomime, 170
 “name-calling” in, 45, 97
 and nuclear testing, 35–37
 and partition of India, 8
 and partition of Pakistan, 8
 plenary of, 13–14, 32–38, 94, 170
 president of, 16, 18, 44
 principal organ of UN, 5

- and representation of China, 80–82
- Rules of Procedure of, 13, 24, 29, 95, 106, 201
- Second Committee of, 26, 32, 94
- and Secretary-General, 75–77
- sessions of (regular, special and emergency), 1, 13, 92
- and significance of 1960, 82–84
- and significance of 1990, 84–85
- Sixth Committee of, 32, 94
- and South Africa, 6
- Special Political Committee of, 32, 94
- suspension of members by, 6
- Third Committee of, 32, 94
- General Assembly (*continued*)
- vice-presidents of, 23
- voting procedure of, 1, 5, 15, 23–24, 28–29, 83, 164, 167, 171
- working languages of, 15
- and Yugoslavia, 6
- Geneva, 61, 66, 72
- UN office in, 20
- Geographic distribution. *See* Regional groups
- Georgia, 12, 132, 135
- dissolution of USSR and UN, 8
- membership in UN, 8, 176
- negative votes cast by, 197
- German Democratic Republic (GDR), 111, 121, 122, 133, 135
- membership in UN, 7, 42, 176, 178n.11
- negative votes cast by, 197
- Germany, Federal Republic of, 17, 19, 37, 67, 68, 85, 86, 101, 108, 127, 130–137 *passim*, 152–157 *passim*
- CI with other countries, 209
- membership in UN, 7, 176, 178n.11
- negative votes cast by, 197
- reunification, 85
- and UN budget, 20, 21
- Ghana, 75, 77, 125, 148, 150, 180
- CI with other non-aligned, 207
- membership in UN, 7, 176
- negative votes cast by, 197
- Gibraltar, 124, 180
- Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony, 180
- Goa and dependencies, 50, 181
- Gold Coast Colony and Protectorate, 180
- Gorbachov, Mikhail, 84
- Greece, 33–40 *passim*, 102, 107, 127–137 *passim*, 143, 144, 157, 158
- membership in UN, 7, 176
- negative votes cast by, 197
- and question of Cyprus, 33–35
- Greenland, 179
- Grenada, 6, 37, 42, 111, 113, 125, 130, 133, 141, 181
- membership in UN, 7, 176
- negative votes cast by, 197
- Gromyko, Andrei, 31
- Group of 7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and US) industrialized nations, 153
- Group of 77, 17, 61–62, 72, 76, 116, 120–129 *passim*, 136, 141, 142, 148, 149, 159, 153–155, 159, 170
- Guadeloupe and dependencies, 52, 179
- Guam, 49, 181
- Guatemala, 6, 40, 46, 102, 108, 112, 114, 125, 141–147 *passim*
- human rights in, 145–147, 202
- membership in UN, 7, 176
- negative votes cast by, 197
- Guinea, 37, 41, 125, 133, 141, 179
- membership in UN, 7, 176
- negative votes cast by, 197
- Guinea-Bissau, 17, 41, 121, 122, 125, 133, 182
- membership in UN, 7, 176
- negative votes cast by, 197
- Gulf War, 40, 47, 58, 164, 165
- Guyana, 42, 125, 180
- membership in UN, 7, 176
- negative votes cast by, 197
- HABITAT, 108, 201
- Haiti, 6, 36, 40, 87, 102, 112, 125, 141, 144
- membership in UN, 7, 176
- negative votes cast by, 197
- Hamarskjöld, Dag, 75–76. *See also* Secretary-General

- Havana, 103
 - Charter, 61
- Hawaii, 181
- Heritage Foundation
 - attacks against UN, xi, 77
- Hijacking of planes, 74
- Holy See, 11, 12, 176
- Honduras, 17, 37, 40, 54, 102, 112, 125, 132, 141, 143
 - membership in UN, 7, 176
 - negative votes cast by, 197
- Hong Kong, 59, 180
- Hostage-taking, 74
- Human rights, 31, 47, 48–60, 74, 97, 101, 105, 106, 108, 112, 115, 145–147, 160, 171
 - in armed conflicts in Southern Africa, 206
 - and collective rights, 54, 74
 - Commission, 54
 - definition of, 54–56
 - and freedoms of individuals, 54, 74
 - impact of issues on CI, 123–127
 - in general, 61, 202
 - International Covenants on, 54
 - statutes on refugees, genocide, slavery, torture, racial discrimination, *apartheid*, the rights of women, children, invalids, mentally retarded, and migrant workers, 54
 - UN and, 56–60, 115
 - UN high commissioner for, 124, 165
 - Universal Declaration of, 54
 - World conferences on, 56
- Humanitarian intervention, 57–59, 97, 160
- Hungary, 27, 42, 78, 103, 111, 121, 132, 133, 144, 146, 157, 158
 - human rights in, 144–145, 202
 - membership in UN, 7, 176
 - negative votes cast by, 197
 - situation in, 201
 - Soviet invasion of, 24, 78, 144
- Hussein, Saddam, 58
 - membership in UN, 7, 176
 - negative votes cast by, 197
- Ifni, 84, 182
- India, 40–46 *passim*, 79, 84, 102, 108–114 *passim*, 125, 133, 144–152 *passim*, 160
 - CI with other non-aligned, 207
 - membership in UN, 7, 176, 178n.12
 - negative votes cast by, 197
 - partition of and UN, 8
 - and UN budget, 20, 21
- Indian Subcontinent, 112
- Indo-China, 179
- Indonesia, 17, 38, 40, 42, 45, 125, 130, 149, 180, 182
 - CI with other non-aligned, 207
 - membership in UN, 7, 176, 178n.13
 - negative votes cast by, 197
 - withdrawal from UN, 6
- Industrial development, 116, 202
- Industrial Revolution, 57
- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 114, 205
- International Committee of the Red Cross, 87
- International Court of Justice (ICJ)
 - advisory opinions, 70–71
 - cases before the, 203
 - composition, 5, 22
 - and Nicaragua, 113
 - principal organ of UN, 5
 - voting procedure of, 5
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 54
- International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 54
- International Law, 58–59, 73–74. *See also* Codification of Commission, 74
 - reports of, 108, 203
 - Declaration on principles of, 1, 74
- International peace and security, 64, 65, 78–80, 86, 155
- International security, 1, 57, 74, 115
 - Declaration on, 74
 - impact of issues on CI, 123–127, 161
 - and other disarmament issues of General Assembly resolutions,
- Iceland, 40, 54, 127, 132, 143, 145, 157

- list of, 205
- Iran, Islamic Republic of, 6, 37, 38, 42, 44, 46, 102, 114, 125, 133, 143
 - CI with other non-aligned, 207
 - human rights in, 145–147, 202
 - membership in UN, 7, 176
 - negative votes cast by, 197
 - Shah of, 44
- Iraq, 34, 35, 36, 40, 42, 45, 46, 58, 70, 102, 111, 112, 125, 133, 135, 160
 - human rights in, 114, 145–147, 202
 - and invasion of Kuwait, 58, 77
 - membership in UN, 7, 176
 - negative votes cast by, 197
- Ireland, 19, 27, 37, 40, 127, 132, 137, 145, 157, 158
 - membership in UN, 7, 176
- Ireland (*continued*)
 - negative votes cast by, 197
- Israel, 40–47 *passim*, 54, 104, 107–116 *passim*, 122, 130, 132, 133–134, 141–146 *passim*, 150, 154
 - CI with other countries, 135
 - membership in UN, 7, 176
 - negative votes cast by, 197
 - practices of, in the occupied territories, 113, 205
 - and regional groups, 16
- Italy, 17, 27, 37, 49, 52, 68, 84, 127, 132, 137, 150, 152, 153
 - and dependencies, 14, 84, 175, 203
 - membership in UN, 7, 10, 176
 - negative votes cast by, 197
 - and UN budget, 20
- Ivory Coast. *See* Côte d'Ivoire
- Jamaica, 125, 141, 180
 - CI with other non-aligned, 207
 - membership in UN, 7, 176
 - negative votes cast by, 197
- Japan, 14, 49, 64, 67, 68, 85, 86, 130, 132, 141, 145, 146, 150, 152, 153, 155, 158, 164
 - CI with other countries, 212
 - membership in UN, 7, 176
 - negative votes cast by, 197
 - and UN budget, 20, 21
- Jefferson, Thomas, 59
- Jerusalem, status of, 46, 205
- Jordan, 27, 36, 38, 42, 125
 - membership in UN, 7, 176
 - negative votes cast by, 197
- Juárez, Benito, 57
- Kampuchea. *See* Cambodia
- Katanga province, 75
- Kazakhstan, 12, 135
 - dissolution of USSR and UN, 8
 - membership in UN, 8, 176
 - negative votes cast by, 197
- Kenya, 45, 125, 148, 180
 - membership in UN, 7, 176
 - negative votes cast by, 197
- Khrushchev, Nikita, 82
- Kiribati, 11, 12, 176, 180
- Korea, 6, 99, 100, 101. *See also* DPR
 - of; Republic of
 - question of, 6, 37–38, 124, 144, 172, 201
- Kosovo, 145–146
- Kouchner, Bernard, 59
- Kuomintang, 80–81
- Kuwait, 36, 38, 41, 58, 111, 114, 121, 122, 125, 145, 146, 148
 - human rights in occupied, 114, 145–146, 202
 - invasion by Iraq, 58, 77
 - membership in UN, 7, 176
 - negative votes cast by, 197
- Kyrgyzstan, 12, 135
 - dissolution of USSR and UN, 8
 - membership in UN, 8, 176
 - negative votes cast by, 197
- Lac Léman, 61
- Lake Success, New York, xi
- Land-locked countries, 116, 202
- Languages of UN. *See under* General Assembly, working
- Lao People's Democratic Republic, 36, 42, 111, 121, 125, 130, 133, 141
 - membership in UN, 7, 176
 - negative votes cast by, 197
- Laos, 179
- Latin American and Caribbean group.

- See under* Regional groups
- Latvia, 12, 132
membership in UN, 8, 176
negative votes cast by, 197
- Law of the Sea, 74, 112, 203
- Laws of war, 59, 74
- League of Nations, 31, 46, 48, 49, 163, 169
membership of, 9
- Lebanon, 40, 41, 42, 46, 79, 102, 104, 111, 125, 133, 144
membership in UN, 7, 176
negative votes cast by, 197
UN assistance to, 205
- Leeward Islands, 181
- Legal Committee. *See* General Assembly, Sixth Committee of
- Lesotho, 125, 130, 141, 180
membership in UN, 7, 176
negative votes cast by, 197
- Liberia, 36, 40, 102, 125, 130, 135, 141, 144
membership in UN, 7, 176
negative votes cast by, 197
- Libya, 27, 42, 110, 111, 112, 125, 133, 141, 148, 149, 160
membership in UN, 7, 176
negative votes cast by, 197
US intervention in, 201
- Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. *See* Libya
- Lie, Trygve, 75, 76. *See also* Secretary-General
- Liechtenstein, 127
membership in UN, 8, 176
negative votes cast by, 197
- Lithuania, 12
membership in UN, 8, 176
negative votes cast by, 198
- Lodge, Henry Cabot, 25–26, 29
- Luxembourg, 15, 37, 40, 43, 54, 102, 106, 114, 127, 132, 137, 143
membership in UN, 7, 176
negative votes cast by, 198
- Macau and dependencies, 182
- Macedonia (TFYR), 12
membership in UN, 8, 176
negative votes cast by, 198
- MacMillan, Harold, 82
- Madagascar, 37, 42, 125, 180
CI with other non-aligned, 207
and dependencies, 180
membership in UN, 7, 176
negative votes cast by, 198
- Madrid, 39, 41
- Majorities and Minorities in UN General Assembly votes, 23–29, 82
automatic majority, 24–26, 28, 83, 141
meaningless majority, 24, 26
overwhelming majority, 24, 101, 113, 163
- Malawi, 44, 125, 130, 141, 181
membership in UN, 7, 176
negative votes cast by, 198
- Malayan Union, 181
- Malaysia, 42, 125
CI with other non-aligned, 207
membership in UN, 7, 176, 178n.14
negative votes cast by, 198
separation of Singapore and UN, 8
union of Malayan Federation, Sabah and Sarawak, 181
- Maldives, 38, 42, 125, 135
membership in UN, 7, 176
negative votes cast by, 198
- Mali, 36, 42, 125, 133, 148, 179
membership in UN, 7, 176
negative votes cast by, 198
- Malta, 42, 120, 127, 130, 132, 135, 141, 181
membership in UN, 7, 176
negative votes cast by, 198
- Malvinas. *See* Falkland Islands
- Mandela, Nelson, 45
- Mao Tse-tung, 80
- Marianas Islands, 49
- Marshall Islands, 49, 112, 125, 130
membership in UN, 8, 176
negative votes cast by, 198
- Martinique, 52, 180
- Mauritania, 36, 42, 45, 125, 133, 149, 179
membership in UN, 7, 176
negative votes cast by, 198
- Mauritius, 38, 110, 112, 125, 181
membership in UN, 7, 176
negative votes cast by, 198

- Mayotte, 114
- Median. *See under* Tools of analysis;
Voting patterns
- Melilla, 84
- Member States of UN
listed alphabetically, 175–178
listed in order of admission, 7–8
- Mercenaries, 74, 201, 203
- Mexico, 6, 14–15, 40, 42, 55, 59, 102,
125, 143, 145, 146, 147, 150,
158, 168
CI with other countries, 212
membership in UN, 7, 176
negative votes cast by, 198
and UN budget, 21
- Micronesia, Federated States of, 112,
125, 130
membership in UN, 8, 176
negative votes cast by, 198
- Middle Congo, 179
- Middle East, 31, 36, 41–42, 46–47,
94, 101, 104–116 *passim*, 163.
See also Palestine
- Middle East (*continued*)
Camp David Accords, 47
Gaza, 47
impact of issues on CI, 123–127,
161
list of issues of General Assembly
resolutions on, 205–206
Peace Conference, 40, 41
Sinai, 47
Six-Day War, 47, 124, 154
Suez Canal Company, 47
Yom Kippur War, 47
- Midrand, South Africa, 62
- Military Staff Committee. *See under*
Security Council
- Moldova, 12, 135
dissolution of USSR and UN, 8
membership in UN, 8, 176
negative votes cast by, 198
- Monaco, 36, 121, 127, 132, 136
membership in UN, 8, 176
negative votes cast by, 198
- Mongolia, 27, 42, 103, 104, 111, 120,
121, 130, 133
membership in UN, 7, 176
negative votes cast by, 198
- Montenegro. *See* Yugoslavia
- Montserrat, 181
- Morocco, 34, 38, 41, 84, 106, 112,
125, 130, 149, 180, 182
membership in UN, 7, 176
negative votes cast by, 198
- Moscow, 84
- Mozambique, 42, 45, 122, 125, 141,
149, 182
membership in UN, 7, 176
negative votes cast by, 198
and UN budget, 21
- Multilateral trade negotiations, 116,
202
- Multilingualism, 101
- Munich, 85
- Myanmar (formerly Burma), 40, 75,
125, 133, 146, 149
membership in UN, 7
negative votes cast by, 198
- Nairobi, UN office in, 20
- Namibia (formerly South West Afri-
ca), 37, 43, 45, 48, 49, 107, 119,
122–131 *passim*, 137, 149, 154,
161, 171
impact of issues on CI, 123–127,
161
League of Nations mandate, 48
list of issues of General Assembly
resolutions on, 203, 206
membership in UN, 8, 177
negative votes cast by, 198
- Nauru, 11, 12, 177
- Nazi Germany, 65, 69
- Nehru, Jawaharlal, 82, 83
- Nepal, 27, 125, 149
membership in UN, 7, 177
negative votes cast by, 198
- Netherlands, 6, 15, 37, 40, 43, 46, 49,
52–53, 54, 84, 102, 127, 132,
135, 136, 137, 143, 152
- Antilles, 180
and dependencies, 13, 14, 52–53,
84, 149–151, 175, 180, 203
- Indies, 180
membership in UN, 7, 177
negative votes cast by, 198
- New Guinea, 180

- and UN budget, 20
- New Caledonia, 52, 180
- New Guinea, 49
- New Hebrides, 180
- New international economic order, 63, 97, 115, 201
- New York, xi, 20, 31, 61, 72, 169
- New Zealand, 6, 40, 43, 44, 49, 54, 102, 127, 132, 141, 143, 158
 - and dependencies, 13, 14, 149–151, 175, 180, 203
 - membership in UN, 7, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 198
 - and regional groups, 16
- Nicaragua, 40, 44, 102, 106, 108, 125, 130, 132, 133, 141, 144, 159
 - membership in UN, 7, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 198
 - situation in, 112, 113
 - trade embargo against, 113, 201
- Niger, 36, 41, 125, 179
 - Colony, 179
 - membership in UN, 7, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 198
- Nigeria, 42, 125, 145, 146, 148, 150, 181
 - CI with other non-aligned, 207
 - human rights in, 145–146
 - membership in UN, 7, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 198
- Niue Island, 180
- Nkrumah, Kwame, 82
- Non-aligned countries. *See under* Regional groups
- Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
 - representation in ECOSOC, 106, 202–203
- Non-interference in internal electoral processes, 99
- Non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS), 68–73
- Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 29, 35–36, 66–72, 114, 135, 205
 - extension of, 35–36, 68, 71
- Non-self-governing territories, 13, 48–53, 106, 179–182, 203
- Nordic countries. *See under* Regional groups
- North American Free Trade Area. (NAFTA), 155, 158
 - CI of members, 212
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (NATO), 16, 17, 66, 71, 72, 78, 85, 136, 141, 172
- North Borneo (Sabah), 181
- North Korea. *See* DPRK
- Northern Rhodesia, 181
- Norway, 40, 47, 54, 75, 102, 127, 132, 143, 145, 157
 - membership in UN, 7, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 198
- Nuclear disarmament, 20, 35–37, 62–73, 112, 114, 115, 205
 - Atomic Energy Commission, 64
 - cessation of nuclear testing, 29, 35, 36, 66, 108, 109, 112, 113, 114
 - fissile material, 70, 71, 72, 114, 205
 - impact of issues on CI, 123–127, 161
 - list of issues of General Assembly resolutions on, 205
 - non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, 108, 205
 - radioactive waste, 114, 205
 - security guarantees, 67, 71, 72, 114
- Nuclear testing, 29, 35–37, 66, 67, 68, 108, 109, 112, 113, 114, 115
 - Chinese, 35–36
 - cost of, 20
 - French, 35–37
- Nuclear weapons, 64–73
 - effects of the possible use of, 205
 - legality of, 68, 70–71
 - non-proliferation of, 72, 205
 - use of, 64, 67, 69
- Nuclear-weapon States (NWS), 35, 66, 67–73
- Nuclear-weapon-free zones, establishment of, 114, 205
 - in South Asia, 112
- Nyasaland, 181
- Nyerere, Julius, 53
- Oman, 36, 41, 125
 - membership in UN, 7, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 198
- Organization for Economic Co-

- operation and Development (OECD), 136, 155, 158
 - CI of members, 211
- Other issues regarding Southern Africa. *See under* Southern Africa
- Pacific Islands, 49
- Padilla Nervo, Luis, xi
- Pakistan, 12, 40, 42, 43, 112, 125, 146, 149
 - CI with other non-aligned, 207
 - membership in UN, 7, 177, 178n.16
 - negative votes cast by, 198
 - partition of and UN, 8
 - partition of India and UN, 8
- Palau, 120, 125, 135
 - membership in UN, 8, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 198
- Palestine, 46–47, 94, 108, 113, 163
 - Liberation Organization (PLO) and UN, 47, 108, 205
 - partition of, 1, 46–47
 - Special Committee on, 46
- Panama Canal Zone, 181
- Panama, 6, 38, 40, 102, 108, 125, 132, 143, 201
 - membership in UN, 7, 177
- Panama (*continued*)
 - negative votes cast by, 198
- Papua New Guinea, 125, 179
 - membership in UN, 7, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 198
- Papua, 179
- Paraguay, 6, 40, 44, 102, 112, 125, 130, 141, 143
 - membership in UN, 7, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 198
- Paris, 57
- Partial Test-Ban Treaty (PTBT), 66, 67, 205
- Peace and development, 60
- Peace-keeping operations, 86–87, 109, 111, 112, 165, 172
 - cost of, 22
- Peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), 72
- Peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 72, 205
- Peaceful uses of outer space, 74, 205
 - Committee on the (COPUOS), 24–26
- Pelindaba Treaty, 67
- People's Republic of China. *See* China
- Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier, 76, 77. *See also* Secretary-General
- Permanent members of Security Council. *See under* Security Council, permanent members of
- Peru, 6, 40, 45, 46, 75, 102, 125, 132, 143
 - CI with other non-aligned, 207
 - membership in UN, 7, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 198
- Philippines, 38, 40, 78, 102, 125, 143
 - membership in UN, 7, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 198
- Pitcairn Islands, 181
- Planetary Citizens
 - and UN votes, xii
- Poland, 17, 27, 28, 40, 42, 78, 79, 84, 102, 111, 133, 144, 157, 158
 - membership in UN, 7, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 198
- Political questions, 94
 - impact of issues on CI, 123–127, 161
 - list of issues of General Assembly resolutions on, 201
 - non-use of force, 114
- Population. *See under* Development
- Portugal, 27, 37, 38, 42, 43, 49, 50–53, 84, 101, 103, 107–110 *passim*, 127, 130, 131, 132, 137, 144–153 *passim*, 160
 - and dependencies, 13, 14, 52–53, 84, 108, 149–151, 175, 181–182, 203
 - membership in UN, 7, 10, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 198
 - and UN budget, 21
- Portuguese Guinea, 182
- Potsdam Conference, 39
- Preamble of UN Charter. *See under* Charter of UN
- Protection of diplomatic missions, 114
- Puerto Rico, 181
- Qatar, 36, 42, 121, 122, 125

- membership in UN, 7, 177
- negative votes cast by, 199
- Racial discrimination, 115
- Racism and Zionism resolution, 39, 40–42
- Reagan, Ronald, 77, 84, 113, 129
- Recorded votes. *See under* Resolutions of General Assembly
- Red Cross, International Committee of the, 87
- Refugees, 74, 145
- Regional groups in UN, 11–12, 15–19, 78–79, 127, 130. *See also*
 - ASEAN, EU, Group of 77, NAFTA, OECD
- African, 16, 18, 19, 36, 120, 123, 126, 130, 141, 144, 148, 149, 151, 153
- and Afro-Asian nations, 18, 148, 151–153
- and Arab countries, 17, 36, 41–42, 47, 120, 126, 130, 136, 143, 144, 148
- Asian, 16, 18, 19, 120, 123, 125, 126, 130, 141, 144, 148, 149, 151, 153
- Eastern European, 10, 16, 18, 19, 40, 78, 84, 120, 121, 123, 130, 133, 141–149 *passim*, 154–160 *passim*, 164
- and elections, 17–18
- and English-speaking Caribbean, 17, 123
- Latin American and Caribbean, 16, 18, 40, 120–130 *passim*, 141, 144, 148, 149, 152, 153, 160
- and non-aligned countries, 17, 66, 72, 82, 129, 136, 141, 142, 147, 153, 159–160, 170, 207
- and Nordic countries, 17, 136, 157–158, 210
- and sub-Saharan countries, 17
- Western European and Others, 16, 18, 19, 43, 61, 120–130 *passim*, 135, 138, 141–148 *passim*, 151, 153, 154, 158, 160, 164, 167
- Republic of China. *See* China
- Republic of Korea, 6, 17, 37–38, 125, 158
- membership in UN, 8, 177
- negative votes cast by, 199
- Resolutions of General Assembly, 33, 83, 91–116, 193–200
- abstentions on, 95–98
- affirmative votes on, 96–98
- adoption of
 - by roll-call, 95
 - directly in Plenary, 94
 - upon recommendation of Main Committees, 94
 - by a vote, 29, 95–103
 - five-year totals, 93
 - without a vote, 95, 96
 - five-year totals, 93
- consistency of, 33–37
- contradictory, 37–38
- draft, 32, 83
- drafting of, 94, 171
- five-year totals, 92–99
- trends, 92, 98
- length of, 94
- and media, 94–95
- “name-calling” in, 45, 97
- negative votes on, 95, 96–116
 - cast by countries, 97, 100–116, 195–200
 - eleven or more, 98–101
 - evolution of, 96–98
 - five-year totals, 93
 - gang of six (and later five), 102–103
 - listed, 193–194
 - number of, 98–100
 - one against, 98–99, 105–116
 - significance of, 97–98, 117
 - ten or less, 98–100
 - thirty or more, 98–100
 - three against, 98–99, 105–116
 - total, 97
 - two against, 98–99, 105–116
 - and vetoes in the Security Council, 103–104
- without negative votes, 93, 96
- five-year totals, 93
- numbering of, 91, 92
- without objection, 95, 96
- five-year totals, 93

- percent of total, 93, 95
 - recorded votes, 95, 127–128
 - five-year totals, 93
 - list of, 187–192
 - percent of total, 93, 95
 - subjects of, 127, 201–206
 - repeal of, 38–42
 - significance of, 1–2, 95
 - subjects of, 91, 105–116, 119
 - total, 92–95
 - five-year average, 92
 - by session, 183–185
 - by year, 92
 - voting procedure, 1, 95
- Réunion, 52, 180
- Rio de Janeiro Conference, 62
- Rio Muni, 182
- Romania, 27, 41, 42, 103, 130, 132, 133, 141–142, 157
 - human rights in, 145–146, 202
 - membership in UN, 7, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 199
- Roosevelt, Eleanor, 54
- Ruanda-Urundi, 48, 53
- Rules of Procedure. *See under* General Assembly
- Russia. *See* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- Russian. *See under* General Assembly, working languages of
- Russian Federation. *See* USSR
- Russian Revolution, 84
- Rwanda, 42, 87, 111, 125, 135
 - membership in UN, 7, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 199
- Sadat, Anwar, 47
- Safeguards in nuclear matters, 64
- Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (formerly Spanish Sahara), 11, 12, 177, 182
- Saint Helena and dependencies, 181
- Saint Kitts-Nevis, 36, 113, 125, 141, 181
 - and Anguilla, 181
 - membership in UN, 8, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 199
- Saint Lucia, 14, 36, 37, 125, 133, 141, 181
 - membership in UN, 8, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 199
 - and UN budget, 21
- Saint Pierre and Miquelon, 52, 180
- Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 36, 37, 125, 135, 141, 181
 - membership in UN, 8, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 199
- Salim, Salim Ahmed, 77, 104
- Samoa, 125, 141
 - membership in UN, 7, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 199
- San Francisco Conference, 163, 164
 - and disarmament, 65
 - and new UN members, 39
 - and veto, 5–6, 29
- San Marino, 36, 37, 127, 135, 160
 - membership in UN, 8, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 199
- Santiago de Chile, UN office in, 20
- Sao Joao Batista de Ajuda, 182
- Sao Tome and Principe, 14, 36, 42, 50, 121, 122, 125, 133, 135, 182
 - membership in UN, 7, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 199
- Sarawak, 181
- Saudi Arabia, 6, 36, 40, 42, 46, 55–56, 102, 108, 125, 130, 146
 - membership in UN, 7, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 199
 - and right to self-determination, 55–56
- Secretariat, 31, 164–169 *passim*
 - and disarmament, economic affairs and peace-keeping, 165
 - personnel, 1, 22
- Secretary-General, 50, 52, 75–77, 80, 165, 168, 172
 - principal organ of UN, 5
- Security Council, 37, 58–59, 74, 77–80, 94, 134, 138–139, 155–156, 164–166
 - composition of, 1, 5, 17, 18, 23, 77, 78, 81, 85–86, 201
 - and disarmament, 63–65
 - and Gulf War, 58–59
 - and Middle East, 47
 - and Military Staff Committee, 63
 - permanent members of, 1, 19, 35,

- 64, 73, 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 85–86, 134
- principal organ of UN, 5
- and Republic of China delegates, 6
- resolutions of, 155
- and South Africa, 44–45
- and Spanish question, 39
- summit meeting (1992) of, 9, 60, 85–86
- and veto, 1, 5–6, 22–23, 26–29, 45, 75, 76, 77, 80, 86, 103–104, 164, 201
- voting procedure of, 5, 58–59
- Self-determination, right to, 34–35, 52, 54–56, 124, 202
- Senegal, 36, 41, 125, 146, 147, 150, 179
- CI with other non-aligned, 207
- membership in UN, 7, 177
- negative votes cast by, 199
- and UN budget, 21
- Serbia. *See* Yugoslavia
- Seychelles, 36, 122, 125, 133, 135, 141, 181
- membership in UN, 7, 177
- negative votes cast by, 199
- Sheverdnaze, Edvard, 84, 85
- Sierra Leone, 36, 113, 125, 181
- membership in UN, 7, 177
- negative votes cast by, 199
- Sinai, 47
- Singapore, 12, 38, 125, 141, 181
- membership in UN, 7, 177
- negative votes cast by, 199
- separation from Malaysia, 8
- and UN budget, 21
- Six-Day War, 47, 124, 134, 154
- Slavery, 69–70
- Slovakia (Slovak Republic), 12, 102, 132, 157
- dissolution of Czechoslovakia, 8–9
- membership in UN, 8, 177, 178n.7
- negative votes cast by, 199
- Slovenia, 12, 85, 132, 135
- dissolution of Yugoslavia, 8
- membership in UN, 8, 177
- negative votes cast by, 199
- Smuts, Marshall Jan Christiaan, 48
- Sobolev, Arkadi A., 24–25
- Social and humanitarian Committee. *See* General Assembly, Third Committee of
- Social questions, 1, 94, 105, 106, 115. *See also* Human rights
- impact of issues on CI, 123–127, 161
- list of issues of General Assembly resolutions on, 202–203
- Solomon Islands, 125, 135, 141, 181
- membership in UN, 8, 177
- negative votes cast by, 199
- Protectorate, 181
- Somalia, 36, 42, 49, 59, 87, 111, 122, 125, 135, 149, 180
- membership in UN, 7, 177
- negative votes cast by, 199
- Somoza, Anastasio, 44
- South Africa, 6, 34, 40, 41, 43–45, 48, 52, 54, 59, 62, 83–84, 100–110 *passim*, 113, 116, 120, 122, 125, 127, 130–131, 132, 133, 141–147 *passim*, 150–151, 167, 171, 205
- CI with other countries, 130
- and dependencies, 14, 84, 149–151, 175
- membership in UN, 7, 177
- negative votes cast by, 199
- and regional groups, 16
- and suspension by General Assembly, 6, 108, 178n.17
- and voluntary withdrawal from General Assembly, 43
- South Korea. *See* Republic of Korea
- South West Africa. *See* Namibia
- Southern Africa, 104–109, 113, 115, 165. *See also* Apartheid; Namibia
- impact of issues on CI, 123–127, 161
- Other issues of General Assembly resolutions, list of, 206
- situation in, 45
- Southern Rhodesia, 45, 149, 182, 206
- Soviet bloc. *See under* Regional groups, Eastern European
- Spain, 34, 37, 39–40, 41, 42, 44, 49, 50–53, 59, 78, 84, 107, 121, 127,

- 130, 132, 137, 147, 152
- and dependencies, 13, 14, 52–53, 84, 149–151, 175, 182, 203
- membership in UN, 7, 177
- negative votes cast by, 199
- question of, 10, 39, 104, 106, 144
- and UN budget, 20, 21
- Spanish Sahara, 84, 100, 101, 182. *See also* Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic
- Spanish. *See under* General Assembly, working languages of
- Special Political Committee. *See under* General Assembly
- Special sessions of the UN General Assembly devoted to disarmament, 65, 72, 205
- Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon) , 27, 42, 114, 125, 149
 - CI with other non-aligned, 207
 - membership in UN, 7, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 199
- Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), 66, 67, 115, 205
- Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), 114, 205
- Stroessner, Alfredo, 44
- Sudan, 37, 42, 51, 125, 133, 145, 146, 149, 160
 - human rights in, 145–146, 202
 - membership in UN, 7, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 199
- Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 85
- Suez Canal Company, 47
- Suez crisis, 47, 205
- Sukarno, 82
- Surinam. *See* Suriname
- Suriname, 125, 132, 180
 - membership in UN, 7, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 199
- Swaziland, 44, 125, 130, 141, 181
 - membership in UN, 7, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 199
- Sweden, 19, 37, 38, 40, 46, 50, 54, 67, 75, 127, 130, 137, 143, 145, 146, 147, 150, 152, 153, 157
 - membership in UN, 7, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 199
 - and UN budget, 20
- Switzerland, 11, 12, 68, 177
- Syria, 40, 42, 46, 102, 104, 109, 110, 111, 112, 114, 125, 130, 133, 141, 146, 160
 - membership in UN, 7, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 199
 - and UAR, 9
- Taipei, 80
- Taiwan. *See* China
- Tajikistan, 12, 37, 135
 - dissolution of USSR and UN, 8
 - membership in UN, 8, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 199
- Tanganyika, 13, 49, 52, 53
 - membership in UN, 7, 9, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 199
 - union with Zanzibar, 7, 9
- Teheran, 56
- Terrorism, 74, 101
- Thailand, 38, 40, 125, 132, 143
 - membership in UN, 7, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 199
- Thant U, 48, 76. *See also* Secretary-General
- Thatcher, Margaret, 113, 129
- The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. *See* Macedonia
- Third Reich, 64
- Third World. *See under* Regional groups, Group of 77
- Tibet, 144
- Timor and dependencies, 182
- Tito, Josip Broz, 82
- Togo, 36, 49, 52, 114, 125
 - membership in UN, 7, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 199
- Tokelau Islands, 180
- Tonga, 11, 12, 177
- Tools of analysis of voting patterns
 - Members in General Assembly, 117–120
 - analysis of votes, 117
 - Coincidence Index, 118–119
 - median, 120
 - methodology, 117–120
 - subjects of resolutions adopted by a recorded vote, 91, 105–116, 119
- Touré, Sékou, 82

- Transfer of resources, 108–109, 116, 202
- Transfer of technological know-how, 116, 202
- Transfer of technology, negotiation of draft code of conduct on, 74, 201
- Transnational corporations
 - Center on, 74
 - negotiation of draft code of conduct on, 74, 201
- Treaty of Rarotonga, 67, 205
- Treaty of Tlatelolco, 67, 71, 205
- Trinidad and Tobago, 125, 181
 - membership in UN, 7, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 199
- Trust territories. *See* Non-self-governing territories
- Trusteeship Council
 - composition of, 5, 22, 23
 - principal organ of UN, 5
 - reports of, 203
 - voting procedure of, 5
- Tunisia, 41, 106, 125, 149, 180
 - CI with other non-aligned, 207
 - membership in UN, 7, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 199
- Turkey, 34, 35, 40, 42, 43, 54, 102, 112, 114, 127, 130, 132, 141, 143, 158
 - membership in UN, 7, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 199
 - and regional groups, 16
- Turkmenistan, 12, 37, 135
 - dissolution of USSR and UN, 8
 - membership in UN, 8, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 200
- Turks and Caicos Islands, 181
- Tuvalu, 11, 12, 177, 180
- Ubangi Shari, 179
- Uganda, 38, 42, 125, 148, 181
 - membership in UN, 7, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 200
- Ukraine, 12, 13, 17, 27, 28, 40, 42, 78, 79, 102, 108, 111, 114, 121, 133, 144, 152, 167
 - membership in UN, 7, 177, 178n.19
 - negative votes cast by, 200
 - and UN budget, 20
- UN Center on Transnational Corporations, 74
- UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 17, 61–62, 74, 108, 148, 153, 201
- UN Development Program (UNDP), 26, 62, 108, 201
- UN disarmament fellowship program, 115, 205
- UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), 111, 112, 114
- UN Emergency Force (UNEF), 47, 11
- UN Environment Programme (UNEP), 108
- UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), 116, 201
- UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 111, 112, 114
- UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), 47, 108, 113, 205
- UN Special Fund for Development, 62
- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 12–19 *passim*, 22–23, 24–28, 35, 39, 40–74 *passim*, 65–85 *passim*, 102, 103–104, 108, 111, 114, 119, 120, 121, 127, 133, 138–141, 144–156 *passim*, 164, 166, 167, 171
 - absence from Security Council, 6
 - CI with other countries, 208
 - dissolution of and UN, 8–9
 - human rights in, 145–146, 202
 - and invasion of Hungary, 24, 78
 - membership in UN, 7, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 200
 - and nuclear testing, 35
 - separation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, 8
 - and UN budget, 20, 21
 - veto cast by, 28, 103–104
- United Arab Emirates (UAE), 36, 42, 121, 125
 - membership in UN, 7, 177
 - negative votes cast by, 200
- United Arab Republic (UAR). *See also* Egypt; Syria
 - dissolution of, 7, 9
 - membership in UN, 7, 9, 178n.10

- negative votes cast by, 200
- United Kingdom (UK), 17, 19, 22–23, 27, 28, 33–55 *passim*, 59, 66, 68, 84, 85, 100–114 *passim*, 119, 127, 130–139 *passim*, 143–157 *passim*
- and dependencies, 13, 14, 46, 53, 84, 135, 149–151, 175, 180–182, 203
- membership in UN, 7, 177
- negative votes cast by, 200
- and nuclear testing, 35
- and UN budget, 20, 21
- veto cast by, 104
- United Nations (UN). *See also* Budget; Charter; ECOSOC; ICJ; General Assembly; Member States of; Resolutions of General Assembly; Secretariat of; Secretary-General of; Security Council; Trusteeship Council
- administrative questions, 206
- from Cold War to Gulf War, 164–166
- committed international civil servants and diplomats, 168–170
- cost of, per inhabitant, 21
- Declaration by, 64, 163
- Department of Public Information, 116
- and disarmament, 47, 63–66
- and economic relations, 47
- fiftieth anniversary of, 163
- financial crisis of, 22, 91, 206
- fortieth anniversary of, 116
- functioning of, 31, 74–87, 105–107, 116, 163, 164, 201
- headquarters (New York), xi, 20, 31
- United Nations (*continued*)
- and human rights, 56–60
- information centers of, 20
- internationalism vs. parochialism, 164, 166–167
- membership, 7–14, 27–28, 39, 144, 175–178
- regional origin of, 11–12
- and Middle East, 46–47
- Military Staff Committee, 63
- and natural disasters, 116
- numbering of documents, xii
- pension system of, 114
- provisional offices at Lake Success, xi
- purse strings of, 167–168
- and Spanish question, 39–40
- towards effective action, 170–172
- and Viet Nam War, 48
- United Republic of Tanzania, 42, 77, 125, 133, 148, 181
- membership in UN, 7, 177, 178n.20
- negative votes cast by, 200
- union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, 7, 9
- United States, 6, 9, 10, 14, 17, 19, 22–23, 24–28, 35–55 *passim*, 59, 65–84 *passim*, 100–119 *passim*, 122, 127, 130–159 *passim*, 163, 164, 168, 171
- Congress and UN voting, xi–xii, 118–119
- and dependencies, 13, 14, 53, 149–151, 175, 181, 203
- membership in UN, 7, 177
- negative votes cast by, 200
- and nuclear testing, 35
- and regional groups, 16
- State Department, xii, 20, 118–119
- and UN budget, 20, 21
- veto cast by, 29, 103–104
- Uniting for Peace resolution, 26–27, 79
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1, 26, 29, 44, 54, 56, 203
- Upper Volta. *See* Burkina Faso
- Uruguay, 40, 46, 54, 102, 125, 141, 143
- membership in UN, 7, 177
- negative votes cast by, 200
- Uzbekistan, 12, 36, 37, 135
- dissolution of USSR and UN, 8
- membership in UN, 8, 177
- negative votes cast by, 200
- Vanuatu, 14, 36, 41, 121, 122, 125, 180
- membership in UN, 8, 177
- negative votes cast by, 200

- Venezuela, 38, 40, 54, 85, 102, 125, 144, 146
 membership in UN, 7, 178
 negative votes cast by, 200
 Veto. *See under* Security Council
 Vienna, 56
 UN office in, 20
 Viet Nam, 42, 48, 111, 116, 121, 122, 125, 130, 133, 141, 160, 179
 membership in UN, 8, 116, 178
 negative votes cast by, 200
 War and UN, 48
 Virgin Islands of the US, 181
 Vitoria, Francisco de, 59
 Votes. *See under* General Assembly, voting procedure; Resolutions of General Assembly
 Voting patterns in General Assembly, 117–162. *See also* Majorities and minorities; Tools of analysis
 analysis of votes, 117
 CI in General Assembly, 120–160
 coincidences and discrepancies, 117–172
 consistency and contradictions, 33–42
 and contours of a new agenda, 160–162
 and emergence of majority, 127, 141–142, 147–151, 153–154
 and EU, 127, 136–138, 155
 five stages of, 142–160
 and gang of five, 28
 general trends, 1946–1996, 120–127
 impact of issues on CI, 123–124, 161
 and Israel, 127, 130, 133–135, 154
 and like-minded groups, 129–130, 141
 median in General Assembly, 120–127
 methodology, 117–120
 politicization of human rights, 145–147
 and regional groups, 120
 and relations among P-5, 127, 138–139, 154–155
 relative weight of issues, 127–129
 some signposts, 127–142
 and South Africa, 127, 130–131, 149–151
 and UK, 127, 134–136
 and US, 127, 130, 131–132
 and US/USSR confrontation, 127, 139–141
 Waldheim, Kurt, 76, 104. *See also* Secretary-General
 Warsaw Pact, 16, 17, 66, 78, 155
 Washington, D. C., 132
 Weapons of mass destruction, 64–65, 114, 115
West Side Story, 60
 Western European and Others group. *See under* Regional groups
 Western Sahara. *See* Spanish Sahara
 Western Samoa, 49
 Wilson, Woodrow, 54
 Windward Islands, 181
 Women, legal status of, 61, 74, 108, 115, 145, 202
 Working languages of UN. *See under* General Assembly
 World Decade for Cultural Development, 116
 World Federalists, 117
 World Health Organization, 70
 World Nature Charter, 116
 World Population Conference, 62
 World Trade Organization (WTO), 61
 World War I, 54, 163
 World War II, 9, 10, 49, 52, 65, 80, 163, 165
 Wyoming, 84
 Yemen (formerly Arab Republic of, and now Republic of), 36, 40, 41–42, 125, 133, 135, 146
 membership in UN, 7, 178
 negative votes cast by, 200
 union with Democratic Yemen, 9
 Yom Kippur War, 47
 Youth, 202
 Yugoslavia, 12, 13, 17, 19, 27, 28, 36, 42, 46, 50, 78, 102, 111, 114, 120, 125, 130, 133, 135, 141, 144, 145, 147, 148, 149, 172

- CI with other non-aligned, 207
- dissolution of and UN, 8
- human rights in, 114, 145–146
- membership in UN, 7, 178
- negative votes cast by, 200
- and regional groups, 16
- and suspension by General Assembly, 6, 201
- Zaire. *See* Democratic Republic of the Congo
- Zambia, 125, 148, 160, 181
 - CI with other non-aligned, 207
 - membership in UN, 7, 178
 - negative votes cast by, 200
- Zanzibar, 13, 178, 181
 - membership in UN, 7, 178
 - negative votes cast by, 200
 - union with Tanganyika, 7, 9
- Zimbabwe (formerly Southern Rhodesia), 77, 122, 125, 133, 182
 - CI with other non-aligned, 207
 - membership in UN, 8, 178
 - negative votes cast by, 200
- Zionism, 39, 40–42, 202
 - and racism resolution, 39, 40–42, 100
- Zones of peace, establishment of (Indian Ocean, South Atlantic and Antarctica), 115, 205

